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No one could have imagined in 1980 that the seemingly benign
savings and loan industry would evolve over ten years into a mon-
strous problem, and that the decade of the 1990s would begin with no
clear solution at hand. Yet, that is exactly what happened.
-James R. Barth & R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr.**
If recent political and public policy developments are any indica-
tion, financial institutions, both banks and thrifts, are ready for a reas-
sessment that will focus on community and consumer service ....
-M. Danny Wall.***
I. INTRODUCTION
Not since the Great Depression has the United States faced a
financial disaster as grave as the savings and loan crisis.' Analysts
estimate that the crisis will cost the Federal Government-and ulti-
mately American taxpayers-$500 billion dollars.2 The fallout from
the savings and loan disaster has stretched from Capitol Hill,3 the
** The Road from FIRREA to Deposit Insurance Reform, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 58
(1990) (arguing that the fundamental cause of the savings and loan crisis is deposit insurance).
*** The Future of the Thrift Industry, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 132 (1990) (suggesting an
inevitable reclassification of banks and savings and loans as "community" institutions in the
wake of the savings and loan crisis).
1. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Lobby into Limbo.- The Political Ecology of the Savings and
Loan Crisis, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 25 (1990) (claiming that the savings and loan crisis is
the "largest financial bailout in this nation's history").
2. See id. at 32. The estimated cost of the bailout varies, but the figures seem to rise with
each estimate. The United States General Accounting Office estimates the cost of the thrift
crisis "could be as much as $500 billion in the next 40 years." Testimony of Assistant
Comptroller General, The United States General Accounting Office, before the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Aug. 1, 1990. At the time
Congress enacted FIRREA, the Bush administration estimated that it would need $160 billion
to clean up failed institutions. F. Jean Wells, Savings Institutions and Their Regulatory
Environment Under P.L. 101-73 (Mar. 7, 1990) (on file with author). For more recent
estimates, see Paulette Thomas, Thrift Bailout to Require $100 Billion For Next 12 Months,
Bush Officials Say, WALL ST. J., July 31, 1990, at A2.
3. See generally MICHAEL WALDMAN, WHO ROBBED AMERICA? A CITIZEN'S GUIDE
TO THE SAVINGS AND LOAN SCANDAL (1990) (blaming the savings and loan crisis on
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White House,4 and Wall Street' to homeowners6 and depositors'
across the nation. William Seidman, former Chairman of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, predicts over 100,000 lawsuits stem-
ming from the crisis, many attempting to place liability on corporate
officers and directors for the failure of individual thrift institutions.'
The literature on the crisis is voluminous, with commentators blam-
ing industry failure on a variety of factors: deposit insurance, 9 fickle
regulatory policies,' 0 junk bonds," rising interest rates, 2 brokered
Congress); Michael Waldman, The S & L Collapse: The Cost of a Congress for Sale, 2 STAN. L.
& POL'v REV. 47 (1990) ("Congress is in crisis.... Perhaps the single most important factor
fueling mounting public disillusionment with Congress is the savings and loan crackup and
subsequent government bailout that was enacted in 1989.").
4. The involvement of President Bush's son Neil in a controversial thrift failure has
focused attention on the White House as a scapegoat for the thrift crisis. See Bob
Minzesheimer & Richard Wolf, Blame? It's Politics as Usual, USA TODAY, July 12, 1990, at
2A; Leo M. Katz, Neil Bush; Today, Begins Fight to Clear His Name; S&L Scandal Finds
Symbol in High Place, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 1990, at IA.
5. Perhaps the greatest symbol of failure on Wall Street closely related to the savings and
loan crisis is the failure of Drexel, Burnham & Lambert. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Milken,
91 Civ. No. 0433 (S.D.N.Y.) ("Milken, Complaint") (on file with author).
6. In fact, one of the primary purposes of FIRREA is to provide "a safe and stable
system of affordable housing finance." Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101(1), 103 Stat. 187 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1811 (West Supp. 1991)).
7. A particularly poignant example of the crisis' impact on depositors is Freedom
National Bank in Harlem. Freedom, a small, minority-owned bank was closed by regulators
in November, 1990. Initially, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation refused to reimburse
any depositors for accounts exceeding $100,000. Thirty-one charities maintained accounts in
Freedom in excess of the $100,000 cap. Eventually, after much pressure, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation agreed to pay fifty cents on the dollar for these accounts. See Stephanie
Strom, FDIC Offers to Aid Plan for Minority Owned Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, at 20.
8. Robert L. Mashek, Seidman Sees 100,000 Lawsuits From S&L Scandal, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1990, at 1.
9. See, e.g., James R. Barth & R. Dan Brumbaugh, The Rough Road From FIRREA to
Deposit Insurance Reform, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 58 (1990) (arguing that only deposit
insurance reform will cure the problems in the savings and loan industry); Charles E. Schumer
& J. Brian Graham, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 68 (1990) (claiming that reform in the deposit
insurance system is the key to preventing continued failure in the thrift industry).
10. See, e.g., Thomas Romer & Barry R. Weingast, Congress.- The Genesis of the Thrift
Crisis, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 37 (1990) (asserting that Congress, through a policy of
forbearance, permitted and even encouraged excessive managerial gambling in thrifts); R. DAN
BRUMBAUGH, JR., THRIFS UNDER SIEGE: RESTORING ORDER TO AMERICAN BANKING 40-
49 (1988) (describing the systematic deregulation of the savings and loan industry).
11. For an emotional discussion of the role of "junk bonds" as a cause of the savings and
loan crisis, see WALDMAN, supra note 3, at 40-44.
12. See BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 36-40; H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), 101st Cong.
(1989), at 91. The rising interest rate market of the late 1970s to early 1980s caused
"disintermediation," where depositors withdrew their accounts from limited interest paying
savings and loans and placed their money in lucrative market-sensitive instruments. Id.
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deposits, 13 a stagnant real estate market, 14 managerial abuse,'" even
moral failure. 16
The savings and loan crisis magnified the corporate ownership
and control problem and exposed the inability of the modem financial
institution to balance the competing interests of corporate actors.
Management attempted to serve a variety of masters-federal regula-
tors, depositors, home loan debtors, and shareholders-all with com-
peting goals. The traditional model of corporate governance--driven
by shareholder profit-maximization goals-was ill-equipped to
respond to the many actors in the financial institution community.' 7
Unfortunately, management in the end failed to serve even share-
holder ownership goals as thrift after thrift faced insolvency and
takeover. '8
At the heart of the savings and loan crisis is the debate on the
structural relationship between management and ownership in mod-
em corporations."' Commentators have questioned the viability of
the corporate form of business organization since Professors Berle and
Means' famous work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property.2°
Berle and Means argued that shareholder-owners are removed from
control by a distinct management wielding the majority of corporate
power.2' They concluded that the conflicting goals of shareholders
13. See George J. Bentson, An Analysis of the Causes of Savings & Loan Association
Failures, 3, 7 (Monograph Series, N.Y.U. 1985). According to Bertson, computer technology
facilitated brokered deposits permitting savings and loans to bid for investors located outside
their market areas. The increase in investor funds encouraged managerial risktaking. Id.
14. See NORMAN STRUNK & FRED CASE, WHERE DEREGULATION WENT WRONG: A
LOOK AT THE CAUSES BEHIND SAVINGS AND LOAN FAILURES IN THE 1980s 100-102 (1988).
By 1985, the real estate boom succumbed to overbuilding, causing defaults on many thrift
loans. Id.
15. H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), 101st Cong. (1989), at 95. "Poor thrift management
decisions have resulted in failure for hundreds of FSLIC insured thrifts." Id.
16. See Patricia A. Wenge, Introducing Morality to Thrift Decision Making, 2 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 125 (1990) (discussing managerial and regulatory moral responsibility for the
savings and loan crisis).
17. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1967). The Berle and Means thesis provides the baseline
structure of corporate fiduciary law that recognizes only the rights between shareholder-
owners and management. See infra part II.A.
18. Between 1980 and 1988, over five hundred savings and loans failed. S. REP. No. 19,
101st Cong. 1st Sess., at 2 (1989).
19. For an excellent overview of the corporate law debate, see Lucian A. Bebchuck,
Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom In Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395
(1989). Bebchuck outlines the issues in the debate between those who favor mandatory
corporate laws and those who favor enabling corporate laws that permit corporate actors to
contract out of corporate laws. Id.
20. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17.
21. Id. at 7-9.
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and management naturally resulting from the separation of ownership
from control created inefficiency, which affected the competitiveness
of the corporate form of business organization.22
Berle and Means, while describing the inherent conflict between
the modem corporation and traditional property notions, postulated a
new order where traditional property rights would give way to com-
munity obligation in a revamped corporate system. They claimed
that a community-sensitive economic order would better serve the
complexity of corporate relationships and its unique allocation of con-
trol over wealth. 2' Although Berle and Means' proposal for a
revamped corporate system is vague, they offered two suggestions to
forestall the demise of the corporate system.24 First, they argued that
community obligation should supersede the passive property rights of
the traditional shareholder-owner. 25  Second, Berle and Means pro-
posed a neutral, technocratic corporate system that balances a variety
of interests dictated by public policy rather than shareholder profit-
maximization goals.26
Significantly, the evolution of corporate fiduciary law tended to
resolve the Berle and Means conflict between management and own-
ership by seeking managerial accountability to shareholders rather
than to other corporate actors or the community.27 Concurrent with
the development of corporate fiduciary law, and since the publication
of The Modern Corporation and Private Property,28 three competing
theories of the corporation emerged: the coercionist model, 29 the con-
tractarian model,"° and the social responsibility model.3 ' The various
22. Id. at 9.
23. Id. at 311-12.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. "Before a fiduciary duty arises, an existing property right or equitable interest
supporting such a duty must exist. The obvious example is stock ownership." Simons v.
Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303-04 (Del. 1988).
28. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17.
29. See Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law and Science in the Corporate Field: A
Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530 (1989). Professor McChesney uses the term
"coercionist" to describe those scholars who advocate mandatory corporate laws. Coercionists
claim mandatory corporate laws are necessary to prevent management in a position of power
from coercing stockholder waiver of optional corporate laws designed to protect them from
managerial abuse. See infra notes 113-122 for examples of coercionist scholarship.
30. McChesney, supra note 29. "Contractarian" is the term used to describe those
scholars who argue that a diverse group of corporate actors should structure their
relationships through private contracting, rather than as dictated by mandatory corporate
laws. See infra notes 125-141 for examples of contractarian scholarship.
31. "Corporate social responsibility" describes the teachings of those scholars whose focus
is on increasing the social responsiveness and the public accountability of the modern
1992] FIRREA 1191
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theories of the corporation differ in their conceptualization of the cor-
poration and the form by which law regulates the relationship of cor-
porate actors.32
The coercionist model33 continues the Berle and Means thesis of
a corporation as an entity characterized by its inherent conflict
between shareholder-owners and controlling management. 34  Coer-
cionist commentators argue that mandatory rules should govern man-
agement because their interests may materially diverge from
corporation. For a general overview of corporate social responsibility, see Edwin M. Epstein,
Societal, Managerial and Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility - Product and
Process, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287 (1979). See infra notes 142-163 for examples of corporate
social responsibility scholarship.
32. The coercionist, contractarian, and corporate social responsibility models are neither
homogenous nor exclusive. For a description of the difficulty to identify a coherent coercionist
camp, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance In Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 n.l (1989). The contractarians, too, are
difficult to group coherently. Id. at n.2. Nor are the positions taken by the contractarians and
coercionists exclusive of each other. "No legal writer has suggested that corporation law is
exclusively mandatory or exclusively enabling. The issue is rather whether they see the glass
of water as half full or half empty." Id. Corporate social responsibility theorists, however, are
distinct from both coercionists and contractarians. At one extreme, free market contractarians
disagree with corporate social responsibility for its potential regulation of business. See Robert
Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations. A Contractual and Private Property Model, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1327 (1979); Robert W. Hamilton, Response, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1351 (1979).
Corporate social responsibility, with its recognition of community based on public policy,
presupposes a diverse group of actors affected by the business of corporations. This
recognition is similar to the contractarians' recognition of the multiplicity of actors in
corporations. Yet, coercionist mandatory accountability is sympathetic to corporate social
responsibility goals. Coercionists, however, presume managerial accountability only to
socially desirable shareholder ends. By contrast, corporate social responsibility theorists
presume managerial accountability to the community. "The basic question of corporate social
responsibility is . . . whether it is socially desirable for corporations organized for profit
voluntarily to identify and pursue social ends where this pursuit conflicts with the presumptive
shareholder desire to maximize profit." David Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social
Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1979). Furthermore, corporate social responsibility
theorists debate their own objectives. "The people who say they are discussing corporate
social responsibility are by no means all interested in the same questions, and they often seem
to be talking past each other." Id.
33. Advocates of the coercionist model include Professor Victor Brudney, Professor
Melvin Eisenberg, Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor William Cary, and Professor
Deborah DeMott. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric
of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of
Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal
Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory!
Enabling Balance In Corporate Law, supra note 32; William Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Deborah DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, DUKE L.J. 879 (1988). For a detailed
examination of the coercionist scholarship, see infra notes 113-122 and accompanying text.
34. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 7-9.
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shareholder interests. 3 Underlying the coercionists' proposal for
mandatory rules is a belief that market forces are insufficient to safe-
guard shareholder interests from self-interested management, which
without mandatory accountability rules, would not maximize share-
holder wealth.36 Therefore, coercionist scholars advocate legislative
or judicial rules aimed at alleviating the conflict inherent in the corpo-
rate structure by compelling managerial accountability, forcing man-
agement to act in the best interests of shareholder-owners.
The contractarian model 37 rejects the traditional separation
between ownership and control.38 Instead, contractarians envision
the corporation as a bundle of contractual arrangements among the
various actors comprising the corporation. 39 A contractarian analysis
of corporate ownership interests considers not only the interest of
shareholders-owners, but also the interests of bondholders, employ-
ees, and other creditors who form the corporation through contrac-
tual arrangements.4' Rather than imposing mandatory accountability
rules, contractarian scholars advocate a system of enabling rules that
permit the contracting parties to opt out of corporate default laws.4
The contractarians argue that because the contracting parties will
agree unanimously to the contractual arrangement that maximizes
firm wealth, market forces will resolve any potential conflict between
controlling management and the variety of corporate investors.42
35. Top management has little incentive to constrain their exercise of corporate control.
Management may seek to maintain and enhance their own positions at the expense of
shareholder profits. In a mandatory rule regime, the legislature would set and courts would
enforce strict rules mandating management accountability to shareholders. In such a regime,
management could coerce shareholder waiver of corporate accountability rules. Eisenberg,
The Structure of Corporate Law, supra note 33, at 1141-42.
36. Management would rather enhance their own power and position. Id.
37. The leading advocates of the contractarian model are Judge Frank Easterbrook and
Professor Daniel Fischel. See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Voting in
Corporate Law, 26 J.L. AND ECON. 395 (1983); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989). For a detailed examination of the
contractarian scholarship, see infra notes 125-141 and accompanying text.
38. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 7-9.
39. Contractarians argue that corporations are comprised of diverse agreements among a
variety of economic actors related to the corporate business. The sum of the contractual actors
equals the corporation under the contractarian vision. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, supra note 37, at 1426-27.
40. Contractarians argue that actors other than shareholders-creditors-are as much
"owners" of the corporation as are shareholders. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate
Law, supra note 37, at 396.
41. An enabling rule regime would recognize managerial accountability to a variety of
contractually related corporate actors. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra
note 37, at 1418.
42. Contractarians argue that courts and legislatures are inefficient regulators of the
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Corporate federalism is the major battleground in the debate
between the contractarians and coercionists.4 a The federalism debate
pits the coercionists, who advocate federal minimum corporate stan-
dards, against the contractarians, who argue that market forces dic-
tate the most efficient corporate laws." Coercionists favor federal
minimum standards because they argue that state corporate laws are a
"race to the bottom" among states to enact progressively permissive
corporate laws.45 As a result, individual states enact laws responsive
to management, but unresponsive to the goal of wealth maximiza-
tion.4 6 Coercionists advocate mandatory federal minimum laws to
prevent the states' enactment of exceedingly forgiving corporate laws,
contrary to shareholders' interests. 4 ' Contractarians, however,
believe that market forces obviate the need for federal minimum stan-
dards.48 They argue that corporate managers, like owners, "have
strong incentives to maximize the market value of their services." '49
Market incentives-compensation packages, stock option plans,
mergers, and tender offers-motivate managers to avoid agency costs,
leading to the maximization of shareholder wealth.50 The contractari-
ans thus favor state enabling regulations that permit the development
of the most efficient contractual arrangements between corporate
owners and management.5"
While the coercionists and the contractarians have dominated
the corporate scholarship debate, a third model, corporate social
responsibility, has emerged. 2 This model, grounded in the famous
dialogue between Berle and E. Merrick Dodd 53 and the conclusions
relationship between corporate actors. Free-market contracting, according to the
contractarians, dictates the most efficient relationships between corporate actors. Id.
43. See Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance In Corporate Law: An Essay on the
Judicial Role, supra note 32, at 1618-19. For a detailed examination of the corporate
federalism debate, see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
44. Id.
45. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, supra note 33.
46. Id.
47. See Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, supra note 33, at 1741-42.
48. See supra note 42.
49. Daniel Fischel, "The Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw.U. L. REV. 913, 919 (1982).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 37.
52. The corporate social responsibility model is explained infra text accompanying notes
142-163.
53. The dialogue between Berle and Dodd took place in the Harvard Law Review. See
Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E.
Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932);
Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1365
(1932). For an overview of the dialogue, see Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on
1194
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reached by Berle and Means in The Modern Corporation and Private
Property,54 envisions corporations governed by social responsibility.
Berle and Means postulated a revamped corporate system where
traditional property rights would give way to community obligation."
They suggested that a system of "community obligation" and a "neu-
tral technocratic" management would divert corporate power from
service to the traditional shareholder property right to the "larger
interests of society on the basis of public policy."' 56 In the years since
the publication of the Berle and Means thesis, the social responsibility
school has proposed an increase in the "social responsiveness and
public accountability" of the modern corporation." Yet, despite the
contribution of social responsibility scholars, few courts or legisla-
tures have recognized this model as a viable theory of corporate gov-
ernance. Instead, the primary objective of corporate law has been to
assure the accountability of management to shareholders.58
Courts and legislatures have developed corporate fiduciary law
from the Berle and Means "separation of ownership from control"
thesis. The development of the duty of care,59 the business judgment
rule,' and the duty of loyalty6 reflects judicial and legislative con-
cern for the potential conflict between the control aspirations of man-
agement and the ownership goals of shareholders. The duty of care
seeks to ensure management's responsible and cautious utilization of
shareholder wealth in conducting the affairs of the corporation. The
duty of loyalty protects shareholders from potentially self-interested
dealings by management. The business judgment rule operates as a
check on the duty of care, preventing undesirable restraints on mana-
gerial exercise of good faith business decisions. Although the corpo-
rate fiduciary regime sought to alleviate the conflict between
management and shareholders, the opportunity for managerial abuse
remained. Responding to perceived excessive managerial autonomy,
the Delaware Supreme Court worked a major shift in the corporate
the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1969). For a detailed examination
of this debate, see infra notes 145-160 and accompanying text.
54. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 311-12.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See generally Epstein, supra note 31. Professor Epstein provides "an analytical
overview and framework on the concept of social responsibility." Id. at 1287.
58. See Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303.04 (Del. 1988).
59. For an exposition of the duty of care, see infra part III.B. 1.
60. For an exposition of the business judgment rule, see infra part III.B.2.
61. For an exposition of the duty of loyalty, see infra part III.B.3.
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fiduciary regime with its 1985 decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom 62
("Trans Union ").
In Trans Union, the Delaware court eviscerated the business
judgment rule, and for the first time permitted judicial review of man-
agement's good faith business decisions. 63 The Trans Union court
ruled that management, in the exercise of a corporate decision, must
avail itself of all readily available information." Trans Union effec-
tively required Delaware courts to review the steps management had
taken to acquire relevant information in making its business decisions,
thus permitting the courts to second-guess managerial decisions.65 In
response to Trans Union, rising damage awards in corporate fiduciary
litigation, and difficulties in the corporate insurance market, liability
insurers for directors and officers raised premiums to exorbitant levels
and placed a moratorium on the issuance of new policies.66 As a
result of the Trans Union liability crisis, the Delaware legislature
enacted Title 8, section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code,67 permitting
Delaware corporations to limit directors' liability for breaches of care
in their corporate charters. 61 In a new "race to the bottom," a major-
ity of states followed Delaware's lead and enacted similar liability lim-
itation statutes.69
While state statutory regimes returned corporate management to
the uninhibited decisionmaking days before Trans Union by eliminat-
ing excessive managerial liability, the fickle economic market of the
late 1970s and 1980s wreaked havoc on corporate financial institu-
tions.7° Savings and loans, traditionally a conservative regulated
industry, suffered dramatically, as the portrait of the thrift heyday
changed from Frank Cappra's It's A Wonderful Life7 1 to the free-
wheeling failure of Gordon Gekko in Wall Street.72 As federal take-
overs and the number of insolvent thrifts increased, the cost of the
62. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). For a detailed examination of Trans Union and its effects,
see infra part III.C. I.
63. Trans Union, 488 A.2d at 872.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 36-42 (1989) (discussing the Delaware
legislative reaction to Trans Union).
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
68. Id. For a detailed examination of state statutory limitations on managerial liability,
see infra part III.C.2.
69. See infra notes 313-321.
70. See BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 36-56; STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14, at 98-106.
For a detailed discussion of the development of the savings and loan crisis, see infra part IV.
71. IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE, (Republic Studios 1947).
72. WALL STREET, (CBS/Fox 1987).
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federal bailout of the savings and loan industry soared.73 Taxpayer
resentment of the bailout and the concurrent political scandals74 sent
politicians searching for a solution.
In 1989, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform
Recovery and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA").75 FIRREA imple-
ments a new regulatory framework designed to resurrect the thrift
industry by creating a safe and stable fiscal environment for deposi-
tory institutions.76  However, FIRREA abolishes the post-Trans
Union state statutory regimes that protected corporate management 77
from potentially enormous liability. Now, with potentially great lia-
bility under FIRREA, the viability of effective corporate leadership is
once again in question in the limited, though important, context of
federally insured depository institutions.7" Perhaps most significantly,
FIRREA marks a dramatic departure from traditional corporate gov-
ernance law founded on the Berle and Means thesis. 79 FIRREA's
fiduciary and regulatory framework dismisses the conflict between
shareholders and controlling management as the dominant corporate
relationship. 0 In its place, FIRREA creates a regulated management
whose primary fiduciary duties are no longer owed to traditional own-
ers."1 In fact, FIRREA's fiduciary obligations motivate managerial
interests that conflict directly with the goal of shareholder wealth
maximization. 2 FIRREA's corporate governance regime takes a
revisionist approach to the coercionist and contractarian models and
implicitly recognizes the community based goals of the corporate
73. Recent estimates place the cost of the Federal bailout at nearly $500 billion. See G.
Christian Hill, A Never Ending Story: An Introduction to the S&L Symposium, 2 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 23 (1990) (calculating the cost of the crisis based on Reports by the Office of
Management and Budget, the General Accounting Office and the U.S. League of Savings
Institutions).
74. Bob Minzesheimer & Jim McTague, S&L Mess: How Deep is the Anger: Politicians
'Scramblingfor Cover,' USA TODAY, July 13, 1990, at IA; Peter Riddell, Bush Starts to Suffer
From the Political Fall.Out; Savings and Loan Crisis, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 4, 1990, at 17;
Jacqueline Frank, Savings and Loan Crisis Erupts into Political Warfare, REUTERS, July 15,
1990; Nathaniel C. Nash, Politics and the Crisis in the Savings and Loan Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1990, at D19, col. 3.
75. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15
U.S.C.).
76. For the "purposes" of FIRREA, see id. § 101, 103 Stat. 187 (1989) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1811 Note (West Supp. 1992)). For a general overview of FIRREA, see infra part V.
77. See FIRREA § 212(k), 103 Stat. 243 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (West
Supp. 1992)). For a detailed examination of FIRREA's fiduciary regime, see infra part V.B.
78. See infra part V.
79. See infra part VI.
80. See infra part VI.
81. See infra part VI.
82. See infra part VI.
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social responsibility model.8 3
This Comment contends that the new fiduciary regime estab-
lished under FIRREA, albeit a laudable attempt to harness manage-
rial impulses through community obligation, is a flawed solution to
corporate governance problems in financial institutions. It constrains
corporate decisionmaking by holding management to an unreasonable
standard of care that inevitably deters qualified directors from serving
on corporate boards. Finally, by departing from traditional share-
holder wealth maximization goals and imposing community obliga-
tion on the management of savings and loan institutions, FIRREA's
fiduciary principles place thrifts at a competitive disadvantage in rela-
tion to other financial service corporations, despite a recent trend in
corporate law obligating managerial sensitivity to community goals.
Part II of this Comment introduces the Berle and Means' thesis
and the theories of corporate governance that have emerged from it:
the coercionist model, the contractarian model, and the corporate
social responsibility model. The Berle and Means conflict between
ownership and control in the modem corporation forms the underly-
ing premise for the debate amongst the proponents of these theories.
Part II also considers another conflict in corporate structure: the con-
flict between shareholder-owners and creditor-"owners." Although
ownership conflict was a dominant theme in the contractarian and
corporate social responsibility models, the fiduciary regime prior to
FIRREA did not recognize ownership rights other than those of
shareholders.
Part III discusses the traditional corporate governance regime
which has focused almost exclusively on the conflict between manage-
ment and shareholders. Part III outlines the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty, fiduciary obligations that emerged to hold directors
and officers accountable to shareholders. The business judgment rule,
also discussed in Part III, traditionally has ensured discretion in man-
agerial decisionmaking. To illustrate the significance of the business
judgment rule in corporate governance, Part III analyzes the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's evisceration of the business judgment rule in
Trans Union and the immediate state legislative responses limiting
director liability.
Part IV reviews the evolution and decline of the thrift industry
that led to the enactment of FIRREA. It also discusses the new regu-
latory structure under FIRREA, culminating with an exposition of
FIRREA's fiduciary provisions.
83. See infra part VI.
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Part V critiques FIRREA, within the traditional separation of
banking and commerce, and the theories of corporate governance that
have evolved since the Berle and Means' thesis. FIRREA's fiduciary
provisions acknowledge corporate actors other than managers and
shareholders and impose fiduciary duties owed to the community
based on public policy. Part V concludes that Congress' attempts in
FIRREA to hold the management of savings and loans to a commu-
nity fiduciary standard hinders the resurrection of a viable thrift
industry. Savings and loans will not be able to attract qualified direc-
tors, inevitably limiting efficient competition with other unconstrained
institutions.
Finally, Part VI considers alternative fiduciary standards that
might better promote the revival of the savings and loan industry.
This Comment concludes by identifying and discussing a trend in cor-
porate law that perhaps realizes the Berle and Means prophecy of an
economic order based on public policy and community rather than
individual shareholder profit goals.
II. COMPETING THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. The Berle and Means Thesis, the Modern Corporation, and the
Separation of Ownership and Control
Nearly sixty years ago, Adolf Berle, Jr. 4 and Gardiner C.
Means85 described the impact of the modern corporation on tradi-
tional notions of private property in The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property.86 Building upon the classical economic assumption that
individual property owners, with the incentive of personal profit and a
fear of loss, will allocate their property to its most efficient use,87 Berle
84. Adolf Berle, Jr., at the time a professor at Columbia University Law School, was
appointed research director for a project to investigate the modem corporation's impact on
society. The Social Science Research Council of America funded the project in coordination
with the Columbia University Law School. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at XXXIX.
85. Gardiner Means' contribution underscores the interdisciplinary nature of Berle and
Means' work. Means, an economist, provided a statistical and economic analysis of the impact
of large modem corporations on society. Berle explains his decision to hire Means: "the
theory being that a lawyer and an economist working hand in hand might secure a more fertile
result than either working alone." Id.
86. Id.
87. Berle and Means describe the traditional utilization of property as driven by self-
interest:
(T]he organization under the system of private enterprise has rested upon the
self-interest of the property owner . . . . It has been assumed that, if the
individual is protected in the right both to use his own property as he sees fit and
to receive the full fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for profits, can be
relied upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any industrial property
he may possess.
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and Means argued that large-scale public corporations,"8 by separat-
ing ownership and control,8 9 will not use private property efficiently. 90
Management in control of corporate wealth does not have a signifi-
cant ownership interest; it merely allocates corporate property as a
conglomerate of individual shareholder wealth. 9' Because managers
do not experience ownership risk/reward effects, they have at best a
marginal incentive to maximize shareholder wealth. 92 "The separa-
tion of ownership from control produces a condition, where the inter-
ests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge,
and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the
use of power disappear." 93 Berle and Means' recognition of the struc-
tural inefficiency of the modern corporation formed the basis for the
debate over a corporate governance resolution to the ownership and
Id. at 9.
88. Essential to the Berle and Means thesis is their characterization of the new corporate
economy. According to Berle and Means, the new corporate form of business organization
differed drastically from the traditional business venture. Prior to the advent of the modem
corporation, private enterprise was historically limited by the purse of individual owner/
managers. Berle and Means defined the modem corporation as "great aggregations in which
... workers and property... are combined through the corporate mechanism into a single
producing organization under unified control and management." Id. at 4.
89. Berle and Means argue that the new corporate system results in a "fundamental
change.., in the economic relationships which rest upon" changes in the traditional notion of
property. Id. at 8. "Physical control over the instruments of production has been surrendered
in ever growing degree to centralized groups who manage property in bulk, supposedly ... for
the benefit of the security holders." Id. As a result, Berle and Means claim that the corporate
economy visits "the dissolution of the old atom of ownership into its component parts, control
and beneficial ownership." Id.
90. Berle and Means suggest that the modem corporate economy subverts the individual
property ownership profit incentive.
Those who control the destinies of the typical modem corporation own so
insignificant a fraction of the company's stock that the returns from running the
corporation profitably accrue to them in only a very minor degree. The
stockholders, on the other hand, to whom the profits of the corporation go,
cannot be motivated by those profits to a more efficient use of the property, since
they have surrendered all disposition of it to those in control of the enterprise.
The explosion of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old assumption
that the quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its effective
use. It consequently challenges the fundamental economic principle of individual
initiative in industrial enterprise.
Id. at 9.
91. Id. at 4.
92. Id. at 7. Berle and Means state that the traditional logic of property does not apply to
the modem corporation with its separation of ownership and control. In the corporate form of
business organization the "two functions of risk and control are, in the main, performed by
two different groups of people." Id. at 300-01. As a result "one group of individuals . . .
performs the function of risktakers and suppliers of capital, while a separate group exercises
control and ultimate management." Id.
93. Id. at 7.
control problems in the modem corporate economy. 94
The ownership and control split led Berle and Means to question
the extent to which corporate law should protect the interests of own-
ers who have surrendered control of their wealth to management. 95
Must we not, therefore, recognize that we are no longer dealing
with property in the old sense? Does the traditional logic of prop-
erty still apply? Because an owner who also exercises control over
his wealth is protected in the full receipt of the advantages derived
from it, must it necessarily follow that an owner who has surren-
dered control of his wealth should likewise be protected to the
full? ' 96
While Berle and Means suggest a corporate reality where owner-
ship wealth is unprotected from potent corporate control powers, they
do not advocate full protection of shareholder property rights.97
Instead, Berle and Means foretell a future where public policy and
community obligation would constrain management.9"
94. See Thomas G. Moore, Introduction, 26 J.L. & ECON. 235 (1983) (discussing the
influence of the Modem Corporation and Private Property on the literature of capitalist
economics).
95. Berle and Means ask whether the traditional purpose and direction of ownership profit
requires a societal or legal pressure compelling corporate business goals for the benefit of
shareholders. Because of the temptation for management to act in self-interest to the
detriment of shareholders, Berle and Means question whether "social and legal pressure
should be applied" in an effort to insure corporate operation primarily in the interests of the
.owners' or whether such pressure shall be applied in the interests of some other or wider
group. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 293.
96. Id. at 297-98 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at 310-11. In fact, Berle and Means argue that shareholder-owners are
inappropriate monitors of management. Nonetheless, Berle and Means acknowledge the
possibility of a trusteeship role for corporate management, and in the absence of other
protection, they favor its use to prevent corporate plundering. To Berle and Means, a
corporate trustee relationship is the "lesser evil" of a choice between protecting shareholders
and granting management untrammeled authority.
Choice between strengthening the rights of passive property owners, or leaving a
set of uncurbed powers in the hands of control therefore resolves itself into a
purely realistic evaluation of different results. We might elect the relative
certainty and safety of a trust relationship in favor of a particular group within
the corporation, accompanied by a possible diminution of enterprise. Or, we
may grant the controlling group free rein, with the corresponding danger of a
corporate oligarchy coupled with the probability of an era of corporate
plundering.
Id. This passage presumably provides the basis for which corporate governance has sought to
protect ownership from management vested with fiduciary obligation. For a discussion of the
corporate trusteeship theory, see infra part II.A.2. Still, Berle and Means claim that a coher-
ent system of community obligation would best resolve the separation of ownership and con-
trol. Id. at 312. See infra note 98.
98. The separation of ownership and control facilitates a system of community obligation,
because passive shareholder-owners relinquish their property and managers operate the
corporation not exclusively for the shareholder owners. Id. at 311-12. Both ownership and
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Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand
against the paramount interests of the community .. . . Rigid
enforcement of property rights as a temporary protection against
plundering by control would not stand in the way of the modifica-
tion of these rights in the interest of other groups. When a convinc-
ing system of community obligations is worked out and is generally
accepted, in that moment the passive property right of today must
yield before the larger interests of society .... 99
Hence, in order to achieve an effective corporate economy responsive
to community obligation, Berle and Means proposed that manage-
ment act as corporate "foremen" directing the allocation of corporate
wealth in the interests of public policy.1°°
It is conceivable, - indeed it seems almost essential if the Corpo-
rate System is to survive, - that the "control" of the great corpo-
rations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing
a variety of claims by various groups in the community and
assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of
public policy rather than private cupidity. '0
Despite Berle and Means' prediction that management would inevita-
bly evolve into a "neutral technocracy" serving the interests of the
control "have cleared the way for the claims of a group far wider" in application. As a result
"[t]hey have placed the community in a position to demand that the modem corporation serve
not alone the owners or the control but all society." Id.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. As "foremen," corporate managers would conduct the business of the corporation not
solely for the benefit of shareholder-owners but for a diverse set of interests. In such a
corporate system, community interests would largely subsume the interests of shareholder-
owners.
Should the corporate leaders, for example, set forth a program comprising fair
wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and stabilization
of business, all of which would divert a portion of the profits from the owners of
passive property, and should the community generally accept such a scheme as a
logical and human solution of industrial difficulties, the interests of passive
property owners would have to give way. Courts would almost of necessity be
forced to recognize the result, justifying it by whatever of the many legal theories
they might choose.
Id. For a discussion of FIRREA's imposition of a "foreman" model of management based on
community obligation, see infra part IV.C.2.
101. Id. at 312-13 (emphasis added). In conclusion, Berle and Means analogized the rise of
the modem corporation and the resulting concentration of economic power to small quasi-
states. Berle and Means claim:
The rise of the modem corporation has brought a concentration of economic
power which can compete on equal terms with the modem state--economic
power versus political power, each strong in its own field. . . . The law of
corporations, accordingly, might well be considered as a potential constitutional
law for the new economic state, while business practice is increasingly assuming
the aspect of economic statesmanship.
Id. at 313.
community rather than those of individual shareholders, corporate
fiduciary law developed to protect shareholders from potential abuse
or negligence by controlling management. 102
Since the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private
Property,113 scholars have grappled with the extent to which fiduciary
and other corporate laws should protect shareholder wealth from the
potential abuse of corporate managers.i°0 Three competing schools of
thought evolved: the coercionist school, the contractarian school, and
the corporate social responsibility school. 105 The coercionist school"°6
and the contractarian school1 °7 each propose a different role for cor-
porate law in the governance of modem corporations.108 They also
disagree on the answer to the Berle and Means rhetorical question:
whether corporate law should protect the rights of shareholders who
voluntarily surrender ownership decisionmaking to the corporation's
controlling managers." 9 The third vision of corporate governance,
corporate social responsibility, 10 builds upon Berle and Means'
prophecy of corporate community obligation served by a neutral tech-
nocratic management.1 ' The corporate social responsibility school
conceives of a system in which societal and community obligation
constrains both managerial control and the economic power of the
102. Seemingly, corporate law chose the lesser of two evils. See supra note 97. Courts have
attempted to reconcile the relationship between corporate management and ownership since at
least the mid-eighteenth century. See Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (1742)
where the court described corporate management as one "of a mixed nature .... Committee
men are most properly agents... and... are within the case of common trustees." Id. at 644-
45. An early American case imposing fiduciary duties on management is Percy v. Millaudon,
8 Mart. (N.S.) 68 (L.A. 1829). For an excellent historical examination of Charitable Corp.,
Percy, and the fiduciary law governing corporate management, see Marcia M. McMurray, An
Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty and the Business Judgment Rule,
40 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1987). See also infra part III.B.
103. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17.
104. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 66, at 4. Bradley and Schipani query the survival
of the modern corporation. "There has always been a certain tension among students of the
modern corporation as to whether legal rules or economic forces are more responsible for the
corporation's continued existence."
105. These "schools" are simplified categories of general scholarship and are by no means
perfectly homogeneous. See supra note 32. Nonetheless certain general observations can be
made to facilitate the study of corporate organization.
106. See infra part II.A.l.
107. See infra part II.A.2.
108. For an overview of the coercionist-contractarian debate, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The
Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989); see also
Coffee, The Mandatory Enabling Balance in Corporate Law, supra note 32, for an overview of
the scholarship debate. Professor Coffee also attempts to reconcile the two schools based on
the judicial role in the debate. Id. at 1621.
109. See supra note 17.
110. See infra part II.A.3.
I 1. See supra part II.A.
19921 FIRREA 1203
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW (Vol. 46:1187
modem corporation.' 1 2
1. THE COERCIONIST MODEL
Coercionist scholars1 13 view the corporate structure traditionally,
as an entity with two sets of actors-shareholders and managers-
engaged in an inherent conflict."1 4 The coercionists recognize, as did
Berle and Means, the tension created by the conflicting interests of
ownership and control.1 5 In response to the Berle and Means' rhe-
112. See infra part II.A.3.
113. Advocates of the coercionist model include Professor Victor Brudney, Professor
Melvin Eisenberg, Professor John Coffee, Jr., Professor William Cary, and Professor Deborah
DeMott and Robert C. Clark. See ROBERT C. CLARK, AGENCY COSTS VERSUS FIDUCIARY
DUTIES IN PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (J. Pratt & R.
Zeckhauser eds. 1985); Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites and Traditions in the Making of
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.REv. 1703 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure
of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of
Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1449 (1989), Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1549 (1989); Brudney, supra note 33; Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law,
supra note 33; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and
the New Trend Toward de Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 789
(1987); Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law, supra note 32; Cary, supra
note 33; DeMott, supra note 33.
114. See Brudney, supra note 33; Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, supra note
33; Clark, Contract, Elites and Traditions, supra note 113. Professors Brudney, Eisenberg and
Clark repudiate the contractual analysis and focus on the structural conflict between
shareholders and management.
The prevailing structure of corporate governance gives corporate management
substantial discretion to reward itself and to satisfice-that is, to limit its input at
the cost of realizable corporate wealth .... [Mlanagement's discretion remains
significant in terms of its power to divert assets to itself, and more than trivial in
terms of its power to refrain from maximizing shareholder wealth.
Brudney, supra note 33, at 1443-44. Professor Eisenberg asserts that corporate law protects
shareholders from management. "In short, corporation law taken as a whole.., contains a
significant number of core mandatory rules to govern divergences of interest between top man-
agers and shareholders." Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, supra note 33, at 1485.
Professor Clark analyzes corporate governance in the context of traditional rulemaking.
Clark, Contract, Elites and Traditions, supra note 113, at 1704. He argues that the contractari-
ans' failure to acknowledge the non-contractual basis for legal rules is "misguided." Id. at
1746. "In the practice of law and in the actual generation of proposals for legal change, the
role of elite groups is decisive... Moreover, both judicial and legislative lawmaking activities
are intensely traditional in character." Id. Professor Clark's recognition of the importance of
the "elites" and "traditional" models of rule-making implicitly recognizes the ownership/con-
trol conflict as both models rely on the shareholder-management dichotomy as the basis for
rule-making. For Professor Clark's identification of the various methods of rulemaking, see id.
at 1712.
115. Professor Eisenberg identifies several conflicts between shareholders and management.
As in any principal-agent relationship ... the interest of shareholders and
managers also diverge. All agents have a potential interest in working at a slack
pace and in avoiding the effort and discomfort involved in adapting to changed
circumstances .... This is the problem known as shirking. All agents have a
1204
torical question, coercionist commentators such as Professor Victor
Brudney and Melvin Eisenberg answer "yes," and propose core fidu-
ciary rules unalterable by management.1 16 They therefore advocate
corporate laws that safeguard shareholder-owners from potential
abuse by managers vested with power to control corporate strategy."17
To protect shareholders, Brudney, Eisenberg, and others favor a
body of corporate law composed of mandatory rules."' They argue
that corporate management, if left to make its own rules, would maxi-
potential interest in diverting the principal's assets to their own use through
unfair self-dealing. This is the problem of traditional conflicts of interest.
Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 1471.
Professor Brudney also warns of the divergence of interest between ownership and man-
agement. "Not even those who believe the separation of ownership and control in the modern
corporation to be the unfolding of a grand scheme of efficiency doubt the ... significant con-
flicts between management's interest and the investors interest in maximizing share values."
Brudney, supra note 33, at 1426-27 (footnotes omitted).
Even Professor Gordon, while explicitly rejecting the rationale of investor protection for
mandatory corporate law, claims that mandatory corporate law will protect shareholders from
the coercive forces of management. He argues that "investor protection no longer justifies
mandatory corporate law, because in well-functioning capital markets sophisticated investors
get what they pay for and unsophisticated investors can free ride. Nevertheless, mandatory
terms can guarantee a certain level of shareholder protection." Gordon, supra note 113, at
1570-71. Furthermore, Gordon suggests the need for mandatory laws "to protect investors"
from abusive managerial amendment of the corporate charter. "[I]nsiders can exploit their
advantages to obtain approval even for wealth-reducing amendments. From this flows an
argument for mandatory corporate law..." Id. at 1374-75.
116. Eisenberg answers with an authoritative "yes" to the Berle and Means rhetorical
question:
[Top managers of publicly held corporations have little incentive to adopt rules
that put constraints on their own positions. The core fiduciary and structural
rules that govern material divergences of interest of top managers in publicly
held corporations, therefore, should be neither determined nor subject to
material variation by the action of managers or managerial organs. The reason
for this principle .... is that in this as in other areas of law, agents whose
interests may materially diverge from the interests of their principals should not
have the power to unilaterally determine or materially vary the rules that govern
those divergences of interest.
Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 1473-74. Professor Brudney also answers "yes" and observes and
questions the efficacy of the shift in corporate law away from mandatory rules. "Certainly, the
effect has been to offer investors considerably less protection against diversion of assets by
management than would the classic law of agency." Brudney, supra note 33, at 1435.
117. See supra note 116.
118. Professor Eisenberg defines mandatory rules as those governing "defined issues in a
manner that cannot be varied by corporate actors." Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 1461.
Mandatory rules, according to Eisenberg, differ from enabling rules which "give legal effect to
rules that corporate actors adopt in a specified manner" . . . and from default rules which
"govern defined issues unless corporate actors adopt other rules in a specified manner." Id.
Historically, mandatory laws have been a fundamental component of corporate laws. See
generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 511-25 (2d ed. 1985).
Prior to the enactment of FIRREA, however, state corporate law had increasingly evolved to
reflect the "enabling" approach suggested by the contractarians. For a discussion of the
contractarian approach, see infra part II.A.2.
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mize managerial power rather than shareholder wealth.' 19 Without
mandatory accountability, management-vested with economic
power and superior information--effectively could coerce shareholder
waiver of constraints on managerial power. Managers would thereby
enhance their own position rather than shareholder wealth. 120  A
mandatory rule regime, according to coercionists, would protect
shareholders from management's unconstrained bureaucratic
rulemaking, and would impose shareholder wealth maximization
goals on management. 121
Some coercionist scholars advocate federal minimum corporate
governance standards. 122 Federal standards, they claim, are needed to
119. See supra notes 114-116. Professor Gordon defines four types of mandatory corporate
rules: (1) Procedural rules, the housekeeping provisions of corporate law, which include
provisions such as notice of shareholder meetings; (2) power allocating rules, which govern the
balance of power between directors and shareholders. Examples include rules that define the
managerial role of the board, shareholder voting rights, and shareholder removal rights;
(3) economic transformative rules, which provide for a mandatory statutory approach to
mergers, sale of assets, and corporate dissolution; and (4) fiduciary rules, which govern the
relationship among controlling shareholders and officers and directors. Gordon, supra note
113, at 1591-93. This Comment focuses on Professor Gordon's "category 4," fiduciary rules.
However, for fear of oversimplification through categorization, it is perhaps best to view the
fiduciary rules discussed in this Comment within the context of Professor Gordon's categories
1-3. After all, procedural rules may mold the relationship and knowledge of the respective
corporate actors. Professor Gordon's power allocating category is particularly important
because the role of the board of directors and shareholder voting rights are the main
playground for the fiduciary relationships of corporate organization. Furthermore, Professor
Gordon's economic transformative category is usually the center of abuse of 'fiduciary
relationships where the corporate actors, particularly management, seek to derive economic
gain at the expense of the corporation. Therefore, for the purpose of this Comment, the core
corporate rules governing the relationship of corporate actors are fiduciary duties, understood
within the context of other rules governing the respective roles and relationships of
shareholders and officers and directors.
120. Eisenberg identifies three types of conflicts of interest. The first two, "shirking" and
"traditional conflicts of interest" are discussed supra note 115. The third and most significant
conflict of interest, which Eisenberg defines as "positional conflicts," occurs when managers
subordinate shareholder power to aggrandize their own managerial power.
Because of ... [their] ... relative autonomy, and the range of discretion that it
leads to, top corporate managers have the power to give expression to still a third
potential divergence of interest; an interest in maintaining and enhancing their
positions even at the shareholders' expense. I will refer to instances of this type
of divergence of interest as positional conflicts.
Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 1471-72 (footnotes omitted). Eisenberg identifies several manifes-
tations of positional conflicts. For instance, managers may restrict the monitoring of their
performance and limit the facility of their removal from office. In addition, managers may
seek to increase the corporate size to the detriment of shareholder wealth as a means of
increasing and perpetuating their managerial power. Managers may also attempt to maximize
certain corporate resources over which they exercise control, notwithstanding shareholder
wealth maximization goals. Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 1472.
121. Historically, state legislatures provided the impetus for enactment of corporate laws
protecting shareholders from unrestrained managerial power. See infra part III.C.2.
122. The basis for the federalism debate in corporate law is the seminal article by Professor
FIRREA
curb the "race to the bottom" among states to attract large corpora-
tions (and their tax revenue) by enacting permissive corporate laws
favoring management over shareholders. 2 ' Federal minimum stan-
dards would provide a baseline for state enactment of corporate laws
and would safeguard shareholders from the abusive power of manag-
ers whose accountability diminishes as states seek to outdo each other
in attracting tax revenue.1 24
2. THE CONTRACTARIAN MODEL
Contractarians reject the Berle and Means' thesis of the separa-
tion of interest between managers and shareholder-owners in the
modem corporation.1 25  Instead, they envision a corporation com-
Cary setting forth his "race to the bottom" thesis. He claimed that states compete for firm
incorporation-and thus corporate tax returns-by enacting corporate laws favorable to
management. The question raised by Cary is whether this state statutory responsiveness to
management maximizes firm and ownership wealth. Professor Cary and others suggest the
need for national corporation laws to constrain state legislatures from favoring management
power rather than shareholder wealth. Cary, supra note 33, at 664, 696-701. Although
reaction to Cary's article was generally favorable, others rejected his thesis. Professor Ralph
Winter, for example, claimed that competitive markets would constrain managers from
incorporation in states adverse to shareholders interest because the per-share value of stock in
corporations found in permissive states would decline. Shareholders, alienated by managerial
decisions against their interests, would question the job ability of management. Fear for their
positions would therefore lead management to a statutory environment favoring shareholders.
Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). Other market proponents suggest that "product, capital and labor
markets-constrain managers to further shareholders' interests. Accordingly, in their view,
conflict between investors and managers over the content of state laws is largely illusory, and
the laws that are promulgated can best be explained as mechanisms for maximizing equity
share prices." Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate In Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO
L. REV. 709, 711 (1987) ("Winter's critique is devastating to Cary's analysis because Cary
completely overlooked the interaction of markets on manager's incentives."). The market
critics of the "race to the bottom" thesis are close allies of the contractarian scholars discussed
infra part II.A.2.
Professor Coffee declared the debate between Professors Cary and Winter a victory for
Cary's support of corporate federalism. In 1987, he observed that new federal minimum
national standards were developing to regulate corporations, replacing the old state standards.
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend
Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759 (1987) (discussing
corporate federalism in the context of federal tender offer rules and "poison pills").
123. See Cary, supra note 33, at 668-670.
124. Id. at 701-702. FIRREA implements a federal minimum fiduciary regime for financial
institutions. For a discussion of FIRREA's preemption of state corporate fiduciary law, see
infra part IV.C.2.
125. Although the coercionists' response to the Berle and Means dilemma has dominated
the corporate scene since 1932, in the last two decades contractarian scholarship has gained
prominence. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Forward, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1396-99 (1967) (discussing the "freedom-to-opt-out
challenge to corporate law theory"). For an overview of the growth of economic analysis in
law, see generally Ronald H. Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL STUD.
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prised of many actors-shareholders, managers, employees, bond-
holders, and other creditors-related to the corporation by formal or
201, 207-08 (1978); Henry G. Manne, Intellectual Styles and the Evolution of American
Corporation Law in ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM; THE ECONOMIC APPROACH APPLIED OUTSIDE
THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS 291 (G. Radnizky & P. Bernbolz eds. 1987). For a detailed
discussion of the contractual view of the corporation, see Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment
on Dean Clark, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1748 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Courts and
Corporations: A Comment on Coffee, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1692 (1989); Fred S. McChesney,
Economics, Law and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1530 (1989); Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for
Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599 (1989); Winter, supra note 122; Ralph
K. Winter, The "Race for the Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1526 (1989). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372 (3d ed. 1986);
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Training, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 271-79, 283-99 (1986); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to
Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9
(1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 37. The contractual
theory of the corporation is derived from the work of Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (No. 3) 386 (1937). For modem economic views of the corporation, see
N. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION: FREE MARKET VS. REGULATION (1984);
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 99 (1989); Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual
Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3-6 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Benjamin Klein, The Modern Business
Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982); Henry G. Manne,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Henry G. Manne,
Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964); Oliver 0.
Williamson, Corporate Governance, 98 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984). For a critical analysis of the
contractual approach to the modem corporate form, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New
Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1989); William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989). Rather than focusing on the structure and governance of
corporations, some economists focus on the definition and extent of the corporate form. They
question the makeup of the firm and theoretically analyze its structure. See, e.g., Oliver Hart,
An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1758-68
(1989). Contractarians envision the Berle & Means separation of ownership and control as an
agency problem of modem labor markets.
Those who have wealth can employ it productively even if they are not good
managers, those who can manage but lack wealth can hire capital in the market.
Investors bear most of the risk of business failure, in exchange for which they are
promised most of the rewards of success.
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 37, at 1425. An unwanted side
effect of the efficient division of labor is a corresponding rise in agency costs. Accordingly, for
a corporation to flourish, the success and profits created by the division of labor must exceed
the rise in agency costs. Id.
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informal contractual arrangements. 126 First articulated by Professors
Jensen and Meckling, 27 and continued by Judge Easterbrook and
Professor Fischel, 28 the "nexus of contracts" approach conceives of
the corporation as a complex web of contracts created voluntarily
through bargaining.1 29 The result is a corporate model unique as "a
statement of capital contributions as formal claims against the firm's
income that are distinct from participation in the firm's productive
activities.' 30
Contractarian scholars maintain that market forces dictate the
most efficient arrangements for each individual corporation. Market
forces reduce corporate agency costs while allocating the payment of
claims on capital contributions to the firm.'31 Contractarian scholars
126. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 37. In discussing
the voting rights of corporate owners, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that many actors in the
corporation are as much "owners" in the corporation as shareholders, each investing their own
specialized capital to the firm. Furthermore, contractarians describe the relationships amongst
corporate actors as far more dynamic than the static ownership and control model. The
multiplicity of corporate actors "negotiate contracts, explicitly or implicitly, with the other
participants .. " Id.; see infra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
127. Professors Jensen and Meckling coined the term "nexus of contract." See Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,
supra note 125, at 310-11.
128. Easterbrook and Fischel state that "[c]orporations are a subset of firms." Easterbrook
& Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 37, at 1425.
129. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, supra note 125, at 310-11.
130. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 37, at 1425. Easterbrook
and Fischel characterize the variety of corporate actors as investors bearing the risk of failure
and the profits of success. The only distinction they find between individual investors is the
type of investment claim. Id. "Equity investors are paid last, after debt investors, employees,
and other investors with (relatively) 'fixed' claims. These equity investors have the 'residual'
claim ...." Id.
131. Corporations, to the contractarians, divide labor efficiently, thereby effectively serving
the needs of large-scale capital economies.
Shareholders and bondholders provide firms with needed capital in exchange for
an expected rate of return generated by cash flows from the firm's assets.
Different groups provide other factors of production: employees supply labor,
managers supply managerial talent necessary for coordinating the various inputs,
and suppliers supply goods. The publicly held corporation, therefore, is a type of
firm that facilitates the organization of production which is particularly effective
when a large amount of capital is required.
Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, supra note 125, at 1262 (footnotes omitted).
Furthermore, according to Professor Fischel, shareholders and managers serve the division of
labor as well. Shareholders may participate in large-scale business ventures even though they
lack managerial ability. In turn, managers may participate in large-scale corporate business
despite the lack of personal wealth by employment of their managerial skills.
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, applying this understanding of the firm, argue
that because of the individual identity of firms and their particular needs, market forces, not
legal rules, are the best "regulators" of efficient corporate business. "The way in which corpo-
rations run the business, control agency costs, raise money, and reward investors will change
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acknowledge Berle and Means' concern that inefficiency results from
the separation of ownership and control, but they argue that contrac-
tual bargaining between shareholders and managers achieves the opti-
mum reduction of agency costs. 32 To Berle and Means' rhetorical
question, contractarians respond in the negative: corporate law need
not protect shareholders from managerial plundering. 3 3 They reason
that corporate laws intended to protect shareholders would ill serve
the variety of corporate actors and the particularized needs of the
individual firm in the "nexus of contracts" approach. 134
Contractarians repudiate the traditional notion of shareholders
as sole owners of the corporation. 35 Easterbrook and Fischel, in their
understanding of the modern corporation, state that "shareholders
are no more the 'owners' of the firm than are bondholders, other cred-
itors, and employees who devote specialized resources to the enter-
prise . ... 136 According to contractual theory, shareholders,
bondholders, creditors, and others in contractual relationships with
the firm infuse into the corporation the necessary capital in exchange
for an expected rate of return. 1 7 From an economic perspective, both
stockholders and creditors "invest" in the firm and expect to receive a
return. 138
The contractarian model leaves the protection of all corporate
from business to business and from time to time within a firm." Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, supra note 37, at 1427 (footnotes omitted). Easterbrook and Fischel warn
with Darwinian allusions that the inefficiency of corporate legal regulation will cause the
demise of the modem corporation. Inevitably, they conclude the failure of the modem corpo-
ration will visit disaster on those capitalist economies attempting corporate regulation. "The
history of corporate law has been that states attempting to force all firms into a single mold are
ground under as well." Id.
132. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel argue that the Berle and Means ownership
and control problem is an unavoidable agency cost in corporate governance. Yet, where
"Berle and Means thought they had diagnosed a fatal disease ... ," the contractarians "do not
envision this agency problem as fatal." Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra
note 37, at 397. Professor Fischel also, independently downplays the ownership and control
problem because "[a]gency costs are an inevitable consequence of every agency relationship
and are outweighed by the gains resulting from an efficient division of labor." Fischel, The
Corporate Governance Movement, supra note 125, at 1266 (footnotes omitted).
133. See supra note 96.
134. Supra note 96; see supra notes 125-132.
135. See supra part II.A.
136. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 37, at 396.
137. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 37, at 1425; see also
Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, supra note 125, at 1262.
138. See supra note 130. The contractual theory of the firm is attractive when applied to
modem economic markets where debt and equity securities have grown increasingly similar.
However, creditor and stockholder interests may clash because creditors "have prior but fixed
claims on a firm's assets while stockholders have limited liability for the firm's debt and
unlimited claims on its remaining assets .... ." See BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE
TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 8 (2d ed. 1981).
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actors-including shareholders-to contractual relationships and
market forces. 139 Mandatory corporate rules are both unnecessary
and inefficient to prevent managerial plundering, as market forces
ensure the most efficient check on managerial power." 4 Thus, con-
tractarians propose a legal system that permits corporate actors to
contract out of statutory or judicial rules to best serve the individual
needs of each corporation.'41
3. THE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY MODEL
Corporate social responsibility theorists conceive of a corporate
regime based on community obligation. 14 2 Such community obliga-
139. Contractarians envision corporate law as a standard form contract designed to reduce
bargaining costs. They argue that the individual nature of the firm makes it virtually
impossible for corporate law to identify ideal corporate relationships. To the contractarians,
corporate law is not a unanimous ideal for the multiplicity of corporate relationships; rather, it
is a starting point. "To the extent ... [corporate law] . . . anticipate[s] the desires of the
contracting parties, these off-the-rack principles reduce the number of items to be negotiated
and the costs of negotiating them." Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra
note 37, at 401.
Because it is impossible for a single legal regime to respond to the needs of each individual
corporation, contractarians advocate a corporate law code that acts as a baseline provision for
corporate actors to accept, or contract out of, at their choosing.
On many occasions the legal rules will not be sufficiently detailed. The standby
rule of corporate law, the fiduciary principle, requires actors to behave in the way
that they would have agreed to do by contract, if detailed contracts could be
reached and enforced at no cost. Yet, the structural rules and the fiduciary
principle together cover only the outlines of the relations among corporate
actors. Something must fill in the details.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Easterbrook and Fischel conclude that "[o]n this view corporate law
supplements but never displaces actual bargains-save in situations of third-party effects or
latecomer terms .... Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 37, at 1445.
140. See supra note 139.
141. Contractarians describe baseline corporate laws as "enabling" statutes. As Judge
Easterbrook and Professor Fischel claim, "[t]he corporate code in almost every state is an
enabling statute." Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 37, at 1417.
Enabling statutes permit individual corporate establishment of "systems of governance without
substantive scrutiny from regulators and without effective restraint on the permissible methods
of corporate governance." Id.
142. For an excellent overview of corporate social responsibility theory, see Edwin M.
Epstein, supra note 31. For the various approaches and the difficulty in achieving consensus
among corporate social responsibility theorists, see Engel, supra note 32. Corporate social
responsibility scholarship proliferated in the 1970s. See, e.g., JAMES W. HURST, THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-
1970 (1970); HENRY G. MANNE & H. WALLICH, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 37-52 (1972); RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976); CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975); RATIONALITY, LEGITIMACY,
RESPONSIBILITY: THE SEARCH FOR NEW DIRECTIONS IN BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 52 (E.
Epstein & D. Votaw eds. 1978); Kenneth Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic
Efficiency, 21 PUB. POL'Y 303 (1973); Luis A. Baumol, Business Responsibility and Economic
Behavior, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 45 (E. Phelps ed. 1975); Martin
Bronfenbrenner, The Consumer, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS
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tion--despite its potential conflict with shareholders' wealth goals-
would constrain managerial abuse of economic power. 14 3 Berle and
Means allude to a model of corporate responsibility in The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.'" Although the community obliga-
tion language in The Modern Corporation and Private Property pro-
vided some impetus for the development of corporate social
responsibility theory, the famous dialogue between Berle and E. Mer-
rick Dodd, Jr. on the trusteeship role of corporate management is the
basis for the current corporate social responsibility scholarship.145
The Berle-Dodd dialogue began in 1931, when Berle authored
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust in the Harvard Law Review.' 46
Somewhat surprisingly, given his ensuing suggestion of community
obligation in The Modern Corporation and Private Property,'47 Berle
initially argued that all corporate power should be entrusted in con-
PREDICAMENT 169 (J. McKie ed. 1974); Marvin A. Chirelstein, Corporate Law Reform, in
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT 41, 76 (J. McKie ed. 1974);
Alfred F. Conard, Response: The Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, Variations on a
Theme of Edwin M. Epstein, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1321 (1979); Alfred F. Conard, Reflections on
Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941, 942- 43 (1977); Robert A. Dahl, Governing the
Giant Corporation, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 10, 15 (R. Nader & M. Green eds.
1973); Jerome Rothenberg, The Physical Environment, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
BUSINESS PREDICAMENT 191, 200-04, 207, 211-15 (J. McKie ed. 1974); Donald E. Schwartz,
Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-Existence With Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 57, 63-64 (1971); A.A.
Sommer, Jr., The Struggle For Corporate Responsibility, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1987).
143. For one definition of corporate social responsibility, see Engel, supra note 32, at 5-6.
"The term is most useful if taken to denote the obligations and inclinations, if any, of
corporations organized for profit, voluntarily to pursue social ends that conflict with the
presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit." Id. (footnotes omitted). Another
definition of corporate social responsibility also focuses on the structure of the corporation.
"[T]he public policy debate about whether and how to increase the social responsiveness and
public accountability of the contemporary large business corporation in the 1980s, will, most
likely, revolve around the interconnected issues of corporate structure and corporate
government." Epstein, supra note 31, at 1287. But cf Fischel, Corporate Governance
Movement, supra note 125, at 1269. Professor Fischel argues that the contractarian model of
the corporation is closely allied with the goals of corporate social responsibility. Because the
contractarian approach favors the profit goals of all corporate actors, a successful corporate
business venture benefits many providing jobs, goods and service to the community. In fact,
Professor Fischel argues that firm success is imperative to effectively serve social goals because
during periods of low profitability, management is most likely to first sacrifice social goals
during cost cutting. Therefore, he concludes that profitability is not only consistent with social
goals but also a prerequisite. Id.
144. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
145. For an overview of the Berle-Dodd dialogue, see Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd
Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964); see also Wilber
G. Katz, Responsibility and the Modern Corporation, 3 J.L. & ECON. 75, 76-78 (1960).
146. Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
147. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Berle initially offered contradictory
resolutions of the shareholder-management conflict. Compare ADOLPH A. BERLE &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) with
Adolph A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Power in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). For a
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trolling management for the direct benefit of shareholders.14 Berle
continued, arguing for constraints on managers when they deviate
from shareholder profit maximization goals. 149 "[AIll powers granted
to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any
group within the corporation, whether derived from statute or charter
or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the rata-
ble benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears." 5'
Although Dodd agreed with Berle's "power in trust" thesis, he
responded in For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?"'5 that
corporations should serve society, not just shareholders. 15 2 Accord-
ing to Dodd, increased shareholder protection, although a "laudable
purpose," should not subvert the evolution of the modem corporation
as an institution of social service.153 Shareholder protection in the
form of a trust relationship would undermine corporate social goals
by placing an even greater emphasis on "shareholder" profit goals.
Dodd argued that as a new economic order evolved, corporations
would have to modify shareholder profit maximization goals to effec-
tuate a corporate economy responsive to public opinion.'54 The inevi-
discussion of Berle's changing position on managerial accountability to shareholders or
community, see Weiner, supra note 145.
148. Berle, Corporate Powers as Power in Trust, supra note 147, at 1049.
149. Id.
150. Id. Berle proposed two tests to ensure the faithfulness of managerial action to
shareholders. The first, based on technical rules, would guide the "existence and proper
exercise" of managerial power. Id. In the second test, Berle offered "equitable rules somewhat
analogous to those which apply in favor of a cestui que trust to the trustee's exercise of wide
powers granted to him in the instrument making him a fiduciary. Id. Thus, Berle argued for a
trust relationship between management and shareholders, launching the debate with Professor
Dodd. Berle analyzed five "corporate powers" supporting his thesis demanding the protection
of a trust relationship because "through the very nature of the corporate entity, responsibility
goes with power." Id. at 1050. After analyzing examples of corporate power, Berle concluded
with a plea for the imposition of a trust relationship with the dubious assertion that powers are
entrusted to management for the benefit of all corporate participants. Id. at 1073. However,
Berle finally admitted his true allegiance and claimed that "it necessarily follows that: . . .
whenever a corporate power is exercised ... its use must be judged ... with a view toward
discovering whether ... the result fairly protects the interest of shareholders." Id. at 1074.
Berle would also have permitted the courts to use all equitable remedies to protect
shareholders based on the circumstances of the individual case. Id. To ensure shareholder
protection, Professor Berle advocated a mandatory set of corporate rules, unamendable in the
corporate charter. Id. After all, he claimed an individual corporation's amendment of the
corporate laws "would be to defeat the very object and nature of the corporation itself." Id.
151. 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
152. Professor Dodd expressed his "sympathy with Mr. Berle's efforts to establish a legal
control which (would] more effectually prevent corporate managers from diverting profit into
their own pockets from those of stockholders, and agree[d] with many of the specific rules
which ... [Berle] deduce[d] from his trusteeship principle." Id. (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 1143-46.
154. Dodd forecasted that even though shareholder wealth maximization goals at times
coincide with public policy, community goals ultimately would prevail. He assumed that "a
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table modification of the existing economic order would instill an
awareness of community needs in management and force individual
managers to keep pace with public opinion and fulfill their obligation
to society.' 55 Dodd thus advocated corporate laws compelling mana-
gerial responsiveness to the community. 1 6
Berle was quick to criticize Dodd's communitarian corporate
regime."' On corporate social responsibility, Berle stated "[I]t is the-
ory, not practice." 58 Berle considered a model of corporate govern-
ance based on community obligation unworkable because he believed
that the legal regime should not destroy shareholder control over
management without another coherent system ready to take its
place. 5 9 Until such a scheme evolved, Berle maintained that corpo-
rate laws had to compel managerial accountability to shareholders.16"
Since the trusteeship debate, scholars have built upon the com-
planned economic order [would] ultimately resultol in a more stabilized system of production
and employment . . ." As a result, community obligation would supplant the "maximum-
profit-for-the-stockholders-of-the-individual-company formula." Id. at 1152.
155. Dodd expected that corporate managers would be swept up in the changing political/
economic order because "it is natural to expect that this change of opinion will have some
effect upon the attitude of those who manage business." Id. at 1153.
156. "The principal object of legal compulsion might then be to keep those who failed to
catch the new spirit up to the standards which their more enlightened competitors would
desire to adapt voluntarily." Id. Corporate business, Dodd claimed, would become a social
service, with corporate laws prodding the laissez-faire tradition of any lingering capitalists.
Professor Dodd then suggested that corporate business would become communitarian
(concerned for all of society) rather than individualistic (concerned only for shareholders). He
explained: "Business might then become a profession of public service, not primarily because
the law had made it such but because a public opinion shared in by business men themselves
had brought about a professional attitude." Id. (citations omitted).
The motivation for Dodd's proposed evolution to corporate communitarianism lies in the
tremendous power vested in corporate managers. "Modern large-scale industry has given to
the managers of our principal corporations enormous power over the welfare of wage earners
and consumers, particularly the former. Power over the lives of others tends to create on the
part of those most worthy to exercise it a sense of responsibility." Id. at 1157.
157. See Adolph A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365 (1932); Weiner, supra note 145 (commenting on Berle's prompt but unfavorable
reaction to Dodd).
158. Berle, supra note 157, at 1367.
159. Id. To Berle, community obligation was an as yet unrealized ideal because the
corporate manager as
[t]he industrial 'control' does not now think of himself as a prince; he does not
now assume responsibilities to the community; his bankers do not now undertake
to recognize social claims; his lawyers do not advise him in terms of social
responsibility. Nor is there any mechanism now in sight enforcing
accomplishment of ... [Dodd's] ... theoretical function.
Id.
160. Id. Berle argued for continuing managerial obligation to maximize shareholder
owners until such time as a suitable alternative to the shareholder group is identified. Id.
"Now I submit that you can not abandon emphasis on the view that business corporations
exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders until such time as you are
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munity obligation theory.' 6' Although the corporate social responsi-
bility scholarship is diverse, its common goal is to impose social
control on modem corporations. 162 A socially responsible corpora-
tion balances shareholder interests against the interests of the commu-
nity's legitimate claims on the firm.163 However, difficulty emerges in
balancing divergent interests because each corporate actor has distinct
goals.' 1" The practical inability to balance these competing interests
explains why courts and legislatures have not yet adopted a compre-
hensive corporate social responsibility regime.
B. Ownership Conflict in the Corporate Form
Corporate law traditionally focuses on the conflict between two
sets of actors: shareholders and management. Inevitably, the pri-
mary goal of corporate law is to protect shareholders from the vagar-
ies of managerial control. 65  Yet, as contractarians and corporate
social responsibility theorists recognize, other actors exist, with inter-
ests conceptually similar to shareholder-owners. 166 These scholars
challenge the traditional assumption of corporate law-that share-
holders are the exclusive owners of the corporation-because they see
little difference between the "investment" of shareholders and that of
other corporate actors. 167 In fact, creditors may contribute to the cor-
prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone
else." Id.
161. See sources cited supra note 142.
162. See Thomas M. Jones, Corporate Governance: Who Controls the Large Corporation, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1261 (1979) ("The broad issue ... is the social control of business or corporate
social responsibility.").
Professor Engel suggests that the basic issue of corporate social responsibility is "whether
it is socially desirable for corporations organized for profit voluntarily to identify and pursue
social ends . . ." and ultimately whether "this pursuit conflicts with the presumptive
shareholder desire to maximize profit." Engel, supra note 32, at 3.
163. Community claims on the corporation vary from pollution control to requests for
charitable donations. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 31, at 1302 (listing goals of a socially
responsible corporation). Social responsibility can be divided into two levels in the corporate
context. Much of the corporate social responsibility scholarship focuses on the corporation's
obligation to community. Individual managerial responsibility focuses on the individual's
obligation to community. While this distinction may blur in the corporate decisionmaking
context, it is important because corporate social responsibility primarily focuses on the
corporation's obligation. See Joseph Grundfest, Corporate Responsibility: Panel Response, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 817 (1917). Significantly FIRREA mandates individual corporate
responsibility by creating a fiduciary regime sensitive to community obligation similar to the
"neutral technocracy" of Berle and Means. See infra part IV.C.
164. See supra note 163.
165. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303-04 (Del. 1988) ("Before a fiduciary duty
arises, an existing property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must exist. The
obvious example is stock ownership."). But see infra note 190.
166. See supra parts II.A.2 and II.A.3.
167. See supra part II.A.2.
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poration much like shareholders do. 16 1
Therefore, while the separation of ownership and control has
dominated the corporate governance scholarship, at least two struc-
tural tensions afflict corporate law: the traditional conflict between
managers and shareholders, 69 and the conflict between shareholders
and creditors. Dean Bayless Manning explains in A Concise Textbook
on Legal Capital that "[t]he interests of creditors ... and ... share-
holders of a corporation are likely to conflict whenever assets of
shareholders are to be committed to the corporate treasury."' 170 Cor-
porate fiduciary law has largely ignored the latter conflict. 171 Instead,
it has left corporate creditors to their contractual wiles to safeguard
against the usurpation of their investment in the firm. 172 As a result,
corporate creditors' investments-conceptually identical to share-
holders' investments' 73-,do not receive the same protection and bene-
fits as shareholder investments.
Creditors and shareholders, while both benefiting from a profita-
ble, efficiently managed corporation, nonetheless have disparate
investment goals.' 74 Creditors seek repayment of a corporate debt
obligation and therefore aspire to preserve substantial corporate
assets.' 75 Shareholders, by contrast, expect frequent distribution of
168. See supra part II.A.2.
169. See supra part II.A.
170. BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 1 (1977).
171. See discussion infra this part; but see infra note 190.
172. Only by bargaining in contract and to some extent by corporate asset distribution
statutes is creditor investment protected. See MANNING, supra note 170. Dean Manning
argues that only managerial decisions incurring additional debt or distributing corporate assets
are "proscribed or limited by contract or by general law." Id. at 7-8. Although conceptually
similar, creditors do not share in stockholder fiduciary protection. Ultimately, the shareholder
creditor neither has "protection against such commercial risks except his own skill in
predicting whether an enterprise will or will not make enough" to ensure a return on
investment. Id.
173. "The investor who buys shares of the incorporated enterprise, is, as a matter of
economics, engaged in the same kind of activity and is motivated by the same basic objectives"
as creditors. MANNING, supra note 170, at 8. Some scholars suggest that it is unrealistic to
hold management accountable to both creditors and shareholders. See Walter H. Cabot, The
Free Market Promotes Long-Term Efficiency That Benefits All Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 245 (1991); James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing With Fire. Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97 (1991); Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders,
and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON L. REV. 197 (1991) for different approaches to
nonshareholder constituency statutes all favoring the traditional corporate fiduciary obligation
to shareholders alone. See infra note 632 for a discussion of non-shareholder constituency
statutes.
174. "The ideal world as conceived by the creditor of the corporation is a world that is
normally wholly unacceptable to the shareholder." MANNING, supra note 170, at 8.
175. "The creditor of the corporation desires that the enterprise have large quantities of
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corporate assets in return for their equity investment. 176
Notwithstanding contractual and limited statutory protection,177
creditors are still subject to the "risk of the basic commercial vicissi-
tudes of the debtor enterprise."' 78 Because corporate fiduciary law
does not speak to this risk, creditors can lose their investment, with-
out fiduciary redress, through managerial risktaking in corporate
business ventures. 17
9
The difference between creditor investment and shareholder
investment is that shareholders hope for ever increasing returns,
whereas creditors receive a fixed rate of return and priority of
claim. 80 The shareholder's "riskier" investment return is the peri-
odic dividend payment and an increase in the value of their equity
share after payment to all fixed-rate creditors.' Shareholders often
seek income on their investment in the form of dividends, liquidation
distributions, and stock buy-ins.182  Any such distribution of corpo-
assets against which the only other claimants are those who rank junior to him, i.e. the
shareholders." Id. at 14.
According to Dean Manning, the creditor has several objectives for the debtor
corporation: the preservation of substantial corporate assets, the prevention of the incurrence
of additional debt to other general creditors, the unencumberance of the corporation of any
lien interest by a secured creditor, and the prevention of distribution of corporate assets to
junior creditors prior to redemption of the creditors debt. Id. at 7.
176. Shareholders "would like to have as little as possible of their own assets tied up in the
enterprise and exposed to the jeopardy of creditors' claims." Id.
177. Id. at 8. See supra note 172.
178. Id. at 7. Each creditor bears a market risk equal in extent to the amount of their debt
entitlement. As Dean Manning describes the failure of the corporation's product or the drop
in the market value of it assets, such events could leave the creditor in a position only to
"whistle for his claim." Id.
179. Id. Corporate fiduciary law does, however, contemplate duties to creditors in
insolvent institutions. See 12A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS 7889 (Rev. perm. ed. 1981). See discussion infra note 189. Shareholders, by
contrast, would have redress, assuming managerial risk did not fall within the parameters of
the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule is discussed infra part III.B.2.
180. Dean Manning characterizes the investment difference between creditor and
shareholder as a "calculated economic judgment" between priority of claim on interest and "a
fixed principal payment on maturity," and between the potential for a greater capital gain,
uncertain dividends and the residual claim to corporate assets. Id. at 8-9.
181. Dividend payments are the most common distinction between creditor and
shareholder returns. Id. at 9.
182. Id. Dean Manning defines other forms of shareholder payments beside the standard
dividend payment mentioned supra note 181. Liquidation distributions occur when and "[i]f it
is decided that an incorporated enterprise should be broken up, or that some of its assets or
separable operations should be sold for cash .. " Id. at 10. A "cash buy in" is "a transaction
that pays assets out of the corporate treasury to shareholders but brings in to the corporation
nothing but pieces of paper in the hands of the corporation." Id. The corporation may
distribute corporate assets as shareholder compensation although the distribution exceeds the
reasonable value of shareholder services. Furthermore, the corporation may loan, sell, or lease
corporate assets at rates lower than market value. Id. at 11.
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rate assets to the shareholder is in direct conflict with creditor goals of
maintaining the corporate treasury.1 3
As Dean Manning's reference to the "uncontrollable inherent
commercial risk of the enterprise"'' 8 4 implies, the conflict between
shareholders and creditors intensifies in corporations approaching
failure."8 5 Floundering corporations are more apt to engage in high-
risk business ventures because of the need of a high rate of return.1, 6
Because corporate law historically has required management to act in
shareholders' best interests, managers of a failing firm may take dras-
tic strategic measures, too risky under normal circumstances, in a
final effort to maximize shareholders' equity investment.187
Implicit in the corporate fiduciary law that recognizes only the
duty to maximize shareholder wealth is the recognition of the Berle
and Means separation of ownership and control. As a result, corpo-
rate fiduciary duties are designed to alleviate conflict between share-
holder-owners and management, while creditor-owners are left to
other means to protect their investment. An exposition of the com-
mon law and of state statutory corporate fiduciary law will facilitate
an understanding of the relationship of all corporate investors to the
mostly autonomous corporate management.
III. THE CORPORATE FIDUCIARY REGIME
Management has not evolved into a neutral technocracy serving
the interests of the community rather than individual shareholders, as
Berle and Means had hoped.' To reconcile the ownership-control
183. Id.
184. See supra note 125.
185. Stephen K. Halpert, The Separation of Banking and Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J.
CoRp. L. 481, 512-13 (1988). As Professor Halpert discusses, super-optimal risktaking is
particularly pronounced in insured depository institutions approaching insolvency. Id. at 509-
13. For a discussion of insured depository institutions and risktaking, see infra part VI.C.
186. Id. Also, management of corporations no longer exhibits risk-averse behavior as
institutions approach insolvency. Because managers have an employment/financial stake in
the successful firm, they are normally more likely to be risk-averse to the degree shareholders
favor risktaking. The agency costs of the separation of ownership and control is discussed at
length in much of the contractarian literature identified supra note 125. As an institution
approaches insolvency, however, managers have little to lose in risktaking and much to gain.
Therefore, management goals in failing institutions are in conflict with goals of creditors as
well because managers are willing to risk the remaining corporate assets, thereby preserving
their own employment and furthering shareholder goals. Any assets subsequently lost hurt
only the priority creditors, while management, and to a lesser extent shareholders, have little
to lose.
187. See supra note 185. Some case law suggests that when a conflict arises between
bondholders and shareholders, the corporation owes a fiduciary--or at least good faith-duty
to both. Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom, 200 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953). See infra note 189.
188. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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conflict, courts and legislatures have developed corporate fiduciary
laws to protect shareholders from managerial abuse and negligence.18 9
Despite recent trends in fiduciary law considering the fiduciary rights
of nonshareholders, the vast majority of case law reflects corporate
fiduciary law's goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.' 90 The duty of
care evolved as a check on risky managerial decisionmaking. The
business judgment rule operates in tandem with the duty of care to
counteract the potential for excessive managerial liability under the
189. For cases discussing management's duties to shareholders, see Simons v. Cogan, 549
A.2d 300, 303-304 (Del. 1988); Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 723 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
See also Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (stating that the only duty to
creditors is contractual in nature). The traditional fiduciary model changes however when
institutions become insolvent. Insolvent corporation management, in the majority of
jurisdictions, owe fiduciary duties to creditors. See In re STN Enterprises, 779 F.2d 901, 904-
05 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Mortgage America Corp., 714 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1983); Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1982); Robinson v.
Watts Detective Agency, Inc., 685 F.2d 729 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983)
(Massachusetts law); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 990 (1982) (New York law); Brown v. Presbyterian Ministers Fund, 484 F.2d 998,
1005 (3d Cir. 1973) (Pennsylvania law); In re Delorean Motor Co., 49 B.R. 900, 907 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1985) (Michigan law); Pennsylvania Co. For Insurances on Lives & Granting
Annuities v. South Broad St. Theater Co., 174 A. 112, 116 (Del. 1934); In re F&C Servs., Inc.,
44 B.R. 863, 874 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (Florida law). For the changing role of fiduciary
duties based on institution solvency, see Lewis W. Davis, Jr., et al., Corporate Reorganization
in the 1990s: Guiding Directors of Troubled Corporations Through Uncertain Territory, 47 Bus.
LAW. 1 (1991). For an analysis of the shifting fiduciary duties based on the solvency of the
corporation and for a proposal for fiduciary duties to creditors prior to insolvency, see Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625 (1991).
190. In Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), the
Delaware Supreme Court shifted away from the traditional notion of maximization of
shareholder wealth by recognizing a fiduciary obligation to "the corporation" as comprised of
other constituencies. At least in the takeover context, Time may stand for the proposition of
managerial fiduciary duties to all actors in the corporate enterprise. Id. at 1150. For a
discussion of the fiduciary obligations found in Time, see Trevor S. Norwitz, 46 Bus. LAW.
377 (1991). Furthermore, in the Delaware Court of Chancery's recent opinion in Credit
Lyonnais Bank N.V. v. M.G.M. Pathe Communications, Civ. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. Lexis 215
(Dec. 30, 1991), Chancellor William Allen extended the fiduciary rights of creditors to a
period prior to insolvency. "At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of
insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residual risk bearers, but owes its
duty to the corporate enterprise..." Slip op. at 83. See infra part IV.D. For an excellent
overview of Credit Lyonnais, see John C. Coffee, Court Has a New Idea on Directors' Duty,
NAT. L.J., Mar. 2, 1992, at 18 [hereinafter "Court Has a New Idea"]; see also Wieboldt Stores,
Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (action alleging breach of fiduciary
duty to creditors survives 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss); Elliott Goldstein, Will Directors Have a
Duty to Consider Bondholders?, 12 Bus. LAW. UPDATE 9 (1992). Furthermore, the recent
growth of "other constituency" statutes may provide the "hook" for a court to hang a creditor
fiduciary right. For a discussion of "other constituency" statutes, see Morey McDaniel,
Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121 (1991). Examples of "other
constituency" statutes may be found infra at note 632.
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duty of care. In addition to the duty of care, the duty of loyalty devel-
oped to prevent managers from using their positions to maximize
their self-interest to the detriment of shareholders. Both the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty attempt to limit managerial autonomy
and the exploitation of shareholder wealth. Part III.B discusses the
fiduciary duty of care, the business judgment rule, and the duty of
loyalty.
Exacerbating the difficulty of fiduciary issues is the complexity of
corporate management itself. Management is not a homogenous
group. Part III.A explores the function of the board of directors, the
dichotomy between inside and outside directors, and the varying
degrees of care owed to the corporation.
A. The Board of Directors
1. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Corporate boards are responsible for choosing chief executive
officers and top management.' 9 ' They regularly audit the accounting
of the corporation and advise upper level management in corporate
business planning. 92 Also, despite the formalities of shareholder elec-
tions, the board of directors usually determines the new members of
the board. 193 The directors further determine the executive manage-
ment compensation level, including incentive packages based on the
performance of the corporation. 94 The board of directors also evalu-
191. Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standards for Outside Directors, 24 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 5, 12 (1989). "First [the monitoring model] must assure that the corporation
has in place a functioning management." Id.
192. According to Professor Hamilton, the board of directors ensures proper "accounting
and accountability mechanisms" that conform to both legal and ethical standards as well as
provide a formal advisory function. Id. As advisors, "directors are essential to provide the
'fresh look' or 'independent points of view' desired by management." Id. at 13.
193. Professor Hamilton claimed that although shareholders technically elect a board of
directors, management usually offers a slate of candidates that receives shareholders' rubber
stamp approval. Id. at 12. Shareholders, though absent from the everyday management of the
corporation, do exercise some influence over corporate managers largely through their voting
rights: the election and removal of directors. Furthermore, shareholders may align their votes
in proxy contests or sell their shares to a party attempting a takeover bid. Shareholders may
further influence corporate affairs by approving or rejecting corporate by-laws or amendments
to the by-laws. Major corporate transactions-transactions not in the usual course of ordinary
business-need shareholder approval as well. In large corporations, shareholders may inform
and therefore empower their vote by using corporate information which the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 requires the corporation to release. For an overview of shareholder
voting rights in corporate law, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note
37. See also Bohannan v. Corporation Commission, 313 P.2d 379 (Ariz. 1957).
194. Special board committees of outside directors usually determine compensation and
incentive based packages for senior management. Hamilton, supra note 191, at 13-14. See also
The Subcommittee on Executive Compensation of the Committee on Employee Benefits and
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ates corporate transfers of control such as merger proposals or cash
tender offers.1 95 In addition, directors review transactions for poten-
tial conflicts of interest. 96 Finally, the board declares shareholder
dividends, proposes amendments to corporate bylaws, and presents
recommendations for corporate action requiring shareholder
approval. 97 The responsibilities of the board of directors are the
focus of the fiduciary duty legal regime which requires managerial
conduct consistent with the goals of shareholding ownership. 98
2. INSIDE AND OUTSIDE DIRECTORS:
MANAGERS AND MONITORS
The traditional corporate board managed the corporation. 99
The growth and complexity of modem corporations, however, has
forced corporate directors--especially directors unaffiliated with the
corporation-to become monitors or supervisors of hired manag-
ers.2o° The monitoring role of modem boards suggests varying levels
Executive Compensation, Executive Compensation: A 1987 Road Map for the Corporate
Advisor, 43 Bus. LAW. 187 (1987).
195. Id.
196. Conflict-of-interest transactions usually require ratification by a majority of
disinterested directors. For the outside directors role in ratification of conflict of interest
transactions, see id.
197. Id. at 15.
198. Both directors and officers have fiduciary duties to the corporation. Statement of the
Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly
Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2090 (1978). Officers need not also serve on the
board of directors of the corporation. In fact, each state's corporate law provides for the
appointment of officers by the board of directors. The duties of the officers are set by the
corporation in its bylaws or by the board of directors. WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A.
BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.08 at 15 (4th ed. 1988).
Professors Eisenberg and Cary consider executives (officers and "inside" directors) the real
managers of the modem corporation because of practical constraints on the board of directors.
WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 207 (6th ed. 1988). Cary and
Eisenberg identify three constraints on outside directors. Because outside board members
spend only five to ten working days a year "managing" the corporation, time constraints
severely limit outside directors. Outside directors face constraints on the information they
receive because they rely on corporate officers and their staffs for the compilation and
dissemination of information. Furthermore, many board members, both "inside" and
"outside," are related to the Chief Executive Officer or other executives either financially or
socially, which provides ample constraint on the decisionmaking process. For the purposes of
this paper, officers and "inside" directors are used interchangeably to designate boardmembers
who also serve the corporation in an everyday managerial capacity, with more hands-on
contact than unaffiliated "outside" directors. Officers are responsible for the daily operation
and management of the corporation and prepare the reports and financial statements on which
directors rely in formulating corporate policy and in advising management. Id. at 207.
199. Id. In the traditional model "the board of directors manages the corporation's
business and makes business policy; the officers act as agents of the board and execute its
decisions..." Id.
200. The modern corporate board has evolved simultaneously with the large scale
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of accountability to the corporation. Members of the board are distin-
guished based on individual knowledge of and contact with the
corporation.2° 1
A typical board of directors consists of inside directors and
outside directors.2 °2 Outside directors, who are not employees of the
corporation, perform a monitoring role.2 °3 They bring objectivity to
corporate decisionmaking because they "have no immediate account-
ability for short-range financial results [which] assures greater detach-
ment and a better focus on longer-range corporate interests. ' 2°
Because of their objectivity, outside directors often serve on executive
compensation and corporate audit committees.2 °5 Inside directors,
corporation. As corporations grew, concerns about economic concentration have grown as
well.
The operation of the market and of competition, the requirements for large
aggregations of capital and for aggregations of technological and managerial
capabilities, have led in turn to the development of the large publicly-held
corporation....
It is appropriate, however, that the public and its elected representatives
should be concerned that private business organizations like government itself be
subject to checks and balances, to constraints on excessive power.
Statement of the Business Roundtable, supra note 198, at 2090. The complexity of the modern
corporate economy has invariably led to change in the role of the board of directors. "It has
become increasingly clear.., that in practice the board rarely performs either the management
or the policymaking functions." CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 198, at 207. "Modern
boards of directors have practically nothing to do with the day-to-day business of the corpora-
tion." Hamilton, supra note 191, at 9. Because of the size and scope of many modern corpora-
tions, "business decision-making is diversified and diffused." Id. Courts also have
acknowledged the changing role of the board of directors. "Directorial management does not
require a detailed inspection of day-to-day activities, but rather a general monitoring of corpo-
rate affairs and policies." Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
201. In effect, individual board members serve in a division of labor based on their
committee service and their relationship to the everyday business of the corporation. A central
question in shareholder litigation becomes, in essence, which director had access to the
information that forms the basis of the alleged fiduciary breach. See Hamilton, supra note 191,
at 5.
202. See generally Hamilton, supra note 191 (describing the evolution of the modern
corporate board and its greater emphasis on "outside" directors); Statement of the Business
Roundtable, supra note 198 (suggesting an "outside" director majority composition for a
corporate board of directors).
203. A corporation usually invites an outside director to sit on its board because she has
expertise to offer the corporation. See Marshall L. Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in
Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1356-57 (1979).
204. Statement of the Business Roundtable, supra note 198, at 2108. "It seems to us that
outside directors . .. can perform a very valuable service to the corporation. They are
windows on the world who provide a protection against insularity and lack of vision." Id. at
2107.
205. The desirability of outside directors is enhanced by "certain board responsibilities-
notably setting top management compensation, and the audit function-performed by
directors who have neither a stake nor a prior involvement in the matters they are reviewing or
resolving." Id. at 2108.
Corporate board committees permit an enhanced role for outside directors whose service
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who are employees of the corporation and usually corporate execu-
tives, participate in everyday corporate decisionmaking. Though they
do not have the objectivity of outside directors, their constant contact
with corporate affairs provides them with a level of awareness essen-
tial for an effective board of directors.
Because of their greater knowledge and participation in the eve-
ryday business of the corporation, inside directors are held to a
greater standard of care than outside directors.2"6 Some commenta-
tors go one step further in advocating state legislation reflecting vary-
ing degrees of care for directors based on their relation to the
corporation.20 7  Generally, however, the flexible state statutory due-
care standards hold inside and outside directors liable for not acting
as reasonable persons would in like circumstances.208
Outside directors have become increasingly important to the
modern corporation. 2°  As corporate governance evolves through the
1990s, outside directors will continue to constitute the majority on
most boards.210  The objectivity of outside directors and their moni-
is only "part-time." Furthermore, board committees allow outside directors to "focus on a
particular problem" as well as to apply "specialized knowledge and experience" to board
service. Id. at 2109. See also Scott V. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special
Committee-Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Management
Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 43 Bus.
LAW. 665 (1988).
206. "The standards applied to ... [nondirector officers and inside directors] ... are high
and reflect their greater responsibilities and their obligation of greater familiarity with the
affairs of the corporation." KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 198, at 15. See Bates v. Dresser,
251 U.S. 524 (1920). In Bates, the court held that a bank president owed a greater degree of
care because he controlled the bank's business affairs and that a director who did not have
significant involvement with the daily business operations did not owe as high a degree of care.
Id. at 529-31. However, the state legislation limiting director liability does not in most cases
offer the same protection to corporate officers. See infra part III.C.2.
207. State corporation laws do not generally provide separate standards for different classes
of board service. Yet, as commentators argue, "[i]f ... nondirector officers are expected to
assume responsibilities commensurate with their familiarity with the corporation's affairs, the
same rule should apply to inside directors who are officers or employees of the corporation."
KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 198, at 18. For a discussion of the duty of care and business
judgment rule, see infra parts III.B. 1 and III.B.2. For the state statutory fiduciary enactments,
see part III.C.2.
208. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
209. Hamilton, supra note 191, at 6. The enhanced role and growth of the outside
directorship evolved "on a de facto basis, without legal compulsion or a great deal of fanfare."
As a result "outside independent directors comprise the majority of most boards of directors of
publicly held corporations." Id. (citations omitted). The growth of the outside directors' role
is directly attributable to a belief that the majority of board members should not have a direct
relationship with everyday management and the realization of the importance of outside
directors in critical corporate decisions. Id. at 7.
210. The modern corporation will assuredly continue to flourish under the monitoring
model and the auspices of outside directors. What remains to be seen is whether financial
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toting role inspires managerial fidelity to the corporation.211 It is pre-
cisely this monitoring role that has enhanced the value of the outside
directors to the corporation. At the same time, however, the monitor-
ing role creates the unfortunate side effect of complicating the already
controversial corporate fiduciary regime.
B. Managerial Accountability: The Duty of Care, the Business
Judgment Rule, and the Duty of Loyalty
Directors and officers have been the corporate decisionmakers
for over one hundred years.212 Yet only recently, with the Trans
Union liability explosion of the mid-1980s, 213 have issues of director
214 o h rnand officer liability gained prominence. Because of the Trans
Union decision and subsequent liability growth, qualified members of
corporate boards--outside directors in particular-resigned or
refused to serve in directorial positions to avoid liability.21 5
Fiduciary law reflects courts' and state legislatures' concern that
corporations attract and keep qualified directors.216 Fiduciary doc-
trine therefore attempts to achieve a balance between managerial
autonomy and accountability to shareholders. The recognition of this
basic conflict in corporate governance has led to a body of law that
attempts to reconcile the competing interests of management and
ownership. An exposition of the evolution of the director's duty of
care, duty of loyalty, and the business judgment rule will facilitate an
understanding of the traditional corporate governance model and the
institutions can survive in a regulatory environment which hampers their ability to attract the
same outside directors so crucial to the modem corporation. See infra part VI.
211. Corporate Directors Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1978). "If the board of directors
is to function effectively .... a significant number of its members should be able to provide
independent judgment regarding the proposals under consideration." Id. at 1619.
212. For an early American case discussing the relationship between shareholders and
management, see Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 68, 74-75 (La. 1829). The most notable
early Supreme Court recognition of the fiduciary duties of management to the corporation and
its shareholders is Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (stating that "[a] director is a
fiduciary"). See also McMurray, supra note 102, at 605.
213. See infra discussien in Part III.C.
214. See Jesse A. Finkelstein, Introduction, Symposium: Director and Officer Liability and
Indemnification, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1989) ("Over the past decade, a great deal of
judicial and scholarly attention has been focused upon issues of director liability.");
Introduction, Special Project: Director and Officer Liability, 40 VAND. L. REV. 601 (1989).
215. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 66 (compiling and analyzing empirical evidence on
the effects of Trans Union liability on corporate governance); Daniel R. Fischel, The Business
Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985). Outside directors, in
particular, who often serve on corporate boards for nominal salaries, will not accept positions
if they face substantial liability for "bad" decisions.
216. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880
(2d Cir. 1982).
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potential effect of expanded director liability on the corporate form of
business organization.
1. THE DUTY OF CARE
Since the early 1800s, courts have required corporate managers
to exercise due care and diligence in managing the corporation's busi-
ness affairs.217 Most courts have found that corporate managers owe
some duty of care, but have disagreed on a uniform standard of care
for corporate directors.218 As a result, three common law standards
of care have evolved: (1) the degree of care to avoid gross negli-
gence;219 (2) the degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person
would exercise in conducting personal business affairs;22° and (3) the
degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under
like circumstances. 221 Although each standard contemplates some
form of negligence, the expectations of behavior are different under
each. Like negligence law, fiduciary law holds managers liable only
when their breach of duty is the actual and proximate cause of the
damage claimed. 222
For the most part, managers of financial institutions have been
held to the same fiduciary standard as other corporate managers.223
217. See McMurray, supra note 102, at 605.
218. Id. at 607.
219. Id. McMurray cites Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 A.L.A. 191, 200 (1847), for the
proposition that "bank directors are liable only for errors of the grossest kind," and Percy v.
Millaudon, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 68, 74-75, 78 (La. 1829) for the proposition that "bank directors
must devote only ordinary care and attention to their jobs in order to avoid making gross
errors." Id.
220. McMurray, supra note 102, at 607 (citing Berkhart v. Smith, 157 A. 299, 301 (Md. Ct.
App. 1931) and Marshall v. Farmers & Mechanics' Say. Bank, 8 S.E. 586, 590 (1889)).
221. McMurray, supra note 102, at 607 (citing Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152
(1891); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)). For a thorough
discussion of all three common law standards of care, see KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 198,
Sec. 2.3, at 43-47.
222. Compare United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.)
with Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, J.).
As Judge Learned Hand concludes in Barnes, liability attaches only where the breach of
care results in damage to the corporation.
When the corporate funds have been illegally lent, it is a fair inference that a
protest would have stopped the loan, and that the directors' neglect caused the
loss, but when a business fails from general mismanagement, business incapacity,
or bad judgment, how is it possible to say that a single director could have made
the company successful or how much in dollars he could have saved?
Id. at 616. See also American Law Institute Prin. of Corp. Gov. § 7.16 ("an omission that
constitutes a breach of the [duty of care or loyalty] is the legal cause of loss incurred by the
corporation ... if the plaintiff proves that.., the performance of the duty would have been a
substantial factor in averting the loss .. "); RESTATEMENT 2D OF TORTS § 886(A).
223. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 198, at 516.
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Although several early bank embezzlement cases suggested that bank
directors might owe a higher standard of care than other corporate
managers, 224 on the theory that "the reasonable person standard" pre-
supposes greater care for directors handling large liquid assets, mod-
em courts have not imposed higher standards on bank directors.225
State and federal legislatures, however, have subjected managers of
financial institutions to a variety of civil liabilities.226
The decisions most frequently cited for duty of care/business
judgment language are Bates v. Dresser,227 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co.,228 Kamin v. American Express Co.,229 Francis v.
United Jersey Bank,230 and Joy v. North.231 In Bates, the United
States Supreme Court discussed the liability of the directors and the
president of a national bank for the depletion of the bank's assets
resulting from employee theft.232 Justice Holmes found that the
directors of the bank had not breached their duty of care where they
relied on the bank cashier's statement of the assets and liabilities.233
Furthermore, the court concluded that the bank president's "daily
presence" at the bank justified the other directors reliance on his
assurances and that the directors could not be "bound by virtue of the
office gratuitously assumed by them .... 234 Justice Holmes found
the bank's president liable based on his "insider" role in the bank.235
Because of his daily presence in the bank and his direct influence on
the everyday business of the bank, the court expected the bank presi-
224. Id. (citing Greenfield Say. Bank v. Abercrombie, 97 N.E. 897, 899 (Mass. 1912);
Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 136 N.E. 403, 408 (Mass. 1922); Litwin v. Allen, 25
N.Y.2d 667, 678 (1940)).
225. Id. (citing McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd., 491 F.2d 380, 383 (2d Cir.
1974); A.L.I., Principles of Corporate Governance Sec. 4.01, introductory note, cmt. c (draft
no. 4, 1985)). The flexible application of the duty of care suggests differences between the
fiduciary duties of financial and nonfinancial corporate officers and directors. Since financial
corporations typically engage in business with "the regular receipt of cash or property" and
the maintenance of large liquid assets, the risk and temptation for mishandling or self-dealing
is greater than with other corporations. Furthermore, the various state and federal enactments
dealing with financial institutions "may impose special obligations" on directors. CARY &
EISENBERG, supra note 198, at 517.
226. See infra part IV.C for a discussion of FIRREA's imposition of civil liability.
227. 251 U.S. 524 (1920).
228. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
229. 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
230. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
231. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
232. Bates, 251 U.S. at 526-28.
233. Id. at 529-30.
234. Id. at 530 (citing Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891) and Warner v. Penoyer, 91
F. 587 (2d Cir. 1898).
235. Id. at 530-31.
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dent to react to indications of wrongdoing. 236
In Graham,237 directors of a manufacturing company faced a
stockholder derivative suit alleging due care liability for damage to
the company resulting from price fixing and other federal antitrust
violations by four company employees. 28  The stockholders claimed
that the directors should have taken action to learn of and prevent the
employees' violations.239 The court refused to hold the directors lia-
ble because of the size, complexity, and decentralized management of
the corporation. 240 As the court explained, the "nature of the enter-
prise" ensured that the "company's directors could not know person-
ally all the company's employees," which effectively limited the board
to "broad policy decisions .... ,,241 The court concluded that the
directors properly relied on corporate records and reports and could
not be found liable where there was no warning or hint of
wrongdoing.242
Stockholders in Kamin 243 claimed that corporate directors negli-
gently permitted the declaration of stock dividends instead of selling
the dividend stock on the open market, which would have saved
nearly eight million dollars in corporate taxes. 2" In finding that the
directors had not breached their duty of care, the court assumed that
decisionmaking errors could not form the basis of liability because
"the powers of those entrusted with corporate management are
largely discretionary. ' 245 Furthermore, the court held, liability does
not result from an imprudent decision.2 46 As the court explained:
"To allege that a director negligently permitted the declaration and
236. Id. As Justice Holmes explained, "[t]he position of the president is different.
Practically he was the master of the situation. He was daily at the bank for hours, he had the
deposit ledger in his hands at times and might have had it at any time. He had hints and
warnings ...." Id. at 530.
237. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
238. Id. at 127.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 130.
241. Id. Allis-Chalmers employed "in excess of 30,000 persons aid extended over a large
geographical area." Id.
242. Id. The Delaware court permitted the directors "to rely on the honesty and integrity
of their subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that something is
wrong." Id. at 130. The court intimated that were there hints of wrongdoing, the directors
would potentially be subject to liability. Id. However, the court was wary to impose a "duty
upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out
wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists." Id.
243. 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
244. Id. at 812.
245. Id. (citations omitted).
246. Id. ("It is not enough to allege... that the directors made an imprudent decision....
More than imprudence or mistaken judgment must be shown.").
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payment of a dividend without alleging fraud, dishonesty or nonfea-
sance, is to state merely that a decision was taken with which one
disagrees."247 The court concluded that through neither nonfeasance
nor malfeasance the directors overlooked facts within their
attention.248
In Francis,249 the New Jersey Supreme Court found a decedent
director's estate liable for breaches of her duty of due care in the over-
sight of a reinsurance company.250 The deceased director, the largest
shareholder of the company, acquiesced in the behavior of the other
directors-her two sons-including their misappropriation of funds,
which caused damage to the company. 25 ' The court found that the
director's neglect of her duty of care contributed to the climate of
corruption and that her failure to act contributed to her sons' corrup-
tion.252 The court identified the minimum guidelines that a director
must follow to discharge her duty of care:
[1] [A] director should become familiar with the fundamentals of
the business in which the corporation is engaged.
[2] Directors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed
about the activities of the corporation.
[3] Directorial management does not require a detailed inspec-
tion of day-to-day activities, but rather a general monitoring of
corporate affairs and policies.
[4] While directors are not required to audit corporate books,
they should maintain familiarity with the financial status of the
corporation by a regular review of financial statements.
[5] The review of financial statements... may give rise to a duty
to inquire further into matters revealed by those statements. Upon
discovery of an illegal course of action, a director has a duty to
object and, if the corporation does not correct the conduct, to
resign....
[6] Sometimes a director may be required to seek the advice of
counsel... [or]... in any appropriate case.., threaten.., suit...
247. Id. at 813.
248. Id. at 813-14.
249. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
250. Id. at 825-26. The court concluded that the decedent had breached her basic duty of
"knowledge and suspension of the business ..." Id. at 826. The extent of her obligation
included review of financial statements and "reasonable attempts at detection and prevention
of the illegal conduct of other officers and directors. Id.
251. Id. at 818-19.
252. Id. at 825-26.
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to prevent illegal conduct by co-directors. 25 3
The court concluded that the decedent had acted merely as a figure-
head director, in violation of the New Jersey Business Corporation
Act.
25 4
In Joy,255 a stockholder brought a derivative suit alleging that
bank directors had breached their duty of care when they made
unsecured loans to a construction company.256 The court allowed the
stockholders to maintain their action, noting that "the loss to City
Trust resulted from decisions which put the bank in a classic no-win
situation. ' 2 7 The court, however, outlined the role of the duty of
care in corporate governance before reaching its conclusion.258
Whereas tort law negligence attaches liability for errors in judgment,
corporate negligence rarely holds a director liable for bad decisions
made within the scope of the director's responsibility.259 Though the
court leaned toward a lenient duty of care standard, the loan at issue
"smelled" of impropriety.2"° The court thus found that outside direc-
tors who approved the loan would be responsible if they had abdi-
cated their directional responsibility in approving the insiders'
presentation of the loan agreement.261
The majority of states codify one of the common law standards
of care.262 Most of these state statutes, patterned after section 8.30 of
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act,263 adopt the "ordina-
rily prudent person in like circumstances" standard. Other state stat-
253. Id. at 821-23 (citations omitted).
254. Id. at 825-26.
255. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
256. Id. at 884.
257. Id. at 896.
258. Id. at 885.
259. Id. at 885-86. "[T]he fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or
officers simply for bad judgment..." because of the business judgment rule. Id. See infra part
III.B.2.
260. See id at 894-95.
261. Id. at 896 ("Directors who willingly allow others to make major decisions affecting the
future of the corporation wholly without supervision or oversight may not defend on their lack
of knowledge, for that ignorance itself is a breach of fiduciary duty.").
262. For a discussion of state corporate fiduciary laws, see KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note
198, § 2.02, at 38.
263. Section 8.30 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act provides that
(A) A director shall discharge his duties as a director ...
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of a
corporation.
Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 8.30 (1983).
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utes adopt different common law standards.26 Omitting any direct
statutory reference to a duty of care, these state statutes enumerate
certain acts for which directors will be held liable. 26- Delaware and
twelve other states did not enact the Revised Model Business Corpo-
ration Act or any other due care standards, permitting the courts to
develop due care standards.266
2. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Although the duty of care doctrine closely resembles negligence
doctrine in tort law, the business judgment rule limits courts from
holding corporate directors liable for many seemingly negligent
actions. 267 The business judgment rule precludes liability where a
director, in an informed business decision, acts in good faith and in
the belief that such a decision is in the best interest of the corpora-
tion.268 However, under a duty of care gross negligence regime, the
business judgment rule does not protect managers from egregious
uninformed business decisions.269 The practical effect of the business
judgment rule is that, short of directorial gross negligence, courts
refrain from finding a director liable for what ultimately turns out to
be a poor business decision.270 Courts generally will not second-guess
264. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 198, § 2.02, at 40.
265. Id. § 2.02, at 40 n.14.
266. JOHN F. OLSON & JOSIAH 0. HATCH, III, DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE, §§ 1.06(4) at 1-28 (1990). However, Delaware did adopt
provisions permitting directors to rely on records and presentations by other officers or
employees of the corporation where the officer or employee "ha[d] been selected with
reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation." Id. citing Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 141(e),
amended by 66 Del. 'Laws, C. 136 (1987 Interim Supp.). Delaware's change toward the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act standard with the reliance statute prompted the
other twelve states to adopt similar due care statutory provisions. Id. at 1-29. Many of the
state statutory enactments were amended in the wake of the liability crisis of the mid-1980s to
limit director and officer liability after Trans Union. See infra part III.C.2.
267. For a comprehensive overview of the business judgment rule, see KNEPPER & BAILEY,
supra note 198, § 6.01-6.17, at 179-208. See also OLSON & HATCH, supra note 266, at 1-8. For
a discussion of the operation of the business judgment rule before Trans Union, see Stuart R.
Cohn, Demise of the Directors' Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions
Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983).
268. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (emphasizing that the business
judgment rule protects directors who act "on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the
honest belief that [a business decision] was in the company's best interest). See also A.L.I.,
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, draft no. 11, § 4.01, at
176-77 (hereinafter "A.L.I.") ("A director or officer has a duty to [her] corporation to perform
[her] functions in good faith, in a manner that [she] reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation ... ").
269. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); and Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d. 858, 873 (Del. 1983), discussed infra part III.C. The gross negligence standard of
FIRREA is discussed infra part IV.C.
270. See Cohn, supra note 267, at 591 (arguing that the business judgment rule has
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the viability of a business decision as long as the directors made the
decision in good faith and without self-dealing.27'
The business judgment rule recognizes that managers need
autonomy in decisionmaking in order to exercise individual business
acumen based on a particular corporation's needs.2 72 As a result, the
business judgment rule encourages creative corporate decisionmaking,
which in turn maximizes corporate (shareholder) profits.27 a Judicial
review of directorial business decisions is perceived as both incompe-
tent and inefficient because courts are insulated from market
restraints that check the activities of corporate directors and, as such,
are inept decisionmakers in a competitive business environment.274
superseded the duty of care as a fiduciary standard). For discussion of the dearth of cases
finding managerial negligence despite the business judgment rule, see Alan R. Palmiter,
Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L.
REV. 1351, 1360 n.21 (1989); and Bradley & Schipani, supra note 66, at 22 n.137. See also
KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 198, § 6.01, at 181. Knepper and Bailey list the "essential
components" for the successful operation of the business judgment rule:
(1) the absence of personal interest or self-dealing;
(2) an informed decision, attributable to a rational business purpose, based on a
reasonable effort to learn the facts;
(3) a reasonable belief that the decision is in the best interests of the
corporation; and
(4) good faith.
Id. (citing Joseph Hinsey IV, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate
Governance Project.- The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 610
(1984)).
271. Delaware courts traditionally found decisions to be in good faith when attributed to
"any rational business purpose." Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971);
Palmiter, supra note 270, at 1359 n.17; but see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985).
272. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
The Joy court noted that the nature of the corporate business enterprise oftentimes demands
"quick decisions based on less than perfect information." Id. The role of the corporate board
is to balance risk, uncertainty and profitability in arriving at a business decision. The
ineffectiveness and inefficiency of reconstructing this balance makes "after-the-fact litigation
... a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions." Id.
273. Without the business judgment rule, the corporate fiduciary regime would stifle
decisionmaking to the detriment of shareholder/ownership. "Because potential profit often
corresponds to the potential risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law
not create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions." Id. at 886. A fiduciary
suppression of risktaking would ruin the opportunity for portfolio diversification, and would
deprive the shareholder of the opportunity to spread risk and choose less or more risky
investments based on profit incentive. Id. The Joy court's single-minded consideration of
shareholder profit goals supports the judiciary's adoption of the traditional model of the
corporation. See supra part II.
274. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259,
1288 (1982) (asserting that courts not subject to the constraints of market forces make inferior
decisions); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management In Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1196-97 (1981)
(arguing that market restraints are a better regulator of corporate decisionmaking than the
courts).
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Commentators have argued that the business judgment rule swal-
lows the duty of care by permitting directors to escape liability for bad
business decisions.275 However, the business judgment rule does not
completely eviscerate the duty of care because directors must still gen-
erally prove that their decisions were not motivated by self-interest
and were informed by all reasonably available, material informa-
tion.2 76 Furthermore, the business judgment rule does not protect
management from breaches of loyalty to the corporation.277
3. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
To ensure directorial decisionmaking devoted to the interests of
the corporation, corporate fiduciary law imposes upon management a
duty of loyalty to the corporation.278 The duty of loyalty prohibits
fraud and self-interested corporate decisionmaking. 279 The underly-
ing premise is that management's primary obligation is to the corpo-
ration and that managers should not use their positions of trust to
further personal interests.28 °
Duty of loyalty litigation focuses primarily on five areas of direc-
275. Perhaps the most widely cited commentary on the power of the business judgment safe
harbor to overcome claims of negligence is by Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and
Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE
L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968) ("The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations
have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search
for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack.").
276. The emasculation of the business judgment rule in the mid-1980s, particularly in the
Trans Union decision and the resulting liability crisis, inspired statutory responses limiting
managerial liability in much the same way the business judgment rule traditionally protected
management. The statutes all generally include a requirement of good faith and informed
decisionmaking. For a discussion of the statutory responses to Trans Union, see infra part
III.C.2.
277. See Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he business
judgment rule presupposes that the director has no conflict of interest.").
278. The duty of loyalty mandates management's "undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation ... [without] conflict between duty and self interest." Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d
503, 510 (Del. 1939). But perhaps the most famous articulation of the duty of loyalty is found
in the partnership context:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden by those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
279. The American Law Institute terms the duty of loyalty "the duty of fair dealing." In an
introductory note, the drafters of Part V of the Principles of Corporate Governance offer "the
duty of fair dealing ... [as] ... a minimum number of rules in cases where a director, officer,
or controlling shareholder acts with a pecuniary interest in a matter." A.L.I., supra note 268,
at 259.
280. See OLSON & HATCH, supra note 266, at 1-4.
1232
FIRREA
tor malfeasance. 21  First is the self-dealing transaction where the
director stands to gain personally from a transaction under board
consideration.282 The second area of duty of loyalty litigation is exec-
utive and director compensation.283 Courts will find a breach of loy-
alty when the -compensation does not bear some minimal relation to
services rendered. 2 4 A third way for officers and directors to breach
their duty of loyalty is by usurping a business opportunity that might
have benefited the corporation. 28 5 To avoid corporate opportunity lia-
281. Id. For an overview of duty of loyalty litigation, see KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note
198, 81-25; CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 198, at 556-719; JESSE H. CHOPER, ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, at 268-333.
282. See A.L.I., supra note 268, § 5.02, at 273-74. The drafters of the Principles of
Corporate Governance describe the requirements for a director to fulfill in a transaction with
the corporation. The duty of fair dealing is met if:
(1) disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the transaction is made to
the corporate decisionmaker who authorizes in advance or ratifies the
transaction; and
(2) (A) the transaction is fair to the corporation when entered into; or
(B) the transaction is authorized in advance, following such disclosure, by
disinterested directors ... who could have concluded that the transaction
was fair to the corporation at the time of such authorization; or
(C) the transaction is authorized or ratified, following such disclosure, by
disinterested shareholders, and does not constitute a waste of corporate
assets at the time of the shareholder action.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Globe Woolen v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 121 N.E. 378
(N.Y. 1918) (interested director had a duty to warn by disclosure of the unfair nature of a
contract in addition to the unexpected disclosure of interest and abstention from voting);
Lewis v. S.L. & E, 629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980) (the defendant director has the burden to prove
the fairness of the transaction once a conflict of interest is found); but .f Eliasberg v. Standard
Oil Co., 92 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952) (court shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiffs to
prove unfairness); see also Alcott v. Hyman, 208 A.2d 501, 507 (Del. 1965) (noting that if
stockholders ratify a transaction, interested directors must only prove that the decision to
proceed with the transaction was based on sound business judgment).
283. Compensation levels generally fulfill the duty of loyalty/fair dealing if:
(1) the compensation is fair...; or
(2) authorized in advance or ratified by disinterested directors or... authorized
in advance by a disinterested superior, in a manner that satisfies the standards of
the business judgment rule; or
(3) the compensation is authorized in advance or ratified, by disinterested
shareholders, and does not constitute a waste of corporate assets ....
A.L.I., supra note 268, § 5.03, at 313.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933) (refusing to justify bonuses approved by
shareholders where they constitute a sum so large as to amount to a spoilation or waste of
corporate property); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979) (stock options given to
director challenged in stockholder derivative suit); Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731 (Del. 1960)
(requiring a reasonable relationship between the value of stock options granted to directors and
the benefit derived by the corporation by granting the options); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S. 2d
653 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (noting the difficulties involved in resolving the "entangled economic
problems" of compensation and concluding that courts should not resolve such issues).
284. See supra note 283.
285. A director or officer may not take a corporate opportunity unless she first "offers the
opportunity to the corporation" with complete disclosures, the corporation rejects the
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bility, managers have to offer the opportunity with full disclosure to
the corporation and a majority of disinterested directors must reject
it.286 Directors also may usurp a corporate opportunity when they
compete unfairly with the corporation upon termination of their serv-
ices.287 A fourth type of loyalty breach can arise during a fundamen-
tal change in corporate control.28 8 Some courts have also held that
directors and majority stockholders owe a fiduciary duty to both the
corporation and the minority shareholders not to derive a personal
gain or cause harm to the corporation through a windfall stock sale of
control or office.289
opportunity, and the rejection is "fair to the corporation or authorized by disinterested
directors, executives or shareholders. A.L.I., supra note 268, at § 5.05(a). Corporate
opportunity is any business opportunity arising in connection with a director's or officer's
service to the corporation which she believes the offeree expects to be offered to the
corporation or believes to be of interest to the corporation. Id. at § 5.05(b)(1). Furthermore,
any senior executive usurps a corporate opportunity when she engages in a business activity
"closely related" to the corporation or "in which the corporation is engaged or expects to
engage." Id. at § 5.05(b)(2).
286. Courts have articulated several variations of the corporate opportunity doctrine. The
interest/expectancy test finds the taking of a corporate opportunity where an officer or director
engages in a business activity in which the corporation has an existing interest or an
expectancy of interest. Another judicial measure, the line of business test, determines a
corporate opportunity where the corporation has a "fundamental knowledge, practical
experience, and an ability to pursue" a business activity that is readily adaptable to a
corporation's "needs and aspirations for expansion." Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 514 (Del.
1939). The fairness test focuses on the individual business taking fairness to the interests of the
corporation. See E.G. Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 80 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 1948). Yet,
another test combines the line of business and fairness analyses. See Miller v. Miller, 222
N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1974); Kliniki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985). For a discussion of
the corporate opportunity standards, see CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 198, at 640-42.
287. Corporate directors and officers unfairly compete with the corporation except where
"there is no reasonably foreseeable harm to the corporation," where the benefits to the
corporation outweigh such harm, or where the competition is authorized or ratified by
disinterested directors, a disinterested superior, or disinterested shareholders. A.L.I., supra
note 268, at § 5.06(a). See, e.g., Karpinski v. Inglasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971) (court will
uphold covenants not to compete only if they are limited to a reasonable area, line, and scope);
Aero Drapery of Kentucky, Inc. v. Engdahl, 507 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974) (court held
that a corporate fiduciary may not set up a competitive enterprise or resign and take key
personnel for the purpose of operating a competitive enterprise).
288. In a transfer of control, one or more directors or officers are interested, the interested
party[s] must prove the fairness of the transaction to the shareholders of the corporation
unless, after full disclosure, the transfer of control receives disinterested approval, where the
party asserting the breach bears the burden of proving a "waste of corporate assets." A.L.I.,
supra note 268, at § 5.15, at 465-66.
289. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962) (Purchasers of a
controlling block of stock, in the absence of a showing of detrimental effect to the corporation,
are permitted to take control of office); Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) (A
director owes fiduciary duties to both the corporation and minority shareholders); Zahn v.
Transamerica, 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (A majority shareholder breached his fiduciary duty
to the minority shareholders by initiating a share redemption that denies the minority
shareholders a higher redeemable value while ensuring himself the higher redeemable value);
1234
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The duty of loyalty, like the duty of care, evolved from the ten-
sion in the corporate structure created by the separation of ownership
and management.290 Central to the Berle and Means thesis is man-
agement's potential exploitation of ownership wealth.2 91 The duty of
loyalty attempts to reconcile the ownership and control conflict by
ensuring that managers subordinate their own transactional interests
to those of the corporation, under threat of personal liability.
C. Expanded Liability and Fear
Despite the imposition of the duty of care and the duty of loy-
alty, the ownership/control debate flourished. In 1985, the Delaware
Supreme Court significantly changed the corporate fiduciary doctrine
in a decision that heightened managerial accountability to share-
holder-ownership. Smith v. Van Gorkom ("Trans Union")29 2 rede-
fined the relationship between the duty of care and the business
judgment rule. Extensive literature293 and subsequent sweeping state
DeBaun v. First Western Bank & Trust Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1975) (where a purchaser of
control looted a corporation, the seller was held liable for the corporation's lost net worth, lost
going concern value, and unpaid debts because the Seller became aware of facts that would
have alerted a prudent person that the buyer was likely to loot the corporation.); Brown v.
Halibert, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969) (Holding controlling shareholder/director liable for
diverting a purchaser from a merger with the corporation to the purchase of the director's
stock only, at a higher price); Jones v. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969) (Controlling
shareholders cannot use their position to contrive a marketing scheme benefitting them alone
while subordinating the value of the minority shares. Majority shareholders have a duty to use
their power in a fair, just and equitable manner); Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 198 N.E.2d 908
(N.Y. 1964) ("The underlying principle is that the management of a corporation is not the
subject of trade and cannot be bought apart from actual stock control.., where there has been
a transfer of the majority of stock, or even such a percentage as gives working control, a
change of directors.., is proper"); Carter v. Muscat, 21 A.D.2d 543, 251 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1964)
(Noting that working control through an acquisition of stock is required to affect control of the
Board of Directors absent a stockholder election with full knowledge of the director's
accession to the board, approving the director's membership on the board); Gerdes v.
Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941) (Director/shareholders had a duty to insure that the
corporation would not be left in jeopardy after a corporate sale of control and director
resignation.). The majority of case law does however permit the sale of a controlling share of
stock at a premium. See Zetlin v. Housan Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1979) (Noting
that it has been settled law that, absent looting of corporate assets, conversion of a corporate
opportunity, fraud or other acts of bad faith, a controlling stockholder is free to sell, and a
purchaser is free to buy, that controlling interest at a premium price); cf. Seagrave Corp. v.
Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 1954); Doleman v. Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480
(9th Cir. 1984).
290. For an overview of the historical evaluation of the duty of loyalty, see McMurray,
supra note 102, at 623-28.
291. See BERLE & MEANS, supra part II.A.
292. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
293. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case,
40 Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985); Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of
Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187 (1986); Bayless Manning, Reflections and
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statutory reforms 294 document the significance of Trans Union and
presage the potential effects of FIRREA on the corporate boardrooms
of insured depository institutions.
1. TRANS UNION AND THE NEW FIDUCIARY REGIME
In Trans Union, shareholders claimed that the corporation's
directors had breached their duty of care in an attempted cash-out
merger proposed by Jerome Van Gorkom, chairman of Trans Union,
and Jay Pritzker, a corporate takeover specialist.295 Van Gorkom
offered to sell Trans Union to Pritzker for fifty-five dollars per
share,296 a price on the low end of the fair-market value range for the
company.297 Van Gorkom did not disclose to the board of directors
that the fifty-five dollar price was low, and left the board to assume
that Van Gorkom and Pritzker had negotiated the price.298  After
Van Gorkom gave a twenty-minute presentation about the merger,
the board discussed the merger for two hours and ratified the proposal
without further review. 299 Furthermore, the board approved amend-
ments based primarily upon Van Gorkom's oral representations and
later approved additional amendments to the merger agreement
"sight unseen," again based on Van Gorkom's representations. °°
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the board of directors
had breached its duty of care by failing to make an informed business
decision on the merger proposal a.30  Although the court did not abol-
ish the business judgment rule's application to corporate transactions,
it concluded that the rule applied only after a board had shown that it
based its business decision on all information reasonably available.30 2
Trans Union thus altered the relationship between the duty of care
and the business judgment rule by requiring directors to prove that
they were not negligent in the decisionmaking process before receiv-
ing the protection of the business judgment rule. This requirement
Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985); William
T. Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment and Neutral Principles, 10 DEL J. CORP. L. 465;
Stephen A. Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 707 (March 1988).
294. See infra part III.C.3.
295. 488 A.2d at 863.
296. Id. at 866-67.
297. Id. at 867 n.6.
298. Id. at 868.
299. Id. at 868-69. When officers of Trans Union balked at the merger and threatened to
resign, Van Gorkom and Pritzker agreed to amend the proposal to ensure the continued
employment of dissident officers.
300. Id. at 869.
301. Id. at 884.
302. Id. at 872.
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effectively extended the duty-of-care negligence standard to the pro-
cess of deliberative decisionmaking, compelling stricter diligence for
directors before they reached the safe harbor of the business judgment
rule.303
2. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TRANS UNION
Corporate communities in Delaware and across the nation soon
felt the impact of Trans Union. The cost of liability insurance became
prohibitive as premiums soared. 3°1 Potential directors declined cor-
porate positions to avoid liability and existing corporate directors
resigned. 30 5  Both feared extraordinary personal liability from deci-
sions made in corporate service in exchange for frequently nominal
compensation. Fearing the demise of Delaware's "corporate cradle"
as a result of Trans Union and the liability insurance crisis it gener-
ated, the Delaware legislature enacted section 102(b)(7) of title 8 of
the Delaware Code.30 6 The Delaware legislature sought to alleviate
the director and officer liability crisis by limiting directors' liability in
section 102(b)(7). 307 Other state legislatures, following Delaware's
lead, enacted a variety of measures limiting director liability to attract
capable and qualified persons to board service.308
303. In effect, under Trans Union, courts could second-guess managerial business judgment
as to the method and choice of business deliberation.
304. Andrea Bennett, Losses Spur Spate of Suits Against Managers, AM. BANKER, Aug. 8,
1985, at 1; Frank A. Beranek, Outlook for Blanket Bonds and Directors'and Officers'Liability,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 15, 1985, at 4; Insurer's Failure to Insure Directors Could Ensure Them
Some Worries, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1983, at 23; Kenneth Labich, Showdown Over Insuring
Corporate Officers-When Chase and BankAmerica Tried to Collect Big Damages by Suing
Their Employees, the Insurance Companies Cried Foull, FORTUNE, Dec. 9, 1985, at 70; Robin
Schatz, Focus on Corporate Boards-Directors Feel the Legal Heat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1985,
at F12; see also Daniel Hertzberg, Insurers Beginning to Refuse Coverage On Directors, Officers
in Takeover Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1986, at A3.
305. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 66, at 47.
306. 1986 DEL. LAWS ch. 289 amending DEL. CEN. CORP. LAW § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
The Delaware statute permits corporations to include in the articles of incorporation:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty
to the corporation or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith
or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law ...
(iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit.
Id.
307. See supra note 304.
308. For a discussion of the variety of state statutory proposals and enactments, see James
J. Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legislation on D&O Liability Limitation and
Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988). Hanks summarizes the liability limitation
enactments as follows:
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Section 102(b)(7) permits corporate charters to circumscribe
damages for breaches of directors' duty of care not involving bad faith
or intentional misconduct.3 °9 It limits liability in shareholders' direct
or derivative litigation, but not in suits by governmental agencies and
other third parties. 310  As a result of section 102(b)(7), many firms
that previously were deterred from incorporation by Trans Union,
again "raced" to incorporate in Delaware. 31 1 Arguably, under section
102(b)(7), the Delaware Supreme Court would exonerate the Trans
Union directors from liability for failing to inform themselves ade-
quately absent a showing of bad faith or intentional misconduct.
312
Other state legislatures have enacted statutory provisions limit-
ing director liability.31 3 Certain states have employed liability limita-
(1) Authorizing charter provisions eliminating or limiting personal liability for
money damages ("charter option statutes");
(2) Changing the standard of liability for money damages to require more than
gross negligence ("self-executing statutes");
(3) Capping on liability for monetary damages;
(4) Expanding the corporation's right to indemnify against judgments,
settlements, and expenses in derivative suits;
(5) Expanding nonexclusivity provisions;
(6) Expanding the criteria that directors may consider in reaching decisions
"other constituency statutes"); and
(7) Authorizing reimbursement from sources other than conventional
insurance.
Id. at 1210. The vast majority of states had enacted liability limitation statutes by the end of
the 1980s in response to "both the realities, and the business community's perceptions of the
liability crisis..." OLSON & HATCH, supra note 266, at § 5.01, at 5-2.
309. See supra note 306.
310. See supra note 306.
311. See Cary, supra note 33, for a discussion of the "race to the bottom" as states seek to
attract prospective corporations through permissive corporate laws. For an excellent
empirical analysis of the effect of the Trans Union decision, see Bradley & Schipani, supra note
66.
312. The Delaware court found that the board members were grossly negligent for failing
adequately to inform themselves. 488 A.2d at 874. Given the absence of bad faith, breaches of
loyalty, intentional misconduct or violations of law in the opinion, a 102(b)(7) corporate
provision would either "limit" or "eliminate" monetary liability for breaches of fiduciary duty
depending upon the particular language of the corporate charter. See Bradley & Schipani,
supra note 66, at 43. In fact, Justice McNeilly in the Trans Union dissent argued for the
application of the business judgment rule because of the directors expert ability to make
corporate decisions such as the sale of the corporation. 488 A.2d at 894-95 (McNeilly, J.,
dissenting).
313. Reviving the debate in the corporate governance scholarship between the coercionists
and contractarians on mandatory or default. corporate laws, the various state provisions
limiting director liability in the wake of Trans Union are either mandatory changes in the due
care standard or optional charter amendment provisions. The charter amendment provisions
permit a corporation, at the choice of its stockholders, to amend the corporate charter to
reflect a limitation on due care liability. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(l)(N) (Supp. 1989)
(optional/charter amendment); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-054(A)(9) (Supp. 1989)
(optional/charter amendment); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3) (Supp. 1989) (optional/
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tion methods different from Delaware's charter-option statute.314
charter amendment); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 204(a)(10) and 204.5 (West Supp. 1990) (optional/
charter amendment); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-3-101(u) and 7-2-102(l.5)(d) (Supp. 1988)
(optional/charter amendment); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-290(c)(2) (1987) (optional/charter
amendment); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988)(optional/charter amendment);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0831 (West Supp. 1990) (mandatory/self enacting); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-202(b)(4) (1989) (optional/charter amendment); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-48A (1985)
(optional/charter amendment); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2) (Supp. 1989) (optional/charter
amendment); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Bums Supp. 1989) (mandatory/self enacting);
IOWA CODE §§ 491.5(8), 496A.49(13) (Supp. 1989) (optional/charter amendment); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020(2)(d) (Mitchie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1989) (optional/charter amendment); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(C)(4)
(West Supp. 1989) (optional/charter amendment); ME. REV. STATE. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716
(West Supp. 1988) (mandatory/self enacting); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 2-
104(b)(8) and 2-405.2 (Supp. 1989) (optional/charter amendment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 156B, § 13(b)(l 1/2) (Mich. Supp. 1989) (optional/charter amendment); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 450.1209(c) (West Supp. 1989) (optional/charter amendment); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 302A.111(u) and 302A.251(4) (West Supp. 1990) (optional/charter amendment);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.345 (Supp. 1990) (mandatory/self enacting); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-
202(e) (1987) (optional/charter amendment); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2035(2) (Supp.
1988) (optional/charter amendment); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037 (Michie Supp. 1989)
(optional/charter amendment); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:54(I-a) (1987) (optional/
charter amendment); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1989) (optional/
charter amendment); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2(E) (Michie Supp. 1988) (optional/charter
amendment); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990) (optional/charter
amendment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11) (Supp. 1989) (optional/charter amendment); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1985) (mandatory/self enacting); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1006(B)(7) (West Supp. 1990) (optional/charter amendment); OR. REV.
STAT. § 60.047(2)(c) (1988) (optional/charter amendment); PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 15, § 1721(e)
(Supp. 1989 and 1989 Special Pamphlet) (optional/charter amendment); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-
1.1-48(a)(6) (Supp. 1988) (optional/charter amendment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-2-102(e)
(Laws Co-op. Supp. 1988) (optional/charter amendment); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-
58.8 (Supp. 1989) (optional/charter amendment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (1988)
(optional/charter amendment); TEX. CORPS. & ASS'NS ANN., § 1302-7.06 (Vernon Supp.
1990) (optional/charter amendment); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1 (Supp. 1989) (optional/
charter amendment); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (1989) (mandatory/self enacting); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (1989) (optional/charter amendment); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23A. 12.020(10)(d) (Supp. 1989) (optional/charter amendment); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.307
(West Supp. 1989) (mandatory/self enacting); WYO. STAT. § 17-1-202(C) (Supp. 1987)
(optional/charter amendment). For a discussion of these statutes, see KNEPPER & BAILEY,
supra note 198, at § 7,204-230; OLSON & HATCH, supra note 266, at §§ 1.07, 1-29-1-37.
314. See supra note 313 for those state statutes that are mandatory/self-enacting changes in
the due care standard.
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Ohio,315 Florida,3 16 and Indiana,3 17 for instance, have lowered the
standard of care expected of corporate directors.3" These statutes
generally require a showing of willful misconduct or recklessness for a
315. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Baldwin Supp. 1985). Ohio's due care provisions
as amended in the aftermath of the Trans Union liability crisis read in pertinent part:
. (C) (I) A director shall not be found to have violated his duties under
division (B) of this section unless it is proved ... the director has not acted in
good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation, or with the care than an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position would use under similar circumstances, in any action brought
against a director ....
(D) A director shall be liable in damages for any action he takes or fails to
take as a director only if it is proved ... that his action or failure to act involved
an act or omission undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the
corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the
corporation ....
316. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0831 (West Supp. 1990). Florida's due care liability limitation
provisions read in pertinent part:
607.0831. LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS
(1) A director is not personally liable ... unless:
(a) The director breached or failed to perform his duties as a director; and
(b) The director's breach of, or failure to perform, those duties constitutes:
1. A violation of the criminal law....
2. A transaction from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit, either directly or indirectly;
4. In a proceeding ... in the right of a shareholder, conscious disregard for
the best interest of the corporation, or willful misconduct; or
5. In a proceeding by or in the right of someone other than the corporation
or a shareholder, recklessness or an act or omission which was committed in bad
faith or with malicious purpose ....
317. IND CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Bums Supp. 1989). Indiana's due care provisions read
in pertinent part:
(a) A director shall, based on facts then known to the director, discharge the
duties as a director .....
(1) In good faith;
(2) With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) In a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation.
(e) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure
to take any action, unless:
(1) The director has breached or failed to perform the duties of the
director's office in compliance with this section; and
(2) The breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or
recklessness.
318. For an excellent discussion of the differences in the state statutes found supra notes
313-317, see KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 198, at § 7.05-7.09, 219-24.
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director to incur duty of care liability. a 9 Unlike section 102(b)(7), 2°
the statutes lowering the duty of care standard are self-executing and
do not require amendments to the corporate charter. a2'
Another approach to limiting director liability imposes a cap on
monetary awards in duty of care lawsuits. a22 Virginia limits director
liability to $100,000.323 The Virginia legislature, however, went even
further by permitting individual corporations to limit director liability
to as little as one dollar with stockholder approval.3 24 Many states
have also adopted indemnification statutes permitting the corporation
to reimburse directors suffering damage losses in fiduciary duty litiga-
tion. 25 In sum, the state statutes limiting director and officer liability
319. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.0831(l)(b)(4)-(5) (West Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Burns Supp.
1989).
320. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1985).
321. The Ohio, Indiana and Florida statutes limiting liability may be "opted out" by
corporate amendment or bylaws. For Ohio opt out provisions, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.59(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1985). For Indiana corporations "opting out" of the liability
limiting statute, see KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 198, at § 7.05, 219.
322. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (1989).
323. Id. The Virginia due care provisions read in pertinent part:
A. In any proceeding brought by a shareholder in the right of a
corporation or brought by or on behalf of shareholders of the corporation, the
damages assessed against an officer or director arising out of a single transaction,
occurrence or course of conduct shall not exceed the lesser of:
1. The monetary amount specified in the articles of incorporation or ....
2. The greater of (i) $100,000 or (ii) the amount of cash compensation
received by the officer or director from the corporation during the twelve months
immediately preceding the act or omission for which liability was imposed.
B. The liability of an officer or director shall not be limited.., if the officer
or director engaged in willful misconduct or a knowing violation of the criminal
law or of any federal or state securities law .....
324. Id. at (A)(1).
325. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-21 (1987); CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-320(a) (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1988); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 29-304(16) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. 607.014 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-2-850 to 859 (1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.75 (Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-1-37-1 to -15 (Burns Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.4A (West Supp. 1989);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305 (1988); MD. CORPS. & ASs'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418 (Supp. 1989);
MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (West Supp. 1989); MICH. CORP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 450.1561 to -.1571 (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 362A.521 (West Supp. 1990); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 79-4-8.50 to -8.58 (Supp. 1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.355 (Vernon Supp.
1990); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-5 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 721-726
(McKinney Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (Supp. 1988); PA. CONS. STAT.
tit. 15, § 1741-1750 (Supp. 1989 and 1989 Special Pamphlet); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4.1
(1988); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art 2.02-1 (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1852(15) (1984); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-696 to -704 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 23A.08.025 (Supp. 1989); W.VA. CODE § 31-1-9 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.042 to
.059 (West Supp. 1989). For a comprehensive discussion of Indemnification, see OLSON &
HATCH, supra note 266, at §§ 4-9.
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alleviated fears that corporations would be unable to attract experts in
corporate business to directorship positions after Trans Union,32 6 and
fueled a resurgence in the director and officer liability insurance
327
market.
IV. SAVINGS AND LOAN INSTITUTIONS: A CORPORATE
FORM IN CRISIS
In the 1980s, one of the United States' major corporate indus-
tries, savings and loan institutions, faced economic crisis. Congress
responded by restructuring the regulatory apparatus that had gov-
erned savings and loans since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Per-
haps most significantly, Congress reformulated the corporate
fiduciary regime, which had existed since the Berle and Means thesis
attempted to resolve the ownership and control problem of the mod-
em corporation.328 The Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)329 abrogates the state statutory
corporate governance schemes that have limited director and officer
liability since the Trans Union decision.330
New issues in corporate governance arise in the context of a fed-
erally regulated corporate financial industry. The federal government
and Congress, driven by a public enraged by a $500 billion bill33' and
a depressed economy, have sought to find scapegoats in the board-
room of failed savings and loans institutions. Because of a few high-
326. For an overview of the effects of the state statutory liability limitations, see Bradley &
Schipani, supra note 66; Thomas C. Lee, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability: Delaware's
Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239
(1987); Steven J. Schleicher, Director Liability Dilemma: Providing Relief for Executive
Anxiety, 56 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 367 (1988); Stacy D. Blank, Delaware Amendment Relaxes
Director's Liability, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111 (1987); James J., Hanks, Jr., Evaluating
Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43
Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988); Dale A. Oesterle, The Effect of Statutes Limiting Directors Due Care
Liability on Hostile Takeover Defenses, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1989); Norman Veasey
et al., Delaware Supports Directors with Limited Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42
Bus. LAW. 399 (1987).
327. For a comprehensive discussion of director and officer liability insurance, see OLSON &
HATCH, supra note 266, at §§ 10, 10-2, 10-5.
328. For a discussion of the Berle and Means ownership and control problem, see supra
part II.A.
329. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15
U.S.C.).
330. For a discussion of the Trans Union decision and the subsequent state legislation, see
supra part III.C.
331. Although experts disagree on the eventual cost of the crisis the United States General
Accounting Office estimates the cost of thrift crisis "could be as much as $500 billion over the
next 40 years." Testimony of Assistant Comptroller General, The United States General
Accounting Office, before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United
States Senate, Aug. 1, 1990 (on file with author).
1242
FIRREA
profile directors who allegedly breached their duties to their institu-
tions, and because of the widespread failure in the industry, Congress
has conducted a legislative witch hunt aimed at many innocent direc-
tors.332 To this day, the federal government grapples with the polit-
ical and financial problems associated with the savings and loan crisis
as the cost of the bailout continues to rise.333
The volume of present and potential litigation is expected to
exceed 100,000 suits. 334  Some of the nation's largest law firms are
devoting more and more of their resources to savings and loan litiga-
tion as fees rise to astronomical levels.335 In the interim, the federal
government has added hundreds of lawyers to its payroll to pursue
the lengthy and complex litigation arising from the savings and loan
crisis.336 Much of the litigation focuses on shareholders' and regula-
tors' pursuit of claims against the officers and directors of failed sav-
ings and loans. 337 The former board members of savings and loans
face increasing liability as federal regulators take over insolvent
thrifts.33 s
As a result, the 1990s may become known as the decade in which
financial institutions were unable to effectively recruit qualified
outside directors, and ultimately the decade in which the savings and
loan industry, after years of deregulatory and reregulatory measures,
332. See Investigation of Lincoln Savings & Loan Association, Hearings Before the House
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter
Lincoln Hearings] (House of Representatives investigation of the "notorious" Charles Keating
of Lincoln Savings and Loan); Silverado Banking, Savings and Loan Association, Hearings
Before The House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1990) [hereinafter Silverado Hearings] (House of Representatives investigation of President
Bush's son Neil Bush's involvement in the Silverado Savings and Loan Scandal); Centrust
Bank, State Savings Bank, Hearing Before The House Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 101st Congress, 2nd Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Centrust Hearings] (House of
Representative investigation of David Paul's involvement in the demise of Miami's Centrust
Savings Bank) (on file with author).
333. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Politics of Denying an S&L Crisis- The Bush
Administration's Refusal to Acknowledge the Size of the S&L Problem only Increases the
Damages, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1989, at 3.
334. Former FDIC chairman William Seidman predicted that 100,000 lawsuits would
result from the S&L crisis. Robert L. Mashek, Seidman Sees 100,000 Lawsuits From S&L
Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1990, at 1.
335. Miriam Rozen, The Bailout Bonanza Continues; More Fees, More Firms, More
Headaches, AM. LAW., Sept. 1990, at 82.
336. See Mashek, supra note 334 (FDIC Chairman Seidman reports on the hiring of more
FDIC lawyers).
337. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Review of Director and officer Liability: Indemnification and
Insurance, 47 Bus. LAW. 355 (1991) ("New actions are commenced daily against officers and
directors by the FDIC and the RTC...").
338. David Tobenkin, New S&L Regulations Tag Directors for Penalties, L.A. Bus. J., Jan.
15, 1990, Sec. 1, at 30.
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finally capitulated. 339 The great irony is that the outside directors, the
corporate monitors, are most dearly needed in the industry. The sav-
ings and loan industry faces an ever more difficult, if not entirely
futile, road to recovery if these institutions are unable to attract quali-
fied managers. Under the fiduciary regime of FIRREA, directors'
and officers' fears of expanding liability and the concurrent crisis in
director and officer liability insurance in the mid-1980s will poten-
tially be relived in the 1990s. Whatever the fallout from FIRREA,
traditional notions of corporate governance are reevaluated and to a
large extent discarded in the new federal statutory and regulatory
scheme.
A. The Savings and Loan: An American Success Story?
1. BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS AND EARLY THRIFTS
The earliest savings and loan institutions in the United States
were formed over 150 years ago .3' Early thrifts known as building
associations consisted of shareholders, each of whom invested in the
organization. 341 The building association required shareholders to
make contributions to fund individual members' home construc-
tion. 42 When construction of all homes was completed the building
association closed.343 Building associations gradually evolved into
building and loan associations that loaned money to shareholders
building their own homes and financed the purchase of existing
homes. 3 "
339. Jay Baris, Thrifts With Help, Have Outlived Usefulness, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 1989,
at 4; Peter F. Blackman, Thrift Officials Face Added Liability After Feds Take Over S&Ls, L.A.
Bus. J., April 9, 1990, Sec. 1, at 1.
340. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10. According to Brumbaugh "[t]he first American thrift
institution, the Oxford Provident Building Association, was organized in Frankford,
Pennsylvania, on January 3, 1831." Id. at 3. STEPHEN PIZZO ET AL., INSIDE JOB: THE
LOOTING OF AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOANS (1989). "The First Savings and Loan in the
United States-then called a "building and loan"... [was] ... tailored after building and loan
societies in England." Id. at 9. PAUL Z. PILZER & ROBERT DEITZ, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE S&L MESS (1989). The early British Building and Loan
societies were called "friendly savings societies." Usually local parish churches or
philanthropic landed gentrymen supported these early savings and loans to encourage local
townspeople to save for old age or illness annuities. Id. at 18-19.
341. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 3. PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340, at 26-27.
342. Id.
343. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 3.
344. Id. PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340, at 27-28. The building and loan societies soon
developed attributes of the modem savings banks as members began to make deposits for later
use as the basis for home loans. Inevitably, some depositors sought the withdrawal of their
accounts prior to maturation and many depositors sought loans quickly. As building and
loans became more flexible in their services, the local society evolved into the local savings
bank, offering withdrawals or principal and interest and immediate home loans. Id.
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Prior to the emergence of the first building and loans, both com-
mercial banks and mutual savings banks offered home loans among
their financial services.3 45 As these organizations grew, however, they
began to specialize in other financial services, such as commercial
loans and demand deposits.3 46 The specialization in different financial
services was reflected on the balance sheets of these institutions.347
Even today, at a time when financial service distinctions begin to blur,
the basic differences in the balance sheets of commercial banks,
mutual savings banks and savings and loans still exist.3 48
By 1890, thrift institutions had spread throughout the United
States,3 49 and large, self-perpetuating thrifts began to replace the early
building and loan associations with their inherently limited life
span.3 0 With middle-class expansion and the help of home mortgage
loans, more and more families found it possible to build and purchase
homes and maintain a savings account.'" As a result, the number of
savings and loan associations increased, and their aggregate assets
eventually exceeded those of the mutual savings bank industry. 52
State and, to a limited extent, federal government regulation
grew alongside the savings and loan industry. 53 By the early 1900s,
345. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 4.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. See infra part IV.A.2. The distinction between the early American financial
institutions was largely "a function of business decisions and ... government limitations of
balance-sheet activities." Id. Historically, financial firms lacked diversification in services.
"Financial 'supermarkets'" offering a broad array of both financial and non-financial services
are modern innovations that ultimately question the utility of savings and loan institutions. Id.
349. Id. at 4-6. LEON T. KENDALL, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN BUSINESS: ITS PURPOSES,
FUNCTIONS, AND ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS 5 (1962). Oklahoma was the final state to offer
a home to a thrift institution in 1890. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 4. "Thrift" is used
interchangeably with savings and loans throughout this Comment. The name "thrift" evolved
with the growth of the first savings and loans because people were encouraged to save and be
thrifty, hence "thrift."
350. Id. The first "self-liquidating" thrifts required shareholding members to receive
mortgage loans. When all thrift members had satisfied their loan obligation, the thrift
association expired. Gradually, however, thrifts began to accept shareholders without
mortgage loan obligations. With expanded membership, thrifts were no longer hampered by a
limited lifespan and the availability of mortgage loan funds grew. Furthermore, national
thrifts with branch offices across the country began to replace the local thrift with its limited
geographical scope. Id. at 4-6. According to Kendall, analysts estimated that between 3,000
and 3,500 thrifts were in existence by 1888, with aggregate assets of $300 million. KENDALL,
supra note 349, at 6.
351. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 6; PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340, at 28.
352. With middle-class expansion, more Americans could afford home ownership, which
spurred the success of the savings and loans in number of institutions, depositors and assets.
Pilzer & Deitz, supra note 340, at 28.
353. KENDALL, supra note 349, at 5-6. State governments regulated thrifts in the late
1800s and early 1900s by "deposits to state officials," "voluntary state examinations," and
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state legislatures began to examine thrifts by monitoring their finan-
cial statements and by regulating the grant of thrift charters.354 Fed-
eral regulation of thrifts, however, did not become prominent until
hundreds of financial institutions failed during the Great
Depression.35 5
2. THE ANATOMY OF A SAVINGS AND LOAN
Other than by name, it is difficult to distinguish savings and loan
institutions from other financial firms in today's market of modem
financial "supermarkets. ' 356 Financial institutions generally fall into
two types: depository financial firms such as savings and loans and
banks, and non-depository financial firms such as insurance compa-
nies, pension funds, brokerage houses, investment banking concerns
and mutual funds. An analysis of a firm's balance sheet distinguishes
savings and loans from other financial and non-financial firms. 357 A
depository financial firm's tangible assets consist primarily of loans,
and its liabilities are mostly deposits.358 A non-financial firm's tangi-
ble assets are usually plant and equipment and its liabilities consist of
debt and equity.359
The distinction between savings and loans and commercial
banks, however, is more obscure. 36° Historically, commercial bank
liabilities were "demand" deposits which depositors could withdraw
at any time, while savings and loan liabilities were generally "time"
deposits, such as savings accounts, which the depositor could only
withdraw after a certain period. 361 The distinction between "time"
and "demand" deposits has faded, and today, the only significant dif-
ference between savings and loan institutions and commercial banks is
their loan maturity term.362 Commercial banks usually make short-
ultimately by "required state examinations." BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 6. State
examiners at that time favored single-family home loans and disapproved loans outside this
traditional savings and loan lending field. State regulators also attempted to ensure the vitality
of individual thrifts by limiting new thrift charters to the needs of the community. Gradually,
regulation focused on thrift balance sheets, effectively prohibiting the diversification of thrift
financial services. Except for a federal tax exemption, the federal government did not regulate
the savings and loan industry until the Great Depression. Id.
354. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 6; see supra note 348.
355. KENDALL, supra note 349, at 6-8.
356. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 4.
357. Id. at 2.
358. Id.
359. Id. In fact, the more frequently financial firms invest directly in real assets, the more
closely they resemble non-financial firms. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
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term commercial loans-savings and loans make long-term home
loans.363
Government regulations have maintained the distinction between
savings and loans and other financial firms such as commercial banks
by prescribing different business activities, capital requirements and
borrowing bases for each.36 In fact, until FIRREA, separate regula-
tory enforcement agencies governed savings and loans and banking
institutions.3 65  The separate regulatory schemes for banks and sav-
ings and loans evolved in Depression era legislation from Congress'
desire to maintain the separation of banking and commerce in the
aftermath and lingering fear of the Depression.366
3. DEPRESSION ERA REGULATION
The Great Depression drastically affected all financial institu-
tions. 367 Thrifts that did not accept demand deposits suffered as indi-
vidual incomes dwindled, prohibiting investment, prompting
withdrawals and causing delinquency in loan repayments at the local
savings association. 36' Because thrifts' assets consisted primarily of
home mortgage loans, they had little cash to meet the rash of with-
drawals.369 As a result, more than 1,700 thrifts failed between 1930
and 1939.370 With financial institutions in chaos, the United States
League of Local Building and Loan Associations, the largest trade
association for the nationally important thrift industry, lobbied for
363. Id.
364. Id. See infra part VI.B for a discussion of the separation of banking and commerce.
365. See infra part IV.A.3 for a discussion of the Depression era regulations and part IV.C
for an overview of FIRREA.
366. See Halpert, supra note 185, at 482. The separation of banking and commerce is a
pervasive tradition in financial institution regulation, with roots extending "three hundred
years under English law." Id. (citations omitted). Both the state and federal governments
achieved the separation of banking and commerce by imposing "substantial legal impediments
to the integration within a firm of both banking and non-banking businesses." Id.
367. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 8. Brumbaugh identifies two periods of economic
difficulty during which thrift institutions suffered dramatic failure. The first occurred during
the Depression of the early 1890s. During this economic crisis, national thrifts disappeared
entirely from the savings association business scene and locally based thrifts suffered as well.
The most notable effect of this crisis was the creation of the United States League of Local
Building and Loan Associations. The "association" of local building and loan associations
later became the United States Savings and Loan League. KENDALL, supra note 349, at 6.
368. KENDALL, supra note 349, at 6-8. Contributing to the demise of the savings and loan
industry was the failure of 8,800 commercial banks. Many savings association customers lost
deposit accounts in bank failures and were unable to make home loan payments. Id. at 6-7.
See also BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 8-9.
369. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 8.
370. Id. "From 1930 to 1933... the size of the thrift industry shrank by about 15 percent.
During that period, more than 500 thrifts failed, and another 1,200 or so failed from 1933 to
1939." Id. Nearly 9,000 banks failed in 1930 alone. Id. at 8-9.
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federal government assistance.37'
The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 revamped the savings
and loan industry under a comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme.3 72 With the passage of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act,
President Hoover and Congress created the Federal Home Loan Bank
System.373 Under the Federal Home Loan Bank System, strict federal
regulations monitored federally chartered thrifts that were part of the
Federal Home Loan Bank System. The Home Owners' Loan Act 374
established the Home Owners Loan Corporation to refinance troubled
home mortgages. Under this system, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, which remained intact for the next fifty years, established a
regulatory structure for federal savings and loans, specified the type
of loans thrifts could make, and lent money through the Federal
Home Loan Bank System for the use of potential home-owning
borrowers.375
371. PIzzo ET AL., supra note 340, at 9. Pizza, Fricker and Muolo suggest that the
prominence of the thrift industry in the nation's economy demanded a federal government
bailout. "By then thrifts had become a critical element in the national economic machinery
and their troubles could not be easily ignored." Id.
372. 47 Stat. 725 ch. 522 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449). In 1913,
Congress enacted the Federal Reserve Act which created the Federal Reserve System, placing
banks under federal regulatory control. The Federal Reserve System loaned money to banks
during periods when banks were unable to attract deposits. Seemingly, this System provided a
sense of bank safety. That sense of security proved to be unfounded with the bank failures
during the Depression. Importantly, the Federal Reserve System did not offer the same
"safety" loans to thrifts.
373. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act created the hierarchical structure and regulatory
apparatus that governed the savings and loan industry until the passage of FIRREA in 1989.
At the highest regulatory level, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in Washington governed
the twelve regional Federal Home Loan Banks. Each of the regional banks regulated and
loaned funds to thrifts within their region. Not all thrifts, however, chose to be federally
chartered and some were instead chartered, and therefore regulated, at the state level. See 47
Stat. 725 ch. 522 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449). See also STRUNK &
CASE, supra note 14; PIZZO ET AL., supra note 340, at 9-10; PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340,
at 31-57; BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 9-10. The funds lent by the Federal Home Loan
Banks "were intended to be lent ultimately to borrowers. In short the main stated purpose of
the Federal Home Loan Bank System was to strengthen savings and loan association
financially in order to promote home ownership." Id. The promotion of affordable housing
goals, a laudable, socially responsible goal, was therefore initiated at the executive level.
FIRREA, for the first time, mandates the socially responsible goal of affordable housing
through a corporate governance scheme that contemplates the dictates of the community as
well as of shareholders. See infra part VI.C.
374. See 48 Stat. 128 ch. 64 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1464).
375. See supra note 373. Another major purpose of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act was
the chartering of Federal Savings and Loans. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board had the
authority to grant charters based on the "need and effect on existing institutions, to charter
federal savings and loan associations following the best principles of existing local mutual
organizations." BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 9, quoting MORTON BODFISH & A.D.
THEOBALD, SAVINGS AND LOAN PRINCIPLES 54.
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The American public, however, was still wary about placing
money in financial institutions. 76 As a result, surviving savings and
loans struggled to maintain equity growth.377 In response, Congress
and the Roosevelt administration enacted the National Housing Act
of 1934 establishing federal savings deposit insurance. 37' The Federal
Savings and Loan Association reassured depositors and insured the
integrity of thrifts by backing savings deposits with a government-
maintained insurance fund. 379 The final element of the financial insti-
376. PIzzo ET AL., supra note 340, at 10.
377. Id. Depositors' wariness of the safety of institutions prevented the successful growth
of the local savings and loan industry. To allay depositors' lingering fears and "[t]o encourage
them to fund their neighborhood savings and loans," Congress created the deposit insurance
system. Id.
378. Id. See 48 Stat. 1246 ch. 847 (1931) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1730).
379. Although deposit insurance may have instilled confidence in depositors in the wake of
the Depression, many scholars now blame it for the ills of the savings and loans in the 1980s.
BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 175-78. R. Dan Brumbaugh asserts that the deposit insurance
system could be eliminated without dramatic instability to the American financial system. The
Federal Reserve acts as a failsafe lender to solvent institutions during "runs" in order to stave
off insolvency. For the depositor in solvent institutions, "deposit insurance is redundant."
During periods of crisis, shareholders, uninsured creditors and depositors all stand to lose their
financial stake in a failing institution. Furthermore, the deposit insuring bodies also stand to
lose as they attempt to bail out failing institution deposit accounts. In a financial system
without deposit insurance, depositors in solvent institutions, shareholders, and uninsured
creditors are no worse off than in a banking system with insurance protection. The insolvent
institution that previously insured depositors, however, does stand to lose. Many
commentators query whether such a result is necessarily undesirable considering the effects of
deposit insurance on the variety of financial institution actors. Under a deposit insurance
system, shareholders of financial institutions bear the cost as solvent institutions pay deposit
insurance premiums. Furthermore, if the crisis is particularly severe, as was the case with the
savings and loan crisis in the mid- to late 1980s, taxpayers ultimately bear the burden of
failure. Since solvent institutions may pass on the cost of insurance premiums to their
customers, solvent institution depositors also bear part of the burden of loss. Essentially,
under a system without deposit insurance, depositors of insolvent institutions would lose their
proportionate share but external societal costs would be low. Losses would therefore be
redistributed from shareholders, customers and taxpayers to insolvent institution depositors, a
result that does "not appear to be too formidable." Id. at 175-176 (citations omitted). See also
James R. Barth & R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., The Rough Road From FIRREA to Deposit
Insurance Reform, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 58 (1990). In a recent work with James R.
Barth, Brumbaugh continued his criticism of the present deposit insurance system and argued
that "FIRREA's most serious limitation is that it ignores the fundamental cause of the savings
and loan problem: federal deposit insurance." Id. See also the Testimony of William R.
Watson, Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premiums, before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, April 19, 1991. Furthermore, the vitality of deposit insurance is
in question as federal regulators battle to maintain the solvency of the fund itself. Testimony
of L. William Seidman, The Condition of the Bank Insurance Fund and Recapitalization,
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Mar. 21, 1991 (on file
with author). In 1991, former Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation L.
William Seidman testified that many "pessimistic . . . observers believe that the banking
industry and the BIF are hopelessly insolvent and will require billions of taxpayer dollars to
fix." Id. at 2-3.
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tutions regulatory regime came in 1933, when Congress passed, and
Franklin Roosevelt signed into law, the Glass-Steagall Banking Act 380
and the Securities Act of 1933.381
The legislation, particularly the Glass-Steagall Act, in the imme-
diate post-Depression era envisioned the banking industry as con-
glomerates of power with potentially insidious effects on the
American economy. 382 The series of banking panics that ultimately
led to the Depression-era failures crippled the nation's economy and
turned the nation's collective psyche to rage against banks and their
managers.383 To allay these concerns, Congress denied banks and
savings and loans the opportunity to engage in non-banking business
practices, effectively prohibiting the integration of diverse financial
services within banking institutions.384 In fact, savings and loan insti-
tutions were even more limited than commercial banks in the services
380. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
381. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
382. Banks have been the focus of American suspicions since the earliest days of the United
States. "Like the owners of large railroads and armaments manufacturers, bankers have been
suspected of pursuing clandestine, antisocial ends and, despite their relatively small numbers,
of having wielded enormous political influence." Halpert, supra note 185, at 505 (citations
omitted). Inevitably, American public suspicions shaped the banking laws and cemented the
separation of banking and commerce. Id. The fears undoubtedly increased with Depression
era bank failures. For an excellent discussion of the Glass-Steagall Act and its genesis, see
GEORGE J. BENTSON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING
(1990).
383. The impetus for the Glass-Steagall Banking Act came directly from the hearings in the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency's Stock Exchange Practices concerning National
City Bank. See BENTSON, supra note 382, at 2 (citing Edwin S. Perkins' The Divorce of
Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 528 (June 1971)). See
EDWARD J. KELLY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT 41-65 (1985), for
a discussion of the national fears culminating in the Glass-Steagall Act.
384. See BENTSON, supra note 382. Bentson identifies eight factors that led to the federally
mandated separation of banking and commerce: (1) Bank "underwriting and holding of
corporate securities and.., revenue bonds" posed a "significant risk of loss to depositors" and
the federal deposit insurance fund. (2) The integration of investment banking services into
traditional depository institutions lent potential to managerial "conflict of interest" abuses.
(3) The American public and Congress were generally averse to the integration of "securities
related activities" into banking institutions. (4) "[S]ecurities brokers ... underwriters and
some bankers" sought to prohibit the market competition naturally resulting from banks
offering integrated financial services. (5) Federal deposit insurance would necessarily become
more costly to protect from the greater risk of loss associated with integrated firms. (6) Banks,
effectively "subsidized" by deposit insurance, would unfairly compete because of "access to
'cheap' deposit funds." (7) Fear of an increased concentration of economic power in banking
institutions encouraged a limitation on banking activities. (8) Without the separation of
banking and commerce, the American banking system would evolve into a close parallel of the
unattractive "German universal" banking system. Id. at 13-14.
Many of these themes, particularly (1) risk of loss, (2) conflicts of interest, and (3) the
federal safety net, were revisited with the systematic deregulation of the savings and loan
industry discussed infra part IV.B.
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they could offer.38 5 In essence, thrifts were "frozen by both statute
and regulation" to a one-product business: long-term home mortgage
loans.3 86 Eventually, the limitation on thrift activities sank the indus-
try while commercial banks, though also limited, retained broad
enough powers to survive with adequate diversification.387 The result-
ing separation of banking and commerce, which prevented banks and
savings and loans from engaging in business practices other than
"traditional" banking activities, survived the next fifty years.3 88 Yet,
until the adoption of FIRREA in 1989, Congress never legislated the
separation in a corporate governance context.389
In the aftermath of the Depression, public sentiment feared inte-
grated firms390 as potentially jeopardizing the stability of the banking
385. Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 51, 511 (1991).
386. Id. The separation of banking and commerce forced thrifts into a "single-risk"
business, relinquishing the advantages associated with diversified investments and "portfolio
theory." Furthermore, home mortgages are long-term, fixed-rate loans. With every home
mortgage loan, thrift managers were "betting that in the next ten to twenty years it would not
have to pay more for its money than it was earning on that asset. If the reverse became true,
the S&L ran a real risk of failure." Id. (citations omitted).
387. Id. Whereas thrifts were dramatically limited by the separation of banking and
commerce, commercial banks had greater opportunity to diversify investment practices. The
National Bank Act of 1863 granted banks broad authority to choose investment and business
practices. As a result, banks until the 1980s avoided long-term home mortgage loans. The
commercial banks' concentration on short-term credit "probably saved the banks from the
disaster ultimately experienced by the S&Ls." Id.
388. In essence, non-traditional banking practices are securities-related activities. See
BENTSON, supra note 382, at 11. Professor Halpert identifies the "primary legislative vehicles
for the development of the separation [of banking from commerce] in this century . . ."
Halpert, supra note 185, at 482 n.3. As previously discussed, the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-
Steagall) is the ultimate legislative separation of banking and commerce. The Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1847-1850
(1982)) furthered the separation of banking and commerce by barring "multi-bank holding
companies from engagement in, or ownership of, business not 'closely related to banking.'"
Halpert, supra note 185, at 482 n.3. The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850, 1971-1978 (1982)
extended the 1956 Act's prohibition of holding company ownership of banks. Halpert, supra
note 185, at 482 n.3. The Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 216-216d (1982) (Garn-St. Germain Act), although primarily a
deregulatory act, furthered the separation by prohibiting bank involvement in the insurance
business. Halpert, supra note 185, at 482 n.3. FIRREA which re-regulated the savings and
loan industry continues the tradition of the separation of banking and commerce, and for the
first time mandates the separation through a depository institution corporate governance
scheme. See infra part VI.B.
389. See infra part VI.B. Savings and Loans were traditionally limited to local home
lending as a "community interest .... The nature of S&L regulation ensured that the
associations specialized in local home lending." Fred E. Case, Deregulation: Invitation to
Disaster in the S&L Industry, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 593 (1991).
390. Integrated firms are depository institutions that offer financial services beyond the
usual loans and deposits.
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industry.39' Congress sought to prevent the "undue concentration of
control of banking activities" because integrated firms faced the temp-
tation of the securities market, with greater risk of insolvency, ulti-
mately undermining depositor confidence.392 By separating banking
and commerce, federal legislation denied savings and loans and banks
the opportunity to engage in risky investment practices that could
threaten insolvency.393 While the prohibition against integration of
other commercial practices into thrift institutions effectively reduced
the potential for risky investment practices to restore depositor confi-
dence, another legislative confidence builder would later cause der-
egulated banking institutions' gravitation towards risky behavior.394
Fixed rate deposit insurance, one of the primary methods
employed to restore confidence in an American Public shaken by the
Depression, inspired many modem thrift insolvencies.395 With the
creation of the deposit insurance system, the federal government
391. See supra note 384.
392. Halpert, supra note 185, at 494. Although Bentson questions the validity of the
"conflict of interest" abuses, "the existence of serious abuses by commercial bank's securities
affiliates and directly carried out securities activities appears to be accepted by both proponents
and opponents of the Glass-Steagall Act, and by many historians and economists." BENTSON,
supra note 382, at 44. Bentson systematically analyzes the alleged "conflicts of interest" that
led to enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act and concludes that the data supporting these
allegations were insufficient. BENTSON, supra note 382, at 43-122. Although the respective
congressional hearings came after the enactment of FIRREA, the alleged wrongdoing at high-
profile savings and loans such as Lincoln, Siverado and Centrust undoubtedly contributed to
the public pressure leading to FIRREA's enactment. See Centrust Hearings, Lincoln
Hearings, Silverado Hearings, supra note 332.
393. While the continued solvency of any corporation serves public policy goals, the
solvency of banking institutions became an issue of paramount importance after the
Depression-era failures and bank holidays. See supra note 377. See also BRUMBAUGH, supra
note 10, at 8-12 for a discussion of bank failures and the Depression.
394. Fixed-rate deposit insurance encouraged banking institution risktaking during the
deregulatory period of the early 1980s. Because of the crisis in the savings and loan industry in
the 1980s, many savings and loans approaching failure gravitated to risky investment practices
permissible under Reagan-era deregulation. With deregulation, thrift "[h]igh-risk takers soon
found, and exploited, a fatal flaw in the deregulatory scheme: The federally insured accounts
of the typically local depositor (the traditional S&L customer) could be used to fund the
lending and investment projects that the deregulated S&Ls were now free to pursue." Case,
supra note 389, at 597. Fixed-rate deposit insurance, which bore no relation to risk of
investment, encouraged banks with their large liquid asset base to engage in super-optimal
risktaking. Furthermore, these institutions were not constrained by depositors who "unlike
creditors of other kinds of institutions, have no incentive to constrain management excesses."
Halpert, supra note 185, at 513. For an overview of the Deposit Insurance System, see Thad
Grundy, Jr., Practical Aspects of the Deposit Insurance System, 44 Bus. LAW. 169 (1988). See
also supra note 379.
395. The National Housing Act created the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, which insured the deposits of thrifts. Ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1730 1989). For the deposit insurance provisions, see id.
§ 402(A) 48 Stat. at 1256.
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assumed the responsibility for thrift and bank deposits.396 Signifi-
cantly, scholars now blame the fixed rate deposit insurance system for
excessive risktaking by savings and loans, and ultimately insolvency,
during the crisis of the 1980s.397
B. Deregulation and Crisis in the Savings and Loan Industry
1. MODERN THRIFTS: FROM BOOM TO CRISIS IN A FICKLE
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Banks and savings and loans thrived in the post-war years.398
National prosperity, spurring private home building and ownership as
well as family savings, enabled the local thrift to resemble the ideal of
Frank Capra's savings and loan in Its a Wonderful Life. 399 The fed-
eral thrift framework functioned well, as savings and loans used
insured deposits to make loans to home buyers, who in turn became
depositors, perpetuating a business cycle that furthered middle-class
home ownership while strengthening thrift institutions.4 o However,
lurking beneath thrift success was the tenuous balance between the
risk incentive of deposit insurance and the separation of banking and
commerce." As modern economic markets became more sophisti-
396. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 9. However, no apportionment of risk responsibility
was delegated to depository institution management in a corporate governance context.
FIRREA's "unsafe and unsound" fiduciary standard is the first legislative attempt to achieve
the separation of banking and commerce through a corporate governance scheme.
397. See supra note 379. Since deposit insurance rates are fixed and unrelated to the
riskiness of institutional investment practices "a depository institution has an incentive to
undertake more risky investments than it would choose in a world without such deposit
insurance." Halpert, supra note 185, at 510. The Federal Deposit Insurance Fund inspires
risky investment because the premium charged to the institution is constant and independent
of the risk of the investment. Therefore, the depository institution derives any and all of the
benefit from the risky investment and the insurance fund bears any and all risk. Depository
institutions logically should favor riskier investments as loss exposure is borne by the insurance
fund and profitable return exclusively accrues to the institution. Compounding the risk-
propensity problem is that insured depositors have little incentive to prevent managerial
risktaking as their monies are protected by the insurance fund and, in essence, as they have
nothing to lose. Id. at 510-12. Thrift risktaking was magnified during Reagan-era
deregulation, as the separation of banking and commerce reached its lowest level this century.
See infra part IV.B.2.
398. For a discussion of savings and loan growth in the post-war years up to 1960, see
KENDALL, supra note 349. "The expansion of the savings and loan business was an
outstanding feature of the postwar decade." Id. at 8.
399. IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE, (Republic Studios 1947).
400. In the immediate post-war years, demand for housing was great as veterans returned
home and took advantage of the Veterans Home Loan Program and the FHA loan program.
Thrift institutions prospered in the post-war growth years because the American public
became increasingly affluent and interested in long term investment and home ownership.
STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14, at 20.
401. See supra part IV.A.3.
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cated and financial services diversified, issues of thrift competitiveness
arose, questioning the viability of the separation of banking and
commerce.
402
The first hints of difficulty in the savings and loan industry came
with the inflationary period of the 1970s.4° As inflation drove inter-
est rates higher, federal reserve interest-rate regulations kept thrift
interests rates down, encouraging disintermediation./ 4 The Federal
Reserve Regulations, known generally as Regulation Q,405 prohibited
banks from paying interest on checking accounts and placed a ceiling
on the interest rate payable to savings and loan depositors. 4°6  With
rampant inflation, however, Regulation Q only succeeded in driving
thrift customers to higher-yield financial instruments. 4° 7 In addition,
402. Competition in the financial services market intensified as "non-depository" financial
firms commanded a larger share of available investment assets because of "inflation, improved
techniques for managing cash, innovation in financial instruments, and the deregulation of
financial markets." BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 14. Furthermore, the seemingly
complacent post-war thrift management was ill-suited to meet the competitive challenge as
"both interest rate and lending risks" increased "to a degree far beyond those experienced
before." STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14, at 26. Issues of thrift competition also arose in the
area where thrifts specialized: Home mortgages. The Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae), the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), "computer applications to mortgage loan
servicing" and "the securitization of mortgages" all undermined thrift dominance in the home
loan field. Id. at 50. At the same time, "[c]ommercial banks and thrift institutions began
competing more with other types of financial firms providing interest-earning deposits and
checkable-type accounts." BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 35 (citations omitted). See also
KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW
COMPETITION IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY (1984).
403. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 36. The genesis of the disparity between thrift interest
rates and inflationary market interest rates "was the regulation of interest rates imposed on
banks during the Great Depression and on thrifts in 1966 .... " Id. Interest rate regulation
ensured that in a market dominated by banks and thrifts, a "monopoly-like" profitability
guaranteed the success of both banks and thrifts, "with thrifts given a... 25-basis-point spread
above bank rates to attract savings deposits . . . ." Id. Unfortunately, thrifts in the modern
market were forced to compete against a variety of other financial service institutions offering
market sensitive instruments. See supra note 402.
404. Disintermediation is the flight of thrift depositors to other market sensitive or higher
interest paying instruments. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 15. Savings depositors left the
conservative security of the thrifts for new market-sensitive financial instruments. These new
instruments, which included negotiable orders of withdrawal and money market accounts,
disadvantaged savings and loan and other financial institutions that could not compete because
of Regulation Q. Id. See infra note 406.
405. Regulation Q was enacted in 1966 and limited the interest rate thrifts could pay on
deposits. See Act of Sept. 12, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823 (1966). Commercial
banks were limited by Regulation Q since 1933.
406. Regulation Q became the bedrock for the insured depository institution industry.
Banks thrived in a non-competitive interest rate environment while thrifts were guaranteed an
opportunity to pay higher interest rates than commercial banks, which assured continuing
depositor interest. STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14, at 39.
407. See supra note 404.
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technology spurred creative investment portfolios for worldwide
financial instruments, offering depositors the opportunity to invest in
a variety of portfolio options. 408 The competitive failings of savings
and loans prompted a series of deregulatory actions and thrift invest-
ment decisions that weakened the industry's financial condition in the
volatile markets of the 1980s."1
In an attempt to help savings and loans regain competitiveness,
Congress and the Reagan administration began to deregulate the
thrift industry, erasing to a large extent the traditional separation of
banking and commerce.4 1° The first move toward the diversification
of thrift services came in 1978, when regulators permitted thrifts, as
well as banks, to offer six-month money market accounts and relaxed
interest rate restrictions.4 ' Money market accounts offering higher
yields than savings accounts increased savings and loan competitive-
ness, but thrift earnings decreased as thrift operating costs
increased.412 Operating costs surged because inflationary interest
408. In the 1970s, technological "change and financial-service innovation developed with
unprecedented speed and rapidly eroded the differences among firms hitherto providing
distinct financial services." BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 35.
409. See generally STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14 (arguing that the savings and loan crisis
occurred as a derivative of the deregulatory moves of Congress, the President and regulatory
agencies). See also Joseph J. Norton, The 1982 Banking Act and the Deregulation Scheme, 38
Bus. LAW. 1627 (1983) (outlining the deregulation of the savings and loan industry).
410. See Norton, supra note 409, at 1627. "Deregulation" was effected from an
"intraindustry" perspective. Initially "statutory and regulatory barriers" were removed,
interjecting competitiveness between commercial banks and thrifts. Unencumbered by federal
prohibition, the thrift institutions "liberalized" both the asset and liability side of the balance
sheet. Id. Thrift regulatory limitations were seen as a relic of primitive financial markets.
"Market discipline" as opposed to federal regulation became the theme of deregulation. Case,
supra note 389, at 596 (citing D.P. Riordian, Deregulation and the Future of the Thrift
Industry 7, Sept. 8, 1980, presented at 63d Annual Convention, Arkansas Savings and Loan
League, Sept. 8, 1980 (16-2,9, 17-3,4)). See also Robert S. Plotkin, What Meaning Does Glass-
Steagall Have for Today's Financial World, 95 BANKING L.J. 404 (1978).
411. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 40. Significantly, money market accounts comprised
20% of all thrift deposits by 1979. Id. See also John A. Adams, Money Market Mutual Funds:
Has Glass-Steagall Been Cracked?, 99 BANKING L.J. 4 (1982). In 1978, the deregulation
process began modestly when compared to the legislation enacted in the following years. The
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Control Act of 1978, ("FIRA") Pub. L. No. 95-
630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978), first liberalized the loan and investment practices of savings and
loans. Norton, supra note 409, at 1628. Significantly, FIRA showed the first signs of
expanded managerial liability and questioned managerial service on financial institution
boards. See Lynn Nicholas, FIRA: Emerging Patterns of Director Liability, 103 BANKING L.J.
151 (1986); Alan E. Grunewald & Bruce P. Golden, Bank Director Liability Post-FIRA: How
to Avoid It, 98 BANKING L.J. (1981); Raymond Guenter, The Lance Legacy---Title VIII of the
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, 96 BANKING L.J.
(1979).
412. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 40. Deregulatory changes counteracted
disintermediation, but troubles continued because rising interest rates drove thrift interest
expenses up. Nonetheless, disintermediation was perceived as the most dangerous threat
1992] FIRREA 1255
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rates increased short-term deposit costs faster than repayment of
long-term mortgages.413 Because the majority of thrift assets
remained in long-term mortgages, thrifts did not have the cash flow to
meet their short-term deposit and money market liabilities.414
Interest rates continued to rise unabated during the late 1970s415
and the thrift industry faced growing losses with little hope from the
existing regulatory scheme.' 16 Finally, in 1980, Congress dismantled
much of the regulatory apparatus separating banking and commerce
in the savings and loan industry with the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act ("Monetary Control
Act").4 7 With enactment of the Monetary Control Act, Congress
because deposit withdrawals could have forced the firesale of thrift home mortgage assets.
Because rising interest rates drove mortgage values down, the forced sale of mortgages "could
have been disastrous" for the thrift industry. Id. at 40-41.
413. As inflation soared, "[s]mall savers rushed to the thrifts to move their cash from low-
interest passbook accounts into high-interest money market accounts at an astounding pace."
PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340, at 65. Time depositors rapidly fled to money market
accounts. "[F]rom January 1, 1979, to June 30, 1980, the level of ordinary passbook time
deposits at banks and thrifts fell by 24 percent, from $907 billion to $690 billion." Id. at 66.
414. This cash flow shortage was the essence of the thrift problem, leading to deregulatory
changes. Because of the new money market accounts, thrifts were forced to "pay" high
interest rates while they were locked into "earning" lower interest rates on long term mortgage
loans. In order to compete "thrifts were having to pay 10 to 20 percent interest on short term-
money certificates." PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340, at 65. Yet, thrifts still had to invest
money market "high-cost funds in residential mortgage loans" at a lower interest rate. Id.
Thrifts, therefore, faced a dual problem: "high interest costs and disintermediation." Id.
(citing TIME MAGAZINE, June 8, 1981, at 58).
415. In 1979, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board attempted to curtail the interest rate
problem. The most effective changes, however, came too late to alleviate the problem of low
interest earned on pre-existing mortgage loans. Newly permitted variable mortgage interest
rates were more sensitive to "the real cost of funds" on newly originated mortgage loans, but
the majority of preexisting mortgages were locked into non-profitable rates. Id. at 67.
Ultimately, monetary policies contributed to inflation and heralded the deregulatory Reagan
era. President Carter's Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker's response to rising inflation
all but assured financial difficulty at thrifts as interest rates soared. Volcker's "Saturday-Night
Special" announced the federal government's change in inflation policy from an effort to hold
down interest rates to a concentration on controlling the money supply. The result was an
"inflationary and interest rate firestorm" that proved disastrous to the thrift industry. PILZER
& DEITZ, supra note 340, at 68 (quoting FREDERICK E. BALDERSTON, THRIFTS IN CRISIS:
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 4 (1985)).
'416. Deregulation to many seemed the only solution to the growing thrift problems and
out-of-control interest rates. With the Federal Reserve "declining" to restrain interest rates,
"[t]he squeeze on the nation's S&L's quickly became intolerable .... Id. Regulatory reform
was the inevitable choice as "some officials acknowledged that consumers had already made
deregulation a de facto reality." Id.
Consumers were sophisticated and invested in unregulated institutions that offered higher
interest rates than thrifts. The easy, though in the long run disastrous, answer to this problem
was congressional deregulation and effective removal of the separation of banking and
commerce.
417. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.). Under the Act, thrifts finally could offer interest-bearing accounts at competitive
FIRREA
and the Reagan administration sought to enhance the competitiveness
of the thrift industry by removing the interest rate ceiling on deposits.
Still, the Act failed to address the inability of thrifts to rapidly earn
revenue from asset-side long-term loans.418
In 1982, Congress and the Reagan administration finally took
steps to address the thrift industry's asset-side problems.4 19  The
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act ("Gan-St. Germain
Act") permitted thrifts to offer commercial real estate loans, addi-
tional consumer loans and, perhaps most notably, allowed thrift
investment in commercial paper and corporate debt securities. 420 The
Garn-St. Germain Act also allowed thrifts to offer demand deposit
accounts, and a full range of money market accounts.42 1 Under this
Act, Congress and the Reagan administration completed the emascu-
lation of the regulatory scheme and effectively joined banking and
commerce. 42 2  Unfortunately, the Garn-St. Germain Act laid the
interest rates. Significantly the Monetary Control Act also increased FSLIC deposit insurance
from $40,000 to $100,000. See Ronald L. Weaver & Andrew M. O'Malley, The Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980: An Overview, 98 BANKING L.J.
100 (1981); COOPER & FRASER, supra note 402, at 105-126.
418. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 41-43. The Monetary Control Act's shortcomings
were obvious. "You didn't need to be a genius to understand that if you were borrowing
money at 16 percent and lending it out at 8 percent, you wouldn't remain in business for very
long." PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340, at 69-70.
Thrift difficulties on the asset side of the balance continued despite Bank Board measures
permitting thrifts to offer market sensitive Adjustable Rate mortgages in 1981. In perhaps the
Federal Regulators' most significant measure, the Board changed Regulatory Accounting
Principles ("RAP") pushing thrifts to amortize the loss on sales of assets at a market value
below book value. This change in RAP was in direct conflict to Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP") and had profound consequences for the entire industry.
BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 44. See infra notes 431-437 and accompanying text.
419. Just prior to congressional legislation in 1982, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
took further measures to help thrifts attract deposits. In taking these measures, the Board
aided thrifts' battle against disintermediation but simultaneously exacerbated the asset-side
problem. The Board allowed thrifts to entertain a greater percentage of brokered deposits,
which in reality was a stop gap measure to disintermediation and invariably increased the cost
of thrift funds. PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340, at 72.
420. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.). For an overview of the completed deregulatory scheme with a focus on the Garn-
St. Germain Act, see Joseph Jude Norton, The 1982 Banking Act and the Deregulation
Scheme, 38 Bus. LAW. 1627 (1983); see also COOPER & FRASER, supra note 402, at 127-141.
421. See infra note 422.
422. The "Garn-St. Germain" Act completed the deregulatory scheme by broadening thrift
powers in order to attract asset-side revenues. See Norton, supra note 409. Now, under
deregulation, thrifts could attract a variety of revenue sources through a wide array of loan
agreements. The loan making capacity of federal savings and loans under Garn-St. Germain is
summarized as follows:
(1) loans on the security of its transaction accounts; (2) loans on the security of
liens (not necessarily first liens, with real property loans secured by
nonresidential real property being subject to a forty percent aggregate loan
1992] 1257
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foundation for the decimation of the thrift industry as managers, no
longer constrained by the separation of banking and commerce, were
able to engage in super-optimal risktaking, gambling on the resurrec-
tion of the industry with the backing of deposit insurance.423
Further deregulation occurred when the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board ("Bank Board") encouraged managerial divergence from
the traditional separation of banking and commerce4 24 and modified
thrift ownership regulations.4 25  To encourage investment in the
industry, the Bank Board changed the traditional notion of mutual
depositor-owned thrifts by permitting single shareholder ownership,
thereby attracting a more sophisticated and speculative breed of thrift
management.4 26 The Bank Board eased capitalization requirements
by authorizing non-cash assets to capitalize savings and loans, further
limitation); (3) loans for home improvement and loans for manufactured homes;
(4) certain federally insured loans to finance the purchase of real estate; (5) loans
to financial institutions subject to federal examination or supervision, or to
federally registered brokers or dealers, secured by loans, obligations, or
investments that the S&L has statutory power to invest in directly; (6) secured or
unsecured consumer loans (subject to a thirty percent aggregate limitation);
(7) educational loans (subject to a five percent aggregation limitation);
(8) nonconforming real estate loans for primarily residential or farm purposes
(subject to a five percent aggregate limitation); (9) loans to business development
credit corporations (limited in aggregate to the lesser of one percent of the S&L's
assets or $250,000, and subject to other requirements); (10) unsecured
construction loans (subject to a five percent aggregate limitation); (11) loans
secured by mortgages as to which the S&L has the benefit of federal insurance;
and (12) loans for commercial, corporate, business, or agricultural purposes
(subject to a five percent aggregate limitation that increases to ten percent on
January 1, 1984).
Id. at 1641-42 (citations omitted).
423. PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340, at 73-74. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 63.
424. PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340, at 74. The Bank Board diligently and
enthusiastically urged thrifts to engage in deregulatory operations in a supervisory climate that
was no more strenuous than under the previous "separated" thrift industry. In fact, the Board
urged thrift management to engage in the very practices for which the Resolution Trust
Corporation now seeks to hold thrift management liable. Id. See discussion infra part V.
425. PIzzo ET AL., supra note 340, at 12-13. Traditionally, thrift chartering was based on
the needs of the community and the competitive market. Now, the Bank Board sought to
attract "innovative, visionary entrepreneurs to be the saviors of the thrift industry. What the
industry got was a rush of brash, new owners with no other stockholders to buffer the S&L's
well-being from the controlling owner's ambition, bad judgment, or greed." Id. at 12.
426. Id. See also STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14, at 94. The traditional requirements for
acquiring a thrift charter was a minimum of 400 stockholders, and no single stockholder was
permitted to own more than 25% of the outstanding stock. The removal of these requirements
permitted a variety of "businessmen" to enter the industry all at the behest of the Bank Board,
which encouraged thrifts to "operate like other businesses-not as organizations designed
primarily to serve local communities." PIZZO ET AL., supra note 340, at 12. There was a
problem, however: "Not only were new charters available, but entrepreneurs desirous of
exploiting short-term profit opportunities could easily buy an existing institution for a
relatively small investment." Id.
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facilitating the acquisition of thrifts by many non-traditional
"entrepreneurial" investors.4 27  Spurring the diversity of thrift
loanmaking, regulators permitted savings and loans to finance one
hundred percent of a borrower's transaction with no down pay-
ment.428 In another move to encourage thrift competitiveness, which
contributed to the unification of banking and commerce, the Bank
Board permitted thrifts to expand the geographic extent of their real
estate loans throughout the county. 429 These Bank Board regulatory
changes encouraged the new growth of single shareholder-owned sav-
ings and loans with complex ownership and control problems, turning
the once conservative thrifts into free-wheeling investment houses
with a risktaking mandate from Congress and federal regulators. 3°
As the complexion of the industry changed, thrift accounting
practices changed as well. Owners, with the approval of federal regu-
lators, began to manipulate the thrift balance sheet to create capi-
tal.4 3 ' The Bank Board aided in the balance sheet manipulation by
changing Regulatory Accounting Principles ("RAP") in response to
the declining net worth of thrifts caused by the sale of assets at a
market value below book value.4 32 These changes permitted thrifts,
which previously were required to take an immediate loss on the sale
of assets below book value, to amortize the loss in a "goodwill" asset
account.433 As a result, many thrifts "looked" more solvent under
RAP than under the business standard Generally Accepted Account-
427. Id. at 12-13.
428. Traditionally, thrifts required a down payment for home loan borrowers. Now, under
the new regulations authorized by the Gart-St. Germain Act, a variety of borrowers could
receive loans from thrifts without the pay-back incentive of a down payment. Id.
429. By loaning beyond their immediate geographic scope, the focus of the "George Bailey"
thrift changed from a locally contend "community" business to a regional or national loaning
machine. Invariably, managerial hands-on oversight of many loans was reduced. The inability
of managers to monitor the new diverse thrift loans properly undoubtedly contributed to the
increased number of "bad" thrift loans under deregulation. Id. at 13.
430. See discussion infra part IV.B.2.
431. The savings and loan associations that emerged from deregulation changed the
traditional balance-sheet look of thrifts. Assets became diversified, reflecting investment in
corporate securities and commercial real estate. Liabilities also changed, reflecting short term
demand deposits and other short term accounts. As a result, the savings and loan associations
were less easily distinguishable from commercial banks and other non-depository financial
institutions by their balance sheets. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 2. For a discussion of the
differences between traditional thrifts and banks prior to the unification of banking and
commerce, see supra part IV.A.2.
432. The accounting changes the Bank Board implemented in 1981 were designed to
encourage thrifts to restructure their fixed-rate home loan portfolios in order to begin the
phase-in of market sensitive adjustable-rate mortgages. The Board's rationale was that
without the incentive of amortization of losses, thrifts would be forced to sell assets at a market
value well below book value. Id. at 41-43.
433. Id. The Bank Board's change in RAP was particularly noteworthy in that under
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ing Principles ("GAAP").434 By employing dubious accounting prin-
ciples, thrifts that the Bank Board would have declared insolvent
were permitted to continue operations, only to delay and exacerbate
the resolution of these "GAAP insolvent" thrifts.435  The Bank
Board's regulatory forbearance from closing "insolvent" thrifts by
manipulating accounting principles only served as an anesthetic to the
eventual painful recognition of the deterioration in the thrift indus-
try.4 36 Under the revamped regulatory scheme governing thrifts, the
balance between risk-encouraging deposit insurance and the separa-
tion of banking and commerce was shattered. Instead, under deregu-
lation, the unification of banking and commerce and the reaffirmation
of the deposit insurance system encouraged a risktaking course in the
industry that in large measure caused the $500 billion thrift crisis.4 37
The Monetary Control Act, the Garn-St. Germain Act, and the
Bank Board's change in regulations enabled formerly conservative
thrifts to attract entrepreneurial management and $100,000 insured
accounts, which they invested in diversified portfolios with great
profit potential but great financial risk. Predictably, many thrifts
gambled on high-risk investments to stave off insolvency and federal
takeover, only to delay the ultimate failure.438 Initially, deregulation
GAAP the Financial Accounting Standards Board would not permit the amortization of thrift
"Goodwill" asset accounts. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 44.
434. The treatment of Goodwill under RAP provided a huge, but cosmetic improvement to
thrift solvency. "The total difference between RAP and GAAP net worth reached $9 billion
by 1984." BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 44. Goodwill as an intangible asset comprised over
forty percent of the thrift industry's new worth by 1986. PIzzo ET AL., supra note 340, at 13.
Although RAP's treatment of qualifying mutual and income-capital certificates, qualifying
subordinated debentures and the appraised value of thrift branches contributed to the net
worth disparity, the Bank Board's treatment of Goodwill was largely responsible for the
inflated RAP net worth value. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 44.
435. RAP accounting principles, which effectively disguised institution insolvency,
furthered regulatory forbearance. "[O]nly 251 institutions were insolvent according to RAP at
the end of 1986, whereas 468 institutions were insolvent according to GAAP." Id. As a
result, RAP accounting dramatically reduced the number of "insolvent" institutions and
therefore the number of regulatory closures. Id. For a general discussion of the Bank Board's
methods of closing an institution, see BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 49-53. For the
exacerbation of thrift solvency problems by Board closure lag time, see STRUNK & CASE, supra
note 14, at 111.
436. See discussion infra part IV.B.2.
437. See discussion infra part IV.B.2.
438. Many thrifts, facing depressed real estate markets, loaded their portfolios with an
unprecedented level (at least in banking institutions) of high-risk ventures. The failure in the
high-yield securities market increased the severity of the savings and loan crisis as thrift failure
became rampant throughout the industry. Many failed thrifts gambled on the ability of these
investments to save them from insolvency and takeover, while the Federal Deposit Insurance
Fund bore the majority of the risk and ultimately the actual loss. In fact, much of the present
thrift director and officer liability litigation focuses on the accumulation of junk bonds in thrift
portfolios, despite the underlying deregulatory scheme that actually encouraged these
and the effects of an improved real estate market, 43 9 along with
Michael Milken and the junk bond market,"' buoyed the thrift indus-
try." 1 Ultimately, however, the real estate market soured," 2 the mar-
ket for junk bonds crashed," 3  Milken went to jail,"4  and the
decimated savings and loan industry was left with a portfolio of
worthless assets.44 5
2. DEREGULATION, FORBEARANCE, AND FAILURE
Between 1979 and 1983, the Bank Board, Congress, and Presi-
dent Reagan dismantled much of the thrift regulatory framework in
an attempt to place the thrift industry in a competitive market posi-
tion. Initially, spurred by new accounting principles, success in the
junk bond market, and a sudden dip in interest rates, the savings and
loan industry progressed toward recovery." 6 In fact, the thrift indus-
try "appeared to grow by $300 billion" in 1983 and 1984. 44' How-
ever, the "new" thrift industry-changing from the traditional,
conservative institution to a money lending and investment firm-
soon revealed financial weakness. 4 8 The recession and collapse in the
real estate market,449 questionable and sometimes illicit thrift invest-
ment practices, 450 and the inadequacy and forbearance of federal reg-
investments. See STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14, at 54-79. Joseph A. Grudfest, Lobbying into
Limbo: The Political Ecology of the Savings and Loan Crisis, 2 STAN. L. POL'Y REV. 25
(1990); Thomas R. Romer & Barry R. Weingast, Congress: The Genesis of the Thrift Crisis, 2
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 37 (1990).
439. See STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14, at 98-100 (describing thrift successes in the
booming real estate market between 1982 and 1985).
440. See WALDMAN, supra note 3, at 38-44 (describing increased thrift involvement in the
bond market, particularly with Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham & Lambert).
441. "And for a while it looked like deregulation was working." PIzzo ET AL., supra note
340, at 13.
442. See STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14, at 100-107 (discussing the depressed real estate
market, particularly in the Southwest, in the mid-1980s).
443. See WALDMAN, supra note 3, at 41 (commenting on the crash of the junk bond
market).
444. Id. (commenting on the criminal charges faced by Michael Milken); but see Milken
Keeps $125 Million After Settling 150 Lawsuits, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 28, 1992, at IC
(describing Milken's wrongdoing that left him with a $125 million fortune).
445. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Milken, Complaint 91 Civ. No. 0433 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (on file with author) (describing more than 200 thrift institutions alleging fraud against
Drexel Burnham & Lambert and Michael Milken for junk-bond purchases).
446. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 56. Despite the immediate successes, the signs of crisis
were omnipresent as "the regulatory damage-control mechanism was thoroughly strained.
The FSLIC fund was inundated by record failures and was performing triage on record
numbers of insolvent but open institutions." Id.
447. Id.
448. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 56; PIZZO ET AL., supra note 340, at 13-14.
449. See Felsenfeld, supra note 385, at 532.
450. Id. at 534.
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ulators monitoring the new free-wheeling savings and loan industry
ultimately led to the failure of thrift institutions across the country.451
Between 1980 and 1988, approximately 1045 federally insured
savings and loans failed.452 The breadth of failure in the thrift indus-
try was even more pronounced because of the number of GAAP-
defined insolvent institutions. 53 Significantly, while 387 thrifts were
resolved between 1984 and 1988, a yearly average of 866 institutions
operated in the "red" during the same period.454 The disparity
between the number of insolvent thrifts and the number of FSLIC
closures has since widened because federal regulators with a policy of
forbearance have not kept pace with the number of insolvent
thrifts.455 The inability of FSLIC regulators to accurately and timely
determine a thrift's insolvency, the limited number of FSLIC employ-
ees, and the relatively small number of healthy thrifts have all con-
tributed to the large number of insolvent institutions still operating. 456
451. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 56. The FSLIC regulatory staff was both
undermanned and inexperienced. Id.; Felsenfeld, supra note 385, at 536-38.
452. "Failed" in this context is defined by a change in operations status forced by the
intervention of Federal Regulatory bodies. (FSLIC and/or FDIC) See F. Jean Wells, Banks
and Thrifts: Restructuring and Solvency 1990, at 11 (Sept. 12, 1990) (on file with author).
Brumbaugh's statistics find that 669 savings and loans failed between 1979 and 1986, with a
peak of 252 failures in 1982. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 40. Between 1980 and 1988, the
FSLIC resolved approximately 500 failed thrifts. In 1980 alone, the FSLIC resolved 205 failed
thrifts. Wells, supra at 11. As of June 31, 1991, the Resolution Trust Corporation had taken
over 623 institutions and was operating 193 failed thrifts. From the enactment of FIRREA to
June 1991, the RTC resolved 430 institutions. Barbara Miles & Thomas Woodward, The
Savings and Loan Cleanup.- Background and Progress 4-5 (Sept. 6, 1991) (on file with author).
Regulators resolve failed institutions by one of three methods: In a "purchase and
assumption" agreement a solvent and stable institution "purchases" an insolvent institution,
acquiring its assets intact. In a "payout" transaction, the federal regulators pay off insured
depositors and retain institution assets for later sale. In the final method, an insured deposit
transfer, federal regulators close a failed institution and transfer its deposits to a healthy
institution. Inevitably, the federal regulators choose the most cost-effective method. Id. at 5.
For a list of thrifts in RTC conservatorship, see Resolved Conservatorship Report (FOIA
Format) (1991) (on file with author).
453. See supra notes 431-437 and accompanying text.
454. E. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? 80 (1989). See also
BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 44. The total decline of thrift institutions in the 1980s was
dramatic, from a total of 4,002 institutions in 1980 to 3,220 institutions in 1986. Id. at 39.
455. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 49. Regulatory forbearance was motivated by several
factors: Accounting principles, fears of a housing decline, a misunderstanding of the depth of
the industry's problems, bad publicity and emotional concerns, and an inadequately
capitalized deposit insurance fund. All factors also contributed to regulatory forbearance in
the closure of weak institutions. G. Thomas Woodward, Origins and Development of the
Savings and Loan Situation, 7-8 (Nov. 5, 1990) (on file with author).
456. See supra note 455. The FSLIC's ability to close a thrift immediately upon insolvency
is limited by the regulatory oversight mechanism. Because regulatory examinations are
infrequent and irregular, because institutions file financial reports only quarterly, and because
of the masking qualities of RAP accounting, federal regulators face difficulty in determining
precisely when an institution's net worth becomes zero. As a result, there often is considerable
1262
Furthermore, failure in the industry inevitably drove the FSLIC
insurance fund toward insolvency and questioned the continuing via-
bility of the federal deposit insurance system.4 57 The financially trou-
bled FSLIC had difficulty efficiently closing and resolving the growing
number of insolvent thrifts, a difficulty ultimately hampering the
bailout of the entire industry. 58
3. RE-REGULATION AND CLEAN-UP BEFORE FIRREA
After five years of deregulation 459 and the demise of hundreds of
institutions, critics of the lax regulatory apparatus called for greater
oversight of thrift institutions, especially in the area of risktaking.' 6
Until then, Congress and the federal regulators had taken almost no
action to handle the growing insolvencies in the savings and loan
industry.461 In 1985, as insolvencies amassed and savings and loans
diversified to riskier assets to stave off failure, the Bank Board began
to regulate excessive risk transactions in an effort to decrease the risk
of loss borne by the FSLIC.462 Bank Board regulations limited the
investments of a federally insured thrift to amounts not exceeding the
greater of ten percent of its assets or twice its net-worth.463 The regu-
lations also imposed greater net worth requirements on growing
lag time between insolvency and closure. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 49-51. The limited
staff available to the FSLIC throughout much of the crisis also exacerbated the FSLIC's
inability to close insolvent thrifts. Only 34 FSLIC employees worked on 297 institutions in
1980. Although the number of employees grew to 159 by 1985; the number of financially
troubled institutions grew to 655. Significantly, over the same period, the number of thrift field
examiners declined. Id. at 57. Failure was so pervasive in the industry that even healthy
thrifts were either wary to merge with troubled institutions or did not have the resources to
complete a successful merger. Since the most efficient means for the FSLIC to dispose of
insolvent institutions was by merger, the FSLIC was further hampered in resolving failed
institutions. Id. at 51-53. All of these factors contributed to further delay resolution of
"failed" thrifts, resolution already slowed by regulatory forbearance.
457. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 51. The FDIC (which insures both banks and thrift
deposits under FIRREA) faces continuing operating losses and "[m]ost observers of the
banking industry and the insurance fund agree that both face challenges not encountered since
the inception of federal deposit insurance in 1934." Testimony of L. William Seidman,
Hearing on The Condition of the Bank Insurance Fund and Recapitalization before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban affairs, at 2 (Mar. 21, 1991) (on file with author).
See also General Accounting Office Report to Congress Bank Insurance Fund: Additional
Reserves and Reforms Needed to Strengthen the Fund (Sept. 1990) (discussing the solvency of
the insurance fund with projections through 1995).
458. See supra notes 456-457.
459. See supra notes 417-418 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Monetary
Control Act of 1978, which began the deregulatory trend.
460. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 75.
461. The Bank Board did, however, raise the capital requirements in 1983 for new thrift
institutions seeking charters. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 73.
462. Id. at 74.
463. Id. These regulations were the first regulatory attempt to separate banking and
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thrifts and prohibited accounting techniques that lowered thrift net-
worth requirements. 46 These Bank Board regulations were the first
step toward reestablishing the historic separation between banking
and commerce established during the Depression years.4
65
In 1986, the Bank Board further stiffened thrift regulations. 66
New regulations created higher incremental capital requirements for
risky investments such as land loans, direct investments, non-residen-
tial construction loans, and letters of credit.4 67 To encourage a con-
servative thrift strategy, the Bank Board lowered the capital
requirements for institutions lowering their interest exposure.468 Fur-
ther contributing to its risk adverse posture, the Bank Board adopted
additional direct investment regulations in late 1986 through 1987.469
Though these additional regulations further curtailed excessive
risktaking, they were too late to curb the mounting thrift crisis, and
they failed to assist already insolvent institutions, straining an already
taxed FSLIC regulatory apparatus.47 °
With the insurance fund reeling, the Bank Board and United
States Treasury officials developed a recapitalization plan to provide
the FSLIC with additional funds to dispose of assets of closed and
insolvent institutions.4  In 1987, Congress and the Reagan adminis-
tration (in a reversal of its earlier deregulatory stance) adopted a plan
commerce since the unification beginning with the Monetary Control Act in 1978 and
culminating with the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982. See supra part IV.B.2.
464. Id. For a discussion of the problems inherent in accounting practices, see, e.g.,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ECONOMIC REPORT ON
CORPORATE MERGERS 120, 127-29 (1969) (stating that "if accounting is a tool designed to
facilitate a rational assessment of business success or failure, its techniques should give a timely
and accurate representation .... ); Ross, The Wonderful World of Accounting, in EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING: SELECTED STUDIES 108 (1970) (questioning the empirical
validity of accounting data); cf Homer Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and
Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1188 (1970) (commenting on the "wildly
unorganized accounting of the 1920s").
465. These regulations show that the Bank Board recognized the danger implicit in unifying
banking, commerce, and deposit insurance.
466. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 76.
467. Id. The Bank Board raised the minimum net worth requirements for existing thrifts
from a low of four percent to six percent RAP net worth. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id. As Brumbaugh notes, the Bank Board's decision to reduce thrift risktaking by
raising capital requirements was "unassailable." Id. at 79.
470. Id. Net worth and other regulatory restrictions, although generally appropriate for the
industry, did little to resurrect already insolvent, but still breathing institutions.
Unfortunately, the federal regulatory scheme largely ignored the increased numbers of
operating insolvent institutions since the early 1980s. "It is astounding that from the time this
problem was perceived in late 1982 and early 1983 no coherent strategy to resolve it has been
devised by the Bank Board, the executive branch, or Congress." Id.
471. Id. at 80. The Bank Board plan was to create a corporation out of capital taken from
each of the twelve regional Federal Home Loan Banks. The corporation would "sell debt"
similar to the one the Bank Board had formulated to recapitalize the
FSLIC.472 The Competitive Equality Banking Act ("Competitive
Equality Act"), authorized formation of the FSLIC Financing Corpo-
ration to raise $10.8 billion to bail out insolvent thrifts.47 3 While aid-
ing insolvent thrifts, the Competitive Equality Act hurt the condition
of solvent thrifts by placing a premium on deposit insurance to raise
recapitalization funds for the bail out.4 74 Worse still, the Competitive
Equality Act fell short of the projected cost and ultimately, the actual
cost of closing and resolving failed thrifts.475
In 1988, the Bank Board, under M. Danny Wall, developed its
controversial "Southwest Plan. ' 476 Under the "Southwest Plan," the
Bank Board sold "sick" thrifts to healthy financial institutions, giving
subsidies and tax breaks to encourage the deals.477 The Bank Board
sold eighty-seven thrifts at bargain prices in fifteen separate transac-
tions.478 Unfortunately, the "fire sale" cost the federal government
dearly. Instead of raising money for the FSLIC and for recapitalizing
closed thrifts,479 the Southwest Plan cost taxpayers $8.5 billion alone
on the tax breaks to thrift buyers.480  Not surprisingly, the Bush
Administration soon terminated the Bank Board's authority to con-
duct Southwest Plan transactions and inspired a Congressional over-
haul of the savings and loan regulatory scheme in 1989.481
C. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989
Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") in response to the esca-
repayable by placing capital in zero-coupon bonds. Any interest on the debt was to be paid
from deposit insurance premiums. The plan hoped to raise $5 billion per year. Id.
472. Id. See infra note 473.
473. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.). See also BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 80-81.
474. Id. See also Stephen K. Huber, The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987: An
Analysis and Critical Commentary, 105 BANKING L.J. 284 (1988).
475. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 80-81.
476. Id. See also PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340, at 203-232.
477. See supra note 476.
478. WALDMAN, supra note 3, at 85.
479. Id. at 84.
480. Id. The total cost of the "Southwest Plan" is estimated at $66.9 billion over ten years.
The "Southwest Plan" was a virtual "catalogue of flaws." PILZER & DEITZ, supra note 340, at
205-06. "[T]he Southwest Plan represented bad business judgment and faulty economic
reasoning, since it sought to delay rather than resolve a critical problem." Id. Public outrage
at M. Danny Wall's secretive thrift sale certainly inspired later congressional reaction to the
thrift crisis in the passage of FIRREA. Id.
481. WALDMAN, supra note 3, at 87 (discussing the "Southwest Plan's" impact on the
White House and its "spark plug" role in the enactment of FIRREA).
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lating savings and loan crisis.48 2 FIRREA revamped the regulatory
apparatus that governed thrift institutions since the Depression and
reversed the deregulatory trend of the late 1970s and early 1980s.483
Its breadth is enormous, 8 4 contemplating both the funding and reso-
lution of insolvent institutions and the continuing viability of the
thrift industry.48 5
FIRREA did away with the Bank Board (and its infamous
Southwest Plan),486 and divided the Board's responsibilities among
three regulatory bodies: the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"),487
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"),488 and the
Federal Home Financing Board ("Finance Board").48 9 The OTS
became the primary regulator of federally-insured, federal and state
chartered thrifts.490 The FDIC assumed the Bank Board's deposit
insurance function.49 ' The Finance Board replaced the Bank Board
482. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.
and 15 U.S.C.). For a comprehensive discussion of FIRREA, see David B. Gail & Joseph J.
Norton, A Decade's Journey from "Deregulation" to "Supervisory Regulation": The Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1103 (1990).
Although FIRREA primarily addresses problems in the thrift industry and its governing
regulatory framework, it also changes banking regulations; M. Maureen Murphy, FIRREA:
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989: A Summary, Aug.
28, 1989 (on file with author).
483. See supra part IV.B.2.
484. FIRREA's 1000-page length in itself is an appropriate commentary on its
comprehensive coverage. Because of the Act's length, Congress had to enact a joint resolution
to expedite its passage. See Gail & Norton, supra note 482, at 1106 n.14 (citing H.R.J. Res.
390, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. H5315 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989)). Public pressure
for a response to the thrift crisis spurred the Bush administration and Congress to enact this
voluminous legislation. As Gail and Norton explain, the savings and loan crisis "was clearly
the administration's number one domestic priority following President Bush's inauguration in
January and the pressure on Congress to act swiftly was immense." Gail & Norton, supra note
482, at 1106 (citing S. Rep. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 967 (1989)).
485. See infra notes 486-516 and accompanying text.
486. FIRREA § 401(a)(2), 103. Stat. 183, 354 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437 note (West
Supp. 1992)) (closing the Federal Home Loan Bank Board); id. § 401(a)(1) (dissolving the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation).
487. Id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 278 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(a) (West Supp. 1992))
(establishing the OTS).
488. Id. § 401(A), 103 Stat. at 354 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (West Supp. 1992))
(transferring the Bank Board's role of insuring deposits of thrifts through the FSLIC to the
FDIC).
489. Id. § 702(A), 103 Stat. at 413 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1422a(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992))
(transferring the Bank Board's oversight role of the Federal Home Loan Banks to the Federal
Housing Finance Board).
490. Id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 280 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1463(a) (West Supp. 1992))
(empowering the OTS with supervisory and regulatory authority over federal and state thrifts).
491. Id. § 401(A), 103 Stat. at 354 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (West Supp. 1992)).
Within the FDIC, the Bank Insurance Fund insures bank deposit accounts and the Savings
Associations Insurance Fund insures the savings accounts of thrift institutions. Id. § 211(3),
103 Stat. at 369 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1992)).
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as the monitor of the Federal Home Loan Bank System.492
In addition to the OTS, the FDIC, and the Financing Board,
FIRREA created the Resolution Trust Corporation493 ("RTC") and
the Resolution Funding Corporation494 ("REFCORP") as temporary
regulatory agencies. The RTC's function is to resolve failed thrifts in
receivership or conservatorship previously insured by the now defunct
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.4 95 The RTC Over-
sight Board monitors the RTC's resolution of closed thrifts.496 Con-
gress created REFCORP to finance, partially through the sale of
bonds, the resolution of insolvent financial institutions.497
FIRREA sought to resurrect the savings and loan industry by
separating banking and commerce, ending regulatory forbearance,
and financing the resurrection of the savings and loan insurance
fund.498 Congress hoped to achieve these goals by limiting the risk
taking tendencies of deregulated institutions and by stricter monitor-
ing of thrift business practices. 499  Through FIRREA, Congress
attempted to rebuild the deposit insurance reserve and to return to a
"safe and stable system" of housing finance institutions."° It did so
by tightening capital, accounting, and other supervisory standards,
and by placing stringent restrictions on high-risk investments. 0 1 To
facilitate implementation of FIRREA's mandates, Congress vested
federal regulators with more expansive criminal and civil enforcement
powers. 502
FIRREA raises capital standards of savings and loans in three
areas. Its goal is to prevent unnecessary waste of federal deposit
insurance funds by placing a greater risk burden on thrift owner-
492. Id. § 702(A), 103 Stat. at 413 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1422(A)(b)(1) (West Supp.
1992)).
493. Id. § 501(a), 103 Stat. at 363 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992))
(establishing the RTC).
494. Id. § 51 1(A), 103 Stat. at 394 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 144lb(A) (West Supp. 1992)).
495. Id. § 501(a), 103 Stat. at 363 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a (West Supp. 1992)). This
section gives the RTC receivership and conservatorship authority for thrifts between January
1, 1989 and August 9, 1992, and empowers the RTC to dispose of all assets of the Federal
Asset Disposition Association by February 4, 1990).
496. Id. § 501(A), 103 Stat. at 369 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3) (West Supp. 1992)).
497. Id. § 511, 103 Stat. at 394 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(e) & (f) (West Supp. 1992)).
498. Id. § 101, Stat. 183, 187 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 note (West Supp. 1992)).
499. For a discussion of the risktaking incentives of deposit insurance and of the unification
of banking and commerce, see infra part VI.B.
500. FIRREA § 101(l) & (2), 103 Stat. 187 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 note (West Supp.
1992)).
501. Id. § 101(3), 103 Stat. 187 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 note (West Supp. 1992)).
502. Id. § 101(9), 103 Stat. 187 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 note (West Supp. 1992))
(stating another of FIRREA's purposes: "To strengthen the enforcement powers of federal
regulators of depository institutions.").
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ship.53 First, FIRREA requires thrifts to maintain a certain leverage
limit-a minimum of a three percent capital to asset ratio. 5°  Second,
it limits thrifts' use of intangible assets such as goodwill in thrift capi-
tal bases. 50 5 Third, it requires thrifts to maintain certain amounts of
capital and assets based on their risk characteristics. °6 Under this
capital standard, to invest in risky assets, a thrift must maintain
higher relative capital on those assets compared with other more sta-
ble assets.5 °7 Although FIRREA sets minimum capital standards, the
OTS may require individual institutions to exceed the minimum stan-
dard capital based on the level of risk as determined on a case by case
basis.50
8
With FIRREA, Congress and the Bush administration enacted
specific provisions designed to curtail industry-wide failure and to
secure the vitality of the thrift industry. 5° Furthering this purpose,
FIRREA enacts other measures to strengthen the savings and loan
industry by placing limits on certain transactions. 510 FIRREA limits
thrifts to certain dollar amounts on loans to one borrower5 1 1 on non-
residential real property loans, 5 2 and on unrated or below-invest-
ment-grade high yield securities, 513 and curtails the ability of thrifts to
503. H.R. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 408, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432
(1989) [hereinafter Conference Report]. See FIRREA § 301, 103 Stat. at 303 (codified at 12
U.S.C. 1464(t)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1992)).
504. FIRREA § 301, 103 Stat. 304 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1992)).
505. Id. § 301, 103 Stat. 304 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1992)). To
compensate for the presence of "Goodwill" on many thrifts' balance sheets, FIRREA permits
the phase-in of core capital requirements for eligible thrifts for qualifying supervisory goodwill.
Id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 310 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(9)(B) (West Supp. 1992)).
506. Id. § 301, 103 Stat. 304 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1992)).
507. Id.
508. Authorized by id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 303 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(2) (West
Supp. 1992)) and formulated by 54 Fed. Reg. 4108, 4109 (1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 3.100)).
509. See F. Jean Wells, Savings Institutions and Their Regulatory Environment Under P.L.
101-73, 7-9 (March 7, 1990) (on file with author).
510. FIRREA § 301, 103 Stat. at 282 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(u)(i) (West Supp.
1992)). Limitations are usually 15% of a thrift's unimpaired capital and uninterrupted
surplus. Id. This provision of FIRREA overturns the prior thrift practice which permitted
real estate loans in value up to 100% of the thrifts' net worth.
511. Id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 310 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(u)(1) (West Supp. 1992)).
512. Id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 286 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(C)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp.
1992)). This provision reduces the amount of thrift loan funds in nonresidential real property
to 400% of capital. Id.
513. Specifically, the Act prohibits investment in any security that has not received an
investment grade rating from a nationally recognized statistical rating organization. FIRREA
§ 222, 103 Stat. at 270 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1833(d)(1) (West Supp. 1992)) (prohibiting
investment); § 222, 103 Stat. at 270 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 163 1(d)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1992))
(defining investment grade security). 0
1268
FIRREA
accept brokered deposits.5" 4 Federal regulators under FIRREA also
employ a "qualified thrift lender" test, mandating that all savings and
loan institutions retain at least seventy percent of their assets in "qual-
ified investments," particularly housing finance.515 Significantly, FIR-
REA holds state-chartered federally insured thrifts to the same
standards as federally-chartered institutions.516
1. REREGULATION TO LIMIT MANAGERIAL RISKTAKING:
BEARING THE BURDEN OF THE CRISIS
FIRREA completes the regulatory, deregulatory, re-regulatory
cycle that has provided the backdrop for the thrift industry since the
Depression-era legislation. Furthermore, re-regulation and the dra-
matic restructuring of the thrift industry under FIRREA occurred
within eight years of a Congress and President bent on deregulating
and broadening thrift business practices. 517 With deregulation, Con-
gress and the President responded to the criticism of the separation of
banking and commerce, which inhibited potentially competitive thrift
business practices. 1 8 Unfortunately, the logical complement of unify-
ing banking and commerce-amending the deposit insurance system
to eliminate or reduce risk incentives 519 -was omitted from the der-
egulatory scheme. Instead, the super-risktaking effects of unifying
banking and commerce in concert with deposit insurance drove many
514. The brokered deposit limitation essentially requires thrifts to maintain FIRREA's
capital requirements in order to receive brokered deposits. Those institutions not in
compliance must receive FDIC approval to be eligible to receive brokered deposits. FIRREA
§ 301, 103 Stat. at 308 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(6)(a)(iv) (West Supp. 1992)).
515. The Qualified Thrift Lender Test originated in the Competitive Equality Banking Act
of 1987 ("CEBA"), Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987). Under CEBA's Qualified Thrift
Lender Test, the Bank Board required thrifts to maintain at least sixty percent of their tangible
assets invested in qualified thrift investments on an average basis in three out of four quarters
and two out of every three years. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1730a(o)(1) (1989). FIRREA retained
CEBA's test until July 1, 1991, FIRREA § 301, 103 Stat. at 331-32 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1467a(m) (West Supp. 1992)) at which time FIRREA increased the required thrift
investments to 70% of portfolio assets on a constant basis, id. § 303(A), 103 Stat. at 343-44
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1467(A) (West Supp. 1992)), and narrowed qualified thrifts'
investments to an emphasis on housing finance. Id. § 303(A), 103 Stat. at 347 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1467(A) (West Supp. 1992)).
516. FIRREA § 222, 103 Stat. at 269 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831(c) (West Supp. 1992))
(prohibiting state thrifts from engaging in activities that federal regulators prohibit national
thrifts from participating in). Also, the FDIC has the authority to prohibit state thrifts from
engaging in activity which threatens loss to the deposit insurance fund. Id. § 221(4), 103 Stat.
at 268 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(m)(3) (West Supp. 1992)).
517. See supra part IV.B.2.
518. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Glass-Steagall: Some Critical Reflections, 97 BANKING
L.J. 631 (1980) (arguing that the separation of banking and commerce operates inefficiently
but is nevertheless significant in a revamped form).
519. See supra note 379.
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thrifts to failure.5 20
Now, under FIRREA, Congress and the President (recognizing
the dramatic risk incentives) took steps to reestablish the separation
of banking and commerce in order to reinvent the thrift industry as a
conservative, but still profitable, housing finance industry. 52I How-
ever, in FIRREA's re-regulation of the thrift industry, Congress and
President Bush profoundly affected traditional notions of corporate
governance in insured depository institutions. Under FIRREA, thrift
management faces unprecedented liability in a fiduciary regime dra-
matically removed from the traditional Berle and Means corporate
governance model, yet sympathetic to Berle and Means' ideal of a
new corporate economic order based on the dictates of community.522
Inevitably, the news media's portrayal of thrift "bad boys" such
as Charles Keating, Neil Bush, and David Paul created public resent-
ment of all thrift industry management analogous to the outrage over
"conflicts of interest" that spurred enactment of the Glass-Steagal Act
in 1933.523 Congressional investigations into the massive financial
failures at Keating's Lincoln Savings and Loan,5 24 Bush's Silverado
Savings and Loan,5 25 and Paul's Centrust Savings Bank 26 captivated
and polarized the American public. Guided by reports of rampant
fraud and questionable business practices, Congress sought a political
scapegoat, and found one in thrift management.527 The question thus
becomes: What is the cost of "punishing" thrift management?
FIRREA reinforced the wall between banking and commerce by
imposing personal liability on corporate managers for excessive com-
mercial risktaking.5 28  As a result, FIRREA profoundly disrupts
traditional notions of corporate governance and places the burden of
the savings and loan crisis on the shoulders of largely undeserving
thrift management.
520. See discussion supra notes 395-397 and accompanying text.
521. See supra notes 486-516 and accompanying text, for a discussion of FIRREA's stated
purposes of providing an effective system of housing finance.
522. See supra part II.A.3.
523. For a discussion of Depression fears and "conflicts of interests," see supra part IV.A.3.
524. See Lincoln Hearings, supra note 332.
525. See Silverado Hearings, supra note 332.
526. See Centrust Hearings, supra note 332.
527. See supra note 332; David A. Rosenbaum, How Capital Ignored Alarms on Savings,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1990, at Al, D4.
528. For a discussion of FIRREA and the separation of banking and commerce, see infra
part VI.B.
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2. THE FIDUCIARY REGIME UNDER FIRREA: TRANS UNION
REVISITED
FIRREA creates a new federal fiduciary regime for insured
depository institution management. FIRREA's fiduciary regime
rejects the statutory and common law developed in the wake of Trans
Union,52 9 which sought to limit the overextension of director and
officer liability. 30 In fact, FIRREA's fiduciary regime is strikingly
similar to the standard articulated by the Trans Union court and thus
begs the question whether fears of Trans Union liability will dissuade
competent and qualified directors from service in thrift institution
management. With the enactment of FIRREA, it appears that sav-
ings and loans will be guided by a new federal fiduciary regime that
exacerbates ownership and control problems in corporate financial
institutions.53" '
a. The Gross Negligence Standard
Under FIRREA, directors and officers of financial institutions
are held to a single standard of liability: gross negligence. Section
1821(k) of FIRREA states:532
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be
held personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action...
for gross negligence, including a similar conduct or conduct that
demonstrates a greater disregard of duty of care (than gross negli-
529. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1988). See supra part III.C.1.
530. See supra part III.C.2.
531. See BARRY S. ZISMAN, BANKS AND THRIFTS GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND
RECEIVERSHIP 1991 § 5.04(1) at 5-46, for a general discussion of FIRREA's fiduciary
standard.
532. Pub. L. No. 101-73 § 212(K) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1821(k) (West Supp. 1992)).
Section § 1821(k) read:
(k) Liability of directors and officers. A director or officer of an insured
depository institution may be held personally liable for monetary damages in any
civil action by, on behalf of, or at the request or direction of the Corporation
(FDIC], which action is prosecuted wholly or partially for the benefit of the
Corporation-
(1) acting as conservator or receiver of such institution,
(2) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased from,
assigned by, or otherwise conveyed by such receiver or conservator, or
(3) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased from,
assigned by, or otherwise conveyed in whole or in part by an insured
depository institution or its affiliate in connection with assistance provided
under S. 1823 of this title,
for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates
a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional
tortious conduct, as such terms are defined and determined under applicable
State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the
Corporation under other applicable law.
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gence), including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are
defined and determined under applicable state law.
5 33
Significantly, Congress used the same gross negligence language found
in Trans Union and presumably intended a gross negligence standard
similar to Trans Union to apply to thrift management in Delaware.
5 34
Furthermore, FIRREA preempts state limitations on managerial lia-
bility,5 35 including all state defenses in the form of director and officer
533. Id.
534. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 198, Cumulative Supp. at 59. The general application
of Delaware "gross negligence" fiduciary law is arguably the basis for FIRREA's statutory
standard: "[T]he term gross negligence [in FIRREA] suggests that such liability will follow
the pattern made by the Delaware courts where gross negligence has been the criterion for
directorial personal liability." Id.
535. Id. "The statute would presumably preempt any contrary state law, including any
defenses to liability available under state law, such as the business judgment rule, the reliance
defense, etc., to the extent that those defenses apply to gross negligence." Id.
The legislative history of section 1821(k) reveals a Congressional intent to preempt state
liability-limiting statutes in the context of insured depository institutions. Even though
Congress knew of the hazards of expanded liability, it still, somewhat surprisingly, preempted
the state statutory regimes with the obvious, though anomalous, result of dissuading
managerial service in the boardroom of insured depository institutions. Senator Sanford gives
a somewhat confused comment on the section 1821(k) provisions, a comment that is contrary
to plain reading of the Act:
Mr. President, I would like to thank the distinguished managers of the bill,
Senator Riegle and Senator Garn, for including in the managers' amendment
modifications to the bill regarding directors['] and officers['] liability . . .
provisions relating to State laws affecting the liability of officers and directors of
financial institutions.
I believe that these changes are essential if we are to attract qualified officers
and directors to serve in our financial institutions. The bill as drafted would have
preempted numerous State laws which provide limited indemnification for
directors and officers. These State laws were enacted largely in response to
problems faced by corporations in attracting good officers and directors.
Problems also occurred in obtaining directors and officers insurance due to
potential law suits against these directors and officers personally based on even
simple negligence claims. Nothing in these State laws would preclude the
bringing of such suits against the corporation itself, but these laws limit the
personal liability of the officers and directors in certain circumstances.
The amendment which the managers have accepted modifies the bill to
preempt State law only in a very limited capacity. The amendment would permit
the FDIC to bring an action or direct others to bring an action against the
directors and officers of a financial institution if the director or officer acted with
gross negligence or committed an intentional tort.
While I fundamentally believe that issues of corporate governance and the
standard of care to which corporate officers and directors should be held are
matters of state law, not Federal law, the preemption of State law permitted by
this bill is limited solely to those institutions that have Federal deposit insurance
and to those cases in which the directors or officers have committed intentional
torts or acts of gross negligence. As such, the establishment of a Federal
standard of care is based on the overriding Federal interest in protecting the
soundness of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation fund and is very limited
in scope. It is not a wholesale preemption of longstanding principles of corporate
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liability protection statutes.536 State legislatures enacted these statutes
to limit potential officer and director liability after Trans Union and
the director and officer liability insurance crisis of the mid-1980s.13
Because FIRREA preempts these state statutes, federal regulators are
free to second-guess management's business judgment when they
allege "unsafe and unsound" business practices violative of the gross
negligence standard.53 Although FIRREA's standard creates uni-
governance, nor does it represent a major step in the direction of establishing
Federal tort standards or Federal standards of care of corporate officers and
directors.
135 Cong. Rec. S. 4276.
Senator Sanford provides the simplistic analysis of the preemption provisions that fails to
consider the potential flight from insured depository institution board service under a fiduciary
regime strikingly similar to the Trans Union liability crisis.
There is a dispute, however, as to the extent of the section 182 1(k) preemption. See Fed-
eral Deposit Ins. Co. v. McSweeney, 1991 W.L. 173336 at 8 (S.D. Cal.) (holding that section
1821(k) preempts only those state laws not rising to the levels greater than gross negligence);
but see FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533 (C.D. Utah 1991) (holding that section 1821(k)
preempts all state law). The Canfield decision was, however, reversed on appeal, FDIC v.
Canfield, 967 F.2d 44 (10th Cir. 1992). While the majority of case law seems in agreement that
1821(k) preserves state causes of action for breaches of duty of care standards stricter than
gross negligence, see, e.g. FSLIC v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1360 (M.D. La. 1992); FDIC v.
Williams, 779 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Texas 1991); FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Ill.
1991); FDIC v. Isham, 777 F. Supp. 828 (D. Col. 1991); FDIC v. Blade, 777 F. Supp. 919
(W.D. Oki. 1991); FDIC v. Fay, 779 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Texas 1991), the issue seems ripe for
Supreme Court review. In fact, the defendant directors in Canfield have petitioned the
Supreme Court for review and are awaiting word as to whether or not the Supreme Court will
take jurisdiction. For an excellent overview of the Supreme Court briefs in Canfield, see Tracy
Collins, (Standard of Care); FDIC v. Canfield, Supreme Court is Asked to Review Simple Negli-
gence Ruling, Failed Bank and Thrift Reporter at 16,014 (Sep. 23, 1992).
536. See supra note 535.
537. For a discussion of the state statutory liability regime, see supra part III.C.2.
538. Congress did not define an "unsafe and unsound" practice in FIRREA. The usual
meaning of the phrase comes from the then-chairperson of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, John Home:
Generally speaking, an 'unsafe or unsound practice' embraces any action, or lack
of action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation,
the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss
or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the
insurance funds.
Zisman, supra note 531, at 2-6 (citing 112 Cong. Rec. 26474). Zisman gives illustrations of the
"unsafe and unsound" standard in First National Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, 697 F.2d 674, 685 (5th Cir. 1983) and First National Bank of Eden v. Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, 568 F.2d 610, 611 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978).
The RTC is using the "unsafe and unsound" standard to second-guess the business prac-
tices of failed institution management. The theory, presumably, is that any "unsafe and
unsound" practice is gross negligence. In one pending litigation, the RTC sued the former
directors and officers of a failed thrift for breaches of fiduciary duty. The RTC's description of
the "nature of the action" is indicative of the strategy of second-guessing thrift managers'
business judgment:
[T]he Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") and the Office of the Comptroller of
the State of Florida ("Florida Comptroller") (collectively "the regulators")
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formity amongst the states, its emasculation of the business judgment
rule, of reliance, and of other defenses, raises questions about Con-
gress' memory of history. With the stated goals of returning the thrift
industry to viability, Congress achieved an undesirable result: Trans
Union-type liability facing already disheartened thrift management.
Under FIRREA, the uncertain ability to attract qualified manage-
ment threatens the effective implementation of FIRREA's regulatory
scheme aimed at revitalizing a dying industry.
Federal regulators can assert that any non-traditional thrift prac-
tice is an "unsafe and unsound" business practice for which manage-
ment may be found grossly negligent and thus personally liable.5 39
Surprisingly, thrift management may also be found grossly negligent
for business practices during the 1980s because of the possible retro-
active application of FIRREA.51° Therefore, not only is the business
judgment rule no longer a viable defense, but managerial decision-
making may be affirmatively reevaluated with 20-20 hindsight, as
thrift regulators apply the "unsafe and unsound [business] practice"
standard. 54
1
declared Centrust to be operating in an unsafe and unsound condition and placed
Centrust in conservatorship.
The rapid rise and fall of Centrust is a result of the acts of waste and mis-
management committed by the former Centrust directors and officers who are
the named defendants in this Complaint. Each of these officers and directors
owed fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to Centrust. The directors and officers
breached these fiduciary duties by authorizing or permitting the depletion of
Centrust's assets through extravagant and inappropriate expenditures.... The
defendants also breached their fiduciary duties by authorizing or permitting a
highly speculative investment strategy that concentrated much of Centrust's
portfolio in high risk, unrated junk bonds. In breach of their duties, the defend-
ants ignored Centrust's deteriorating financial condition from its ordinary bank-
ing operations and the warnings and directives of the regulators that CenTrust's
expenditures and investment strategy were inappropriate for a federally insured
savings and loan.
Complaint, Resolution Trust Corp. v. David L. Paul et al., Case No. 90-1477-CIV-Atkins, at
2-3 [hereinafter "Centrust Complaint"] (on file with author). In the Centrust litigation, the
RTC seeks to second-guess Centrust's investment strategy, a strategy that was permitted and
even encouraged under 1980s deregulation. See infra notes 539-543 and accompanying text.
539. See supra note 538.
540. For an overview of the case law discussing the retroactive application of FIRREA, see
Charles L. O'Brien & Lisa M. Cavage, FIRREA: Retroactive Application, Due Process Issues,
Right-Duty Analysis and the Statute of Limitations, 108 BANKING L.J. 308 (1991). Federal
courts or administrative agencies must apply the law in effect at the time of decision, unless
doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory discretion or legislative history
to the contrary. Although there is a tradition to the presumption of retroactive application of
civil statutes, see Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974), where the Supreme
Court seems to have retreated from this position. See Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Bonjorno,
110 S. Ct. Rep. 1570 (1990).
541. For an example of the RTC's application of 20-20 hindsight, see Centrust Complaint,
supra note 538, at 2-3.
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Effectively, the reevaluation of business decisions under FIR-
REA is a stiffer review than even under Trans Union. 42 Whereas in
Trans Union the court reevaluated management's procedural steps
leading to the business judgment, under FIRREA the business judg-
ment itself is the subject of scrutiny.5 43 In any event, the eradication
of the business judgment safe harbor exposes insured depository insti-
tutions' management to far greater potential liability than other cor-
porate management.
b. Civil Enforcement Provisions
In addition to gross negligence liability under FIRREA, manag-
ers of insured depository institutions also face civil money penalties
for breaches of fiduciary duty under FIRREA. 5 " In Title IX of FIR-
REA, Congress created a three-tier civil penalty regime to police
directors' and officers' duties to FDIC-insured depository institu-
tions.5 45  As a result, the gross negligence corporate governance
542. The review of gross negligence under Trans Union did not reevaluate managerial
business decisions for the decision itself but rather the procedural steps managers took in
arriving at the decision. See supra part III.C. 1.
543. The RTC has sought to hold directors liable for "questionable" investments-junk
bonds, for example-even though the prior corporate governance law allowed and protected
these investments under the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Centrust Complaint, supra note
538, at 2-3.
544. Pub. L. No. 101-73 Title IX (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See Gail &
Norton, supra note 482, at 1188-1200 and Zisman, supra note 531, at § 9.04, for a discussion of
the civil money penalty enforcement provisions of FIRREA. The civil enforcement provisions
apply to a wide variety of depository institution actors beside those in managerial positions.
The civil enforcement provisions apply to "institution affiliated parties," defined as
(1) any director, officer, employee, or controlling stockholder (other than a
bank holding company) of, or agent for, an insured depository institution;
(3) any shareholder (other than a bank holding company), consultant, joint
venture partner, and any other person as determined by the appropriate Federal
banking agency (by regulation or case-by-case) who participates in the conduct of
the affairs of an insured depository institution; and
who knowingly or recklessly participates in-
(A) any violation of law or regulation;
(B) any breach of fiduciary duty; or
(C) any unsafe or unsound practice, which is caused or is likely to cause
more than a minimal financial loss to, or a significant adverse effect on, the
insured depository institution.
Id. § 901(a), 103 Stat. at 446 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786 (West Supp. 1992)).
545. FIRREA creates a general civil money penalty section applicable to all insured
depository institutions. FIRREA § 907(a), 103 Stat. at 462 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)
(West Supp. 1992)). For Federal Court review of FDIC penalty assessment see Dazzio v.
FDIC, 970 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1992) (agency assessment constituted abuse of discretion); Akin
v. Ots, 950 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1992) (cease and desist order penalty assessment held valid);
Stanley v. Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 940 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1991) (cease and
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regime is supplemented by a regulatory/administrative corporate gov-
ernance apparatus that compels further managerial accountability
through the threat of enormous potential liability.
The First Tier of civil penalties under FIRREA concerns the
obligations of insured depository institutions and their affiliated par-
ties to the governing regulatory agencies.- 46 Punishable breaches of
duty occur when the institution or its affiliates violate any law or reg-
ulation, regulatory final order, or temporary order issued to mandate
compliance with FIRREA's enforcement provisions. 54 7 Other viola-
tions under the First Tier include the breach of any condition or
agreement drawn between the insured institution and the governing
regulatory agency. 4 The penalty imposed upon the insured institu-
tion and its affiliated parties for First Tier violations is a maximum of
$5,000 per day during the breaching period.549
The Second Tier of civil penalties under FIRREA's civil enforce-
ment provisions specifically addresses fiduciary duties to the financial
institution.5 0 By this provision, any affiliated party who "recklessly
desist order penalty assessment held valid); Ambery v. FDIC, 934 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1991)
(assessment of civil penalties held to be abuse of discretion where FDIC asserted that directors
were precluded from contesting assessment); Abercrombie v. Clarke, 920 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1990) (upholding agency authority to assess civil penalties for violations prior to notice of
cease and desist).
546. FIRREA § 907(a)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 462 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(A)) (West
Supp. 1992). The First Tier provision reads in pertinent part:
(A) First tier.-Any insured depository institution which, and any institution-
affiliated party who-
(i) violates any law or regulation;
(ii) violates any final order or temporary order ...
(iii) violates any condition imposed in writing by the appropriate Federal
banking agency in connection with the grant of any application or other
request by' such depository institution and such agency, shall forfeit and
pay a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each day during which
such violation continues.
Id.
547. Id. § 907(a)(2)(A)(i) & (ii), 103 Stat. at 462 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West
Supp. 1992)).
548. Id. § 907 (a)(2)(A)(iii) & (iv), 103 Stat. at 462 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West
Supp. 1992)).
549. Id. § 907(a)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 462 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West Supp.
1992)).
550. Id. § 907(a)(2)(B), 103 Stat. at 463 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West Supp.
1992)). The Second Tier provision reads as follows:
(B) Second Tier.-Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), any insured depository
institution, which, and any institution-affiliated party who-
(i)(I) commits any violation described in any clause of subparagraph (A);
(II) recklessly engages in an unsafe or unsound practice in conducting the
affairs of such insured depository institution; or
(III) breaches any fiduciary duty;
(ii) which violation, practice, or breach-
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engages in an unsafe or unsound practice" in the administering of the
business affairs of an insured depository institution breaches her
duty.55 Any breach of fiduciary duty that follows a pattern of breach
and results in loss to the institution also violates the Second Tier pro-
visions.552  Second Tier violations call for a maximum penalty of
$25,000 per day during the period of the violation.553
The Third Tier imposes the stiffest penalties for breaches of
duty. 5 4  A Third Tier violation occurs when any affiliated party
knowingly commits a First Tier violation, "engages in any unsafe or
unsound practice" while "conducting the affairs" of the depository
institution, or "breaches any fiduciary duty."5 5 If, while committing
these violations, the party knowingly harms the institution or benefits
an affiliated party to the detriment of the institution,5 6 the breaching
party is subject to a civil money penalty of up to $1,000,000 per day
(I) is part of a pattern of misconduct;
(II) causes or is likely to cause more than a minimal loss to such
depository institution; or
(III) results in pecuniary gain or other benefit to such party, shall forfeit
and pay a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day during
which such violation, practice, or breach continues.
Id.
551. Id. § 907(a)(2)(B)(i)(II), 103 Stat. at 463 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West
Supp. 1992)).
552. Id. § 907(a)(2)(B)(i)(III), 103 Stat. at 463 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West
Supp. 1992)).
553. Id. § 907(a)(2)(B), 103 Stat. at 463 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West Supp.
1992)).
554. Id. § 907(a), 103 Stat. at 463 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(I)(2) (West Supp. 1992)).
The Third Tier provisions read as follows:
(C)
Third Tier.-Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), any insured
depository institution which, and any institution-affiliated party who-
(i) knowingly-
(I) commits any violation described in any clause of
subparagraph (A);
(II) engages in any unsafe or unsound practices in conducting the
affairs of such depository institution; or
(III) breaches any fiduciary duty; and
(ii) knowingly or recklessly causes a substantial loss to such depository
institution or a substantial pecuniary gain or other benefit to such party by
reason of such violation, practice, or breach,
shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the applicable
maximum amount determined under subparagraph (D) for each day during
which such violation, practice, or breach continues.
Id.
555. Id. § 907(a)(2)(c)(i)(I)(II) & (III), 103 Stat. at 463 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)
(West Supp. 1992)).
556. Id. § 907(a)(2)(c)(ii), 103 Stat. at 463 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West Supp.
1992)).
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during the course of the violation.5 7
The regulatory agency's assessment of a penalty is also to take
mitigating factors into account in determining the amount of the lev-
ied penalty.55 8 The agency must consider the appropriateness of the
penalty in relation to the financial resources and good faith of the
breaching affiliated party. 559 It must also weigh the severity of the
violation, the history of previous violations, and other equitable con-
siderations. 5 ° Although a breaching party can seek judicial review of
the agency assessment of a civil penalty, the amount of the penalty is
not subject to review. 561
Further subjecting thrift managers to greater potential liability
are certain provisions in FIRREA that give federal regulators the
right as conservators or receivers of insolvent institutions to repudiate
director and officer indemnity contracts with the depository institu-
tion.5 62  FIRREA also expands liability exposure by extending the
statute of limitations period to six years, beginning upon the termina-
tion of service of parties affiliated to the depository institutions.563 In
the case of failed institutions, where the FDIC becomes a creditor, the
RTC may consolidate and assert any and all causes of action deriva-
tive of the institution. 6
557. See id. § 907(a)(2)(D), 103 Stat. at 463 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West Supp.
1992)), for the applicable penalty scale.
558. Id. § 907(a)(2)(G), 103 Stat. at 464 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West Supp.
1992)). The mitigation factors section reads as follows:
(G) MITIGATING FACTORS.-In determining the amount of any penalty
imposed under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C), the appropriate agency shall take
into account the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to-
(i) the size of the financial resources and good faith of the insured
depository institution or other person charged;
(ii) the gravity of the violation;
(iii) the history of previous violations; and
(iv) such other matters as justice may require.
Id.
559. Id. § 907(a)(2)(G(i), 103 Stat. at 464 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West Supp.
1992)).
560. Id. § 907(a)(2)(G)(ii)(iii) & (iv), 103 Stat. at 464 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)
(West Supp. 1992)).
561. Id. § 907(a)(2)(I), 103 Stat. 464 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (West Supp. 1992)).
The civil liability provisions took effect on August 9, 1989. However, the $5,000 and
$25,000 per day civil penalties apply to conduct before this date if the breaching party was not
subject to notice of an administrative proceeding on these matters or the if the breach occurred
after completion of the last regulatory examination of the institution. Id. § 907(l)(l) & (2)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 93 note (West Supp. 1992)).
562. Id. § 212(e), 103 Stat. at 234 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (West Supp. 1992)).
563. Id. § 905(a)(3), 103 Stat. at 459 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (West Supp. 1992)).
564. For an example of a case where the RTC consolidated several shareholder derivative
actions, see Centrust Complaint, supra note 538.
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Furthermore, FIRREA subjects management to this stringent
standard of care without state statutory limitation of liability in any
civil action that is even "partially" for the benefit of the FDIC. 65
The Act thus preempts statutory limitations on director and officer
liability in almost every case, because derivative litigation will nearly
always benefit the FDIC. 566 The net result of these procedural provi-
sions is to expand FIRREA liability in any litigation in which the
FDIC or RTC plays a role.
Although FIRREA gives regulators the right to repudiate man-
agement indemnity contracts, the OTS has provided for indemnifica-
tion contracts by regulation.5 67  OTS regulations permit
indemnification contracts between depository institutions and direc-
tors and officers in cases where the indemnified party prevails in a
judgment.568 The OTS also permits indemnity where a judgment has
been rendered against the indemnified party, if a majority of disinter-
ested directors approve the indemnification contract on the belief that
the indemnified party acted in good faith and in the best interest of
the financial institution.5 69
Because the FDIC is empowered to repudiate any indemnifica-
tion contract, it would seem unlikely that an indemnity contract
would survive the scrutiny of the FDIC in an action brought by the
FDIC.57° Furthermore, the OTS can reject an indemnity contract if it
deems the incurred expense unreasonable.5 71 Therefore, in the vast
majority of cases, directors and officers face enormous potential liabil-
ity under FIRREA, which is not balanced by either the protection of
state statutory or federal regulatory indemnification.
FIRREA turns the clock back to 1985. It establishes a Trans
Union-type gross negligence standard and civil enforcement provi-
sions that effectively achieve a corporate governance separation of
banking and commerce in the limited, but important, context of
insured depository institutions. 572 In an attempt to cure the pervasive
ills of the thrift industry, Congress implemented a mandatory federal
565. FIRREA § 212(k), 103 Stat. at 243 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (West Supp.
1992)). See supra note 532.
566. In nearly every suit, the RTC is a receiver or conservator of a failed institution and/or
the FDIC is a creditor for the federal assistance given to resolve the institution.
567. 12 C.F.R. 545.121 (1992).
568. Id. at (c)(1).
569. Id. at (c)(2).
570. FIRREA § 212(e), 103 Stat. at 234 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (West Supp.
1992)).
571. 12 C.F.R. 545.121(b)(2) (1992).
572. For a discussion of the FIRREA corporate governance regime separating banking and
commerce, see infra part VI.B.
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fiduciary standard and civil enforcement provisions that hold manage-
ment accountable not just to shareholders, but also to other corporate
actors, based on the public policy goals of constraining thrift "com-
mercial" operations.57 3 Congress, assuredly driven by the cost of the
bail-out and by the public outcry over the savings and loan crisis,
enacted mandatory accountability rules despite admitted concerns
that many potential candidates would decline seats on financial insti-
tution boards.574
V. FIRREA AND THE LIABILITY OF CORPORATE GOVERNORS:
IN JUDGMENT OF BAD BUSINESS?
The corporate governance statutory regime prior to FIRREA
sought to reduce director and officer liability after Trans Union and to
respond to the fear that qualified individuals would decline service on
corporate boards.575 FIRREA abrogates the protection afforded by
these statutes in the limited context of insured depository institu-
tions.5 7 6 In doing so, it effectively emasculates the business judgment
rule as the safe harbor of corporate management.577 Now, under
FIRREA, directors and officers of insured depository institutions are
potentially liable for "knowingly or recklessly engaging in unsafe or
unsound [business] practices."57 Because the RTC has defined
"unsafe and unsound [business] practices" to include the diverse thrift
practices both prevalent and permissible in the deregulated 1980s,
fiduciary liability is predicated upon the judgment of bad business.57 9
Directors and officers "breach their fiduciary duty by authorizing or
permitting a highly speculative investment strategy.., inappropriate
573. For a discussion of the significance of FIRREA's mandatory federal corporate
governance regime, which recognizes community goals, see infra part VI.E.
574. See supra note 535.
575. For a discussion of the expanded liability under Trans Union and the liability crisis, see
supra part III.C.
576. See supra part III.C.2.
577. The paucity of judicial decisions on FIRREA's gross negligence standard limits any
hypothesis as to a judicial interpretation reading a business judgment rule into the statute.
However, the express preemption of state liability limitation statutes and congressional failure
of inclusion of a business judgment provision strongly suggest that courts may strictly interpret
the section 1821(k) standard without the business judgment defense. Certainly, a court's
failure to find business judgment protection in FIRREA's fiduciary standard would come as
far less of a surprise than the Delaware's Supreme Court opinion in Trans Union.
578. While the unsafe and unsound practices language is found in FIRREA's civil
enforcement provisions section, the RTC has applied similar language in lawsuits based upon
breach of fiduciary duty. See Centrust Complaint, supra note 538, at 3. Furthermore as a
prerequisite to fiduciary litigation, institutions are closed for "operating in an unsafe and
unsound condition." Id. at 2. Inevitably, the unsafe and unsound practices that form the basis
for a bank's closure also form the allegations of subsequent fiduciary litigation. Id.
579. See, e.g., Centrust Complaint, supra note 538, at 2-3.
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for a federally insured savings and loan." ' Despite the teachings of
years of corporate law, FIRREA's statutory language licenses federal
regulators and other derivative claimants to second-guess the business
judgment of insured depository institution management.
The gross negligence and civil enforcement provisions took effect
on August 9, 1989, the enactment date of FIRREA. Yet, the RTC
still seeks to judge directors and officers for business decisions made in
the 1980s.581 Because of the presumptive retroactive application of
civil statutes, FIRREA's strict mandates may apply to the variety of
deregulated practices that were the last gasps of now-insolvent institu-
tions.5 8 2 Conveniently, the RTC has forgotten that its regulatory
predecessors permitted and even encouraged the very same practices
for which the RTC now seeks to hold management liable. 83 Further-
more, many thrifts have been unable to unload their high-risk invest-
ments because of the collapse of the junk-bond market. 84
Management faces the unenviable choice between divesting their port-
folios of prohibited loans and investments at an immediate loss, and
suffering liability under FIRREA's gross negligence and civil enforce-
ment provisions.585 Thus, the RTC could subject directors and
officers to astronomical liability and/or fines in its pursuit of claims
against officers and directors for permissible and logical investments
made when regulatory concern was thrift competitiveness in a high
580. Id.
581. Despite the dubious validity of the presumption of retroactive application of civil
statutes, the RTC continues to allege managerial liability for permissible high-risk investments
made prior to the enactment of FIRREA. See Centrust Complaint, supra note 538, at 2-3. See
supra note 540, for case law and literature questioning the retroactive presumption as applied
to civil statutes.
582. Id.
583. For a discussion of the congressional and agency deregulatory policies that encouraged
the expansion of thrift practices, see supra part IV.B.2.
584. For an excellent gauge on the vast number of high yield securities that remain in
savings and loan portfolios, see RTC Inventory of High Yield Securities, Apr. 17, 1991 (on file
with author), which lists the aggregate inventory of high yield securities held by the RTC in
conservatorship or receivership. Recently, however, junk bonds have rebounded from their
collapse in the late 1980s. Allen R. Myerson, As Defaults Drop, Junk Bonds Make a
Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1992, at Al. New life in the junk bond market questions the
regulatory business judgement requiring divestiture of junk bond portfolios at the bottom of
the market while the RTC zealously pursues claims against former thrift management for
breaches of fiduciary duty. Seemingly, thrift management and federal regulators both
misplayed the junk bond market; however, potential liability unjustly accrues only to savings
and loan management.
585. FIRREA does provide for a moratorium on the divestiture of junk bonds until July 1,
1994. FIRREA, § 222, 103 Stat. at 286 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(Q) (West Supp.
1992). For a discussion of divestiture procedures, see Paul T. Clark et al., Regulation of
Savings Associations Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1013, at 1083-1087 (1990).
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interest-rate market. 58 6
The directors and officers of failed thrifts now face lawsuits for
alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties in authorizing these deregu-
latory-era investments.587 Certainly, under the liability of FIRREA,
the RTC can allege an "unsafe and unsound [business] practice" on
nearly every thrift investment that did not conform to traditional,
conservative business practices. In effect, without the limitation of
the business judgment rule, the RTC may declare any unfortunate
business decisions unsound in hindsight. The RTC could characterize
all assets or liabilities on thrifts' balance sheets other than the safest
home mortgage loans and savings accounts as "unsafe or unsound
business practices."
Presumably, only those business practices permitted under FIR-
REA are safe and sound.588 The unfortunate reward to thrift man-
agement for operating within the strictures and under the approval of
the permissive regulatory framework of the mid-1980s is nearly
unlimited liability.589 Managers of insured depository institutions will
now have to conform their activities to a far higher standard than
other corporate directors. Without the business judgment rule, the
RTC can review any director and officer transaction under a "heads, I
win, tails, you lose" standard. Under this standard, armed with FIR-
REA hindsight, the RTC may classify even activities permitted under
FIRREA as reckless, unsafe or unsound if they end up as "bad busi-
ness" in a future regulatory environment.
While limited to insured depository institutions, FIRREA's sig-
nificance may transcend insured depository institutions and ulti-
mately serve as the forerunner to a new general corporate fiduciary
regime. Given the history of financial institution cases that shaped
existing corporate law, FIRREA's fiduciary regime and its impact on
the business judgment rule will likely serve as a model for general
corporate fiduciary law. 59° And, on a larger scale, perhaps the
expanded liability under FIRREA portends a reevaluation of the
traditional understanding of the separation of ownership and control,
586. See supra part IV.B.2.
587. See, e.g., Centrust Complaint, supra note 538.
588. For a discussion of the business practices permissible under FIRREA, see Gail &
Norton, supra note 482; Clark et al., supra note 585.
589. In the Centrust litigation, the RTC seeks approximately $250 million in damages from
former officers and directors. Centrust Complaint, supra note 538.
590. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 198, at 516 (observing that "[m]any of the early
cases in which directors were held liable for negligence concerned . . . bank directors")
(emphasis added).
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and questions the present understanding of the corporate form of
business organization.
VI. REGULATED DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS AND THE CORPORATE
FORM OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
FIRREA's fiduciary regime "re-separates" banking and com-
merce, 9 ' dramatically revamps the common law and statutory corpo-
rate fiduciary regime, 592 and curiously fits into the corporate
governance scholarship debate.5 93 In a single fell-swoop, Congress
repudiated the statutory fiduciary regimes enacted in the wake of the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Trans Union. 94 In their place,
Congress imposed a minimum federal standard of gross negligence
and strict civil enforcement provisions.5 95 Spurred by the ill-fated
deregulatory unification of banking and commerce, Congress and
President Bush rushed to enact a scheme of corporate governance
that "re-separates" banking and commerce.5 96 Remarkably, FIR-
REA's scheme of corporate governance recognizes the fiduciary rights
not just of shareholders but of creditors as well, particularly rights in
relation to the government as deposit insurer.5 97 Also significant is
FIRREA's amalgamation of principles articulated by both coercionist
and contractarian scholars and its inclusion of community goals, mir-
roring the approach urged by corporate social responsibility schol-
ars.598 Though noted for its comprehensive reform of the savings and
loan industry as a whole, FIRREA creates major changes in the
boardrooms of thrift institutions, the fiduciary rights of creditors, and
the scholarship debate on corporate governance. Setting the stage for
FIRREA's dramatic departure from traditional corporate governance
are the inherent flaws of the savings and loan industry which led to
crisis and which question the ultimate viability of the thrift industry.
A. The Basis for Failure
The given causes of the thrift crisis are as numerous as those
willing to offer an opinion. While surely a variety of factors contrib-
uted to the demise of the thrift industry that triggered the enactment
591. See infra section B.
592. See infra section C.
593. See infra section E.
594. See supra part IV.C.2.
595. See supra part IV.C.2.
596. See infra section B.
597. See infra section D.
598. See infra section E.
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of FIRREA, certain core problems led to the actual thrift crisis.59 9
The synergy of untimely economic effects, a tenuous and unworkable
relationship between the unification of banking and commerce and
deposit insurance, and regulatory and congressional forbearance
doomed the savings and loan industry. These factors provide the nec-
essary backdrop for an understanding of FIRREA's overhaul of tradi-
tional corporate governance.
The roots of the savings and loans crisis lie in the evolution of
modern financial markets and inflation. In the late 1970s, rising inter-
est rates and the growth of market sensitive financial instruments
exposed thrift non-competitiveness as disintermediation drove deposi-
tors away from passbook savings accounts. 6°° Concurrently, the ini-
tially deregulated thrifts offering negotiable orders of withdrawal and
money market accounts could not meet their short-term liabilities
because asset-side entries were tied up in long-term home mort-
gages."° The final deregulation of thrifts removed asset-side limita-
tions and permitted thrifts to invest in diverse commercial real estate
and high-risk securities." 2 The ensuing recession and the collapse of
the real estate market dealt the ultimate blow to a shaky thrift indus-
try, which had initially shown improvement in the deregulatory envi-
ronment. 603 In fact, each of the Congressional regulatory enactments,
including FIRREA, has been a knee-jerk response to adverse financial
markets that undermined the savings and loans as a profitable
industry.' °4
At the heart of the savings and loan problem is the separation of
banking and commerce and the dominance of Depression-era think-
ing." Because of the fears of uncontrolled economic power com-
pounded by Depression despair, Congress separated depository
institutions from other financial service firms. 6°6 Balancing the risk
aversion of separating banking and commerce, risk-inducing federal
599. See supra part IV.B. 1. For a general discussion of the roots of the savings and loan
crisis which is also significant for its intended congressional audience, see G. THOMAS
WOODWARD, ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN SITUATION (Nov. 5,
1990) (on file with author).
600. See BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 31-57; WOODWARD, supra note 599, at 3.
601. See supra note 600.
602. See supra note 422.
603. See supra note 446 and accompanying text. But in reality, congressional deregulation
of the industry "whatever else it might accomplish-had come too late to save the industry."
WOODWARD, supra note 599, at 5.
604. See supra note 603.
605. See STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14, at 26 (discussing the effect of lingering Depression
fears on the regulation of the thrift industry); BENTSON, supra note 382 (discussing the
rationale for the separation of banking and commerce); see supra part IV.A.3.
606. See supra part IV.A.3.
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deposit insurance reserves guaranteed depositor confidence and
encouraged home loans.607 However, thrift competitiveness slackened
as the separation of banking and commerce thwarted thrift business
opportunities in evolving financial markets. 608  To counteract the
dying thrift business, Congress, the President, and federal regulators
systematically deregulated the industry to revive lost thrift competi-
tiveness, with the result of effectively uniting banking and com-
merce.' Unfortunately, however, deposit insurance remained,
encouraging continued thrift risktaking.61° Thrifts, motivated by a
risktaking mandate, diversified their portfolios with commercial real
estate and unrated high-risk securities, only to suffer losses when the
markets for these investments deteriorated. The result: the combined
effect of risk-inducing unification of banking and commerce and of
risk-inducing deposit insurance in the volatile economic market of the
1980s spelled doom for hundreds of thrifts and cost taxpayers billions
of dollars.
Compounding the effects of the unification of banking and com-
merce with deposit insurance was congressional and presidential fail-
ure to modernize thrift regulatory oversight concurrently with thrifts'
expanded commercial powers. 61   Regulatory forbearance only
delayed the closure of failed institutions and exacerbated the problems
of healthy institutions. As thrift institution management with a fed-
eral risktaking mandate gambled for thrift solvency, regulatory over-
sight was either inadequate or purposefully restrained.61 2 In the
relaxed regulatory environment with diversified thrift practices, the
opportunity for excessive risktaking and fraud contributed to the
demise of thrift institutions and inspired scandalous news reports dis-
paraging the reputation of all thrift management.
The combined effects of unifying banking, commerce and deposit
insurance and of inadequate regulatory supervision provided the foun-
dation for inflationary interest rates and the eventual recession to
expose the weakness of the entire industry.6 3 FIRREA's overhaul of
607. See supra part IV.A.3.
608. Thrift weakness became particularly pronounced when rising interest rates caused
disintermediation while thrifts were limited to the interests payable on deposits. See supra
notes 600-604 and accompanying text.
609. See supra part IV.B.2.
610. In fact, deposit insurance increased from $40,000 to $100,000 on each account in the
Monetary Control Act. See supra part IV.B.2.
611. See WOODWARD, supra note 599, at 7-9.
612. Id.
613. See id. at 10-11, for a concise summary of the variety of combined effects that
contributed to the demise of the industry. See also STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14, at 14-16,
for an overview of the causes of the savings and loan crisis.
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the savings and loan regulatory structure directs reform at the per-
verse effects of the unification of banking and commerce, deposit
insurance and regulatory forbearance.61 4 In doing so FIRREA makes
control of corporate governance the priority of thrift reform.
B. FIRREA and Risktaking: Fiduciary Duties Separating Banking
and Commerce
The unification of banking and commerce and the effects of fixed-
rate deposit insurance drove many thrifts to a super-optimal risktak-
ing posture in the wake of deregulation.1 Untimely market effects
drove many of these institutions to insolvency and federal takeover.61 6
Congress and the Bush Administration, inspired by the perceived fail-
ure of the deregulatory experiment, enacted FIRREA as a means of
controlling risk by limiting certain thrift practices in commercial
activities. 617  In effect, FIRREA "re-separates" banking and com-
merce. Yet, portfolio control and other restrictions were seemingly
not enough for a Congress and Presidency facing a political mael-
strom over the scandal in the thrift industry. Assuredly driven by
political pressure and newsroom scandal, Congress and the Bush
administration took the unprecedented step of using a scheme of cor-
porate governance to further separate banking and commerce.
In the legislative environment still seemingly dominated by
Depression-era fears, Congress and the President enacted FIRREA,
which left the risk-inducing deposit insurance system intact but reas-
serted the Depression-era balance with a risk-reducing limitation of
614. For a discussion of FIRREA's reforms, see supra part IV.C.
615. For a discussion of the risktaking effects of deposit insurance and of risktaking and the
separation of banking and commerce, see Halpert, supra note 185, at 509-17. For a
comprehensive overview of the separation of banking and commerce, see BENTSON, supra note
382.
616. See STRUNK & CASE, supra note 14, at 98-105, for an account of the recessionary
economic effects of the mid-1980s.
617. While thrifts under FIRREA are not regulated to the prohibitive extent they were
under the Glass-Steagall Act, FIRREA does enact a variety of portfolio restrictions designed
to inhibit risktaking. For an overview of those provisions, see Gail & Norton, supra note 482.
For an excellent discussion on control of risk, see Alex M. Azar II, FIRREA: Controlling
Savings and Loans Association Credit Risk Through Capital Standards and Asset Restrictions,
100 YALE L.J. 149 (1990). Three types of risk are associated with Savings and Loans: credit
risk, interest rate risk and liquidity risk. Credit risk concerns a borrower's potential default on
a loan. Interest rate risk is the measure of the spread between interest rates paid on deposits
and interest rates returned on mortgage loans. Liquidity risk is a measure of the possibility of
disintermediation or other flight of depositors from thrift institution accounts. Id. at 151-52.
Credit risk is the primary focus of this comment as "[a]n S&L can invest in higher earning, yet
riskier assets and still pay the same interest rate to depositors and the same premiums to the
FDIC." Id. at 156. FIRREA's fiduciary regime limits credit risk by threatening personal
liability for poor business decisions that deviate from traditional thrift "investment" practices.
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thrift activities. FIRREA's gross negligence and civil penalty provi-
sions prevent all but the most conservative of business strategies.
Management, threatened with hindsight evaluation of their business
decisions under FIRREA's "unsafe and unsound practices" standard,
must necessarily be risk-averse. In effect, management is obligated to
observe the separation of banking and commerce by the threat of
enormous personal liability. Whereas the traditional separation of
banking and commerce placed limitations on specific thrift activities,
FIRREA's corporate governance "separation" conceives of a core
corporate relationship based on risk aversion. This relationship
explicitly recognizes the risk of loss borne by the deposit insurance
fund as institutions gamble to thwart insolvency and federal
takeover.618
While FIRREA includes other measures to prevent managerial
misuse or abuse of an institution's assets, its fiduciary provisions cre-
ate a trust relationship between depository institution management
and the federal government as insurer. 6' 9 The trust relationship vests
the federal regulators with enforceable rights against management for
breaches of fiduciary duty in the exercise of due care and loyalty to
the institution. Insured depository institution managers now owe a
duty of due care and loyalty to the federal deposit insurers, akin to the
duty traditionally owed to shareholders, yet conceptually different in
FIRREA's concept of a corporate financial institution structure dra-
.matically removed from the Berle and Means thesis.620
FIRREA's strict corporate governance regime, distinct from
traditional corporate law, inserts a regulatory trust relationship into
the pervasive tension between managers and shareholders. The Berle
and Means separation of ownership and control problem is exacer-
bated as the goals of the federal government as insurer and stockhold-
ing ownership materially diverge.621 Unfortunately, the difficulty that
thrift management faces in resurrecting the industry is now com-
pounded by distinct liability to both shareholders and the Federal
Government. FIRREA's incorporation of the separation of banking
and commerce into the structural tension in corporate law questions
618. See Coffee, supra note 190, for a discussion of the risk propensity of savings and loans
approaching insolvency.
619. FIRREA's fiduciary trust relationship harkens back to the "corporate powers as
powers in trust" debate between Berle and E. Merrick Podd. See supra part II.A.3.
620. The separation of ownership and control thesis is discussed supra part H.A.
621. The government as insurer becomes risk averse particularly as institutions approach
insolvency, while shareholders with nothing to lose and everything to gain favor risk as
institutions approach insolvency. For a discussion of this relationship, see Coffee, supra note
190.
1992] 1287
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1187
the viability of the thrift industry in a corporate form, as management
attempts to serve the disparate goals of two unforgiving masters, both
threatening enormous liability.
C. Life in the Boardroom After FIRREA 622
The regulatory framework created under FIRREA will have a
similar effect on the corporate governance of insured depository insti-
tutions as Trans Union did on the general corporate governance
regime.623 FIRREA will cause directors and officers of banks and
thrifts to rethink their commitment to service at these institutions.
Many of the most qualified leaders,624 fearing tremendous personal
liability, will resign or refuse to serve on savings and loan and bank
boards. The projected difficulty in attracting the most qualified per-
sons to serve in a fiduciary capacity arises at a time when the need for
effective corporate governance in the savings and loan and banking
industries is the greatest. Only the most qualified boards could help
the savings and loan industry emerge from a decade of insolvency and
prevent the banking industry from suffering a similarly bleak fate in
the 1990s.
Perhaps Congress and President Bush believe that in the strin-
gent regulatory environment of FIRREA there will be no need for the
entrepreneurial management that operated the savings and loans in
the deregulated 1980s. Since federal regulation strictly monitors the
governance of financial institutions, less qualified and/or cautious
individuals, serving as "foremen," would facilitate the rebirth of the
savings and loan industry by pursuing the legislatively mandated con-
servative corporate strategy.625 In FIRREA's regulatory model, man-
agers as "foremen" would take guidance from the regulatory
apparatus, which prohibits all but the most traditional aspects of
thrift and banking business based upon the strictures of public policy
rather than shareholder wealth maximization.626
However, given the enormous potential liability of FIRREA's
fiduciary provision, Congress' belief that the resurrection of the say-
622. See Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After
Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985), for the effects of Trans Union on corporate managerial
liability.
623. Id. See supra part II.C.
624. For a discussion of the skills needed by thrift management under FIRREA, see David
de Wilde, Fitting Talent to Thrift Industry Needs, AM. BANKER, Nov. 2, 1989, at 1.
625. Corporate "foremen" is an allusion to, and perhaps a realization of Berle and Means'
"neutral technocratic" management, allocating decisions based on the dictates of community
through public policy. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17. See supra part III.C.
626. See infra part VI.E.
1288
FIRREA
ings and loans can be accomplished through cautious, non-risktaking
management is questionable. After all, what right-minded, cautious,
non-risktaking person would seek a management position with an
insured depository institution facing the potentially enormous per-
sonal liability of FIRREA? Whatever effect FIRREA has on the sav-
ings and loan industry, the federal fiduciary regime for financial
institution directors and officers has become entirely distinct from the
fiduciary regime of general corporate law.
Whether FIRREA relives on corporate governance in the 1990s
the same debate and liability crises Trans Union did in the 1980s
remains to be seen. The President and Congress, under enormous
political pressure from the mounting savings and loan crisis, seem to
have ignored the evolution of the state statutory corporate governance
regime.627 FIRREA, in its attempt to resurrect the devastated thrift
industry, has enacted a liability regime with provisions similar to
those in the Trans Union decision that shook the corporate world.
The effect of Trans Union on corporations was clear. Many of the
most qualified individuals refused to serve on the boards of corpora-
tions for fear of potentially great liability. Ironically, FIRREA's pur-
pose is to promote "a safe and stable system of affordable housing
finance."62 Yet, FIRREA, by subjecting directors and officers to
greater liability standards, implicitly suggests that qualified directors
and officers do not play any significant role in achieving the stated
purpose of FIRREA.
By effectively removing directors and officers from the creation
and administration of a viable thrift industry, Congress assumes that
the regulatory framework alone will establish a successful depository
institution industry. But, as the history of federal thrift regulation
suggests, legislation and agency regulation have been inadequate to
establish a stable savings and loan industry.62 9 Knee-jerk regulating
has been ineffective in responding to dynamic market forces. With
the ever-changing market, the savings and loans industry needs effec-
tive autonomous managers to navigate back to health. A sluggish reg-
ulatory framework cannot properly monitor an industry thus exposed
to the vagaries of market forces, as demonstrated by the ill-timed reg-
ulatory, deregulatory, re-regulatory see-saw between 1978 and 1989.
But did not the regulatory agencies also bear the responsibility of
627. But see the rather incongruous Senate debate, supra note 535.
628. FIRREA, § 101(1), 103 Stat. at 187 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 note (West Supp.
1992)).
629. For an overview of the ineffective regulatory history of the thrift industry, see supra
part VI.A.
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the thrift industry collapse? By deregulating the industry, President
Reagan and Congress made the same high-risk investment decision
for which FIRREA now seeks to impose liability upon directors and
officers. Economic forces, the unwieldy balance between deposit
insurance and the unification of banking and commerce, regulatory
forbearance, and boardroom decisions systematically caused the col-
lapse of the savings and loan industry. As directors and officers bear
the brunt of litigation and liability, the political consequences suffered
by politicians and regulators seem mild in comparison. After all, the
majority of officers and directors acted in good faith and in compli-
ance with Congressional and regulatory provisions. The result: insti-
tutional failure. The causes of the thrift fiasco go far deeper than the
boardroom and the offices of management. While some high-profile
industry magnates committed serious breaches, under FIRREA, Con-
gress and President Bush designated the managers of failed thrifts as
the major cause of the savings and loan collapse. Succumbing to
political pressures, FIRREA's drafters naively sought to recoup
bailout costs from the pocketbooks of deposed management, despite
the obvious adverse effects of expanded liability.
As a fiduciary measure, FIRREA is an effort by the federal gov-
ernment to resolve the corporate governance conflict in insured
depository institutions. In its efforts, however, Congress has sup-
planted director and officer management with a regulatory "foreman"
management. Yet, by effectively placing much managerial responsi-
bility within regulatory agencies, Congress has not resolved the poten-
tially conflicting interests between absentee owners and management.
Now, absentee shareholder-owners face a management regime even
less responsive and accommodating than that of traditional directors
and officers. Under FIRREA, regulatory management's primary
goals are to preserve the sanctity of the deposit insurance fund, while
shareholders' primary aim still is the maximization of their ownership
wealth regardless of the risk to insurance reserves.63 ° Shareholder-
owners, with goals of maximizing wealth, do not share the same
exclusive regulatory goal of maintaining a safe system of affordable
housing finance. 63 1 With shareholder-owners and regulatory manage-
ment "separated" to an even greater extent than the separation of
ownership and control in general corporate law, the future of savings
and loans and banks as viable corporate financial forms is dim.
630. See supra part VI.D, for a discussion of conflicting shareholder and creditor goals.
631. FIRREA, § 101(1), 103 Stat. at 187 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 note (West Supp.
1992)).
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D. Fiduciary Rights of Creditors and Shareholders
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of FIRREA's corporate
governance regime is its implicit recognition of a fiduciary relation-
ship between corporate management and the Federal Government as
insurer along with other potential creditors.632 Both the gross negli-
gence standard and the civil enforcement provisions of FIRREA per-
mit second-guessing of corporate management business decisions. In
effect, officers and directors of financial institutions are now con-
strained by the retrospective "unsafe and unsound" business practice
standard. This standard reinforces director and officer adversity to
strategic corporate risktaking, which, although generally protecting
shareholders from the diminution of their equity investment, primar-
ily affects the fiduciary preservation of creditor claims on corporate
assets as financial institutions approach insolvency. 33
The business judgment rule as applied to financial institution
officers and directors prior to the enactment of FIRREA served the
goals of both management and ownership.634 It protected directors
and officers because courts would not find them liable even for bad
business decisions, despite application of a 20-20 hindsight standard.
Shareholders, with goals of wealth-maximization, are served by a
management willing to lead the corporation into an innovative, albeit
sometimes risky direction. While there is always risk to the corporate
enterprise, shareholders may protect themselves against risky ven-
tures by choosing to invest in a certain type of corporation, conserva-
632. Twenty-eight states do however codify "other constituency" statutes which permit but
do not require corporate management to consider non-shareholder constituencies in corporate
decision making. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 33-313(e) (1991); FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5)
(1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 30-1702 (Supp. 1991);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (1989); IND. CODE §§ 23-1-35-1(d), (f) and (g) (Supp.
1990); IOWA CODE § 491.101B (1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (Baldwin
1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G)(2) (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-
A, § 716 (West Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 156B, § 65 (Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.251(5) (1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (Supp. 1900); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 351.347.1(4) (Supp. 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035(1)(c) (Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14A:6-1(2), 14A:6-14(4) (West Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Supp. 1991);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1701.13(F)(7), 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (1989); 15
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 and 1716 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (Supp. 1990); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988); WIS. STAT.
§ 180.0827 (1989-90); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-16-830, 17-18-201 to 17-18-203 (enacted 1989). For
a comprehensive review of these statutes, see Symposium: Corporate Malaise-Stakeholder
Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. No. 1 (1991); see also infra part VII.
633. See Coffee, supra note 190 for a discussion of risktaking by financial institutions
approaching insolvency.
634. See supra part III.B.
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tive or risktaking, most suitable for their potential expected return.
Without the business judgment rule, the threat of retrospective criti-
cism by courts would constrain management's decisionmaking and
preclude any non-conservative strategy, to the detriment of share-
holder investors seeking greater returns on their investment. In fact,
the distinction between shareholder and creditor, both as investors in
the corporation, becomes blurred in a risk-prohibitive corporate man-
agement environment. In FIRREA's risk-prohibitive environment,
the investment return ratio of the shareholder is to a large extent sub-
sumed to the investment/return ratio of the corporate creditor. Man-
agement, constrained in decisionmaking, limits the shareholders'
return on their equity investment to nearly a fixed rate, similar to the
expected return of creditors.
The "unsafe and unsound business practice" standard may, how-
ever, benefit some shareholders of financial institutions. Given the
rampant failure in the industry due in large part to permissive regula-
tions, a risk-prohibitive regulatory environment may prevent failure,
at least in the short term, thereby preserving shareholder wealth. Yet,
with financial institutions floundering, the "unsafe and unsound"
standard primarily benefits financial institution creditors.
As corporate institutions approach insolvency, they are more
likely to take investment risks.635 Creditors at this time are more
likely to suffer the loss of their originally conservative, fixed-rate
investment because risky investments diminish corporate assets. At
the same time, shareholders have the most to gain from a last ditch
effort to utilize the remaining assets to bail out the institution prior to
insolvency and takeover. The "unsafe and unsound" standard pre-
serves the assets of institutions approaching insolvency-a period dur-
ing which risktaking would favor stockholders. As a result, the
"unsafe and unsound" standard primarily favors creditors.636 There-
fore, FIRREA's fiduciary regime implicitly recognizes a duty owed by
officers and directors to corporate creditors, to conduct business in a
"safe and sound" business manner to preserve institution assets.637
As a potential creditor, the deposit insurance reserve benefits
from the preservation of assets under the "unsafe and unsound" stan-
dard. The ongoing efforts to replenish the progressively depleted
deposit insurance fund is well served by a fiduciary regime that pre-
serves the assets of failing institutions. These assets, when liquidated,
635. See Halpert, supra note 185, at 512-13.
636. In the unlikely event that corporate assets remain after distribution to creditors,
shareholders may recoup some of their losses.
637. For further discussion of the fiduciary rights of creditors, see infra part VII.
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may keep the federal deposit insurance fund afloat. Any measure that
preserves corporate assets prior to failure serves the interests of gov-
ernment and general creditors alike. However, these same measures,
designed to preserve institutional assets, may also contribute to insti-
tutional failures,63 with the contradictory result of taxing the insur-
ance reserves.
The issue that remains to be settled is the price Congress and the
regulators are to willing to pay in their misguided efforts to replenish
the insurance fund. By prohibiting risktaking by institutions
approaching insolvency, Congress effectively sounded a death-knell
for many institutions. The result is that institutions nearing insol-
vency are not likely to recover. Healthy institutions must compete in
a regulatory environment that encourages creditor claims, yet dis-
courages shareholder equity investment. Therefore, the prospects for
a rejuvenated savings and loan industry are grim, especially in light of
the competition of other financial institutions that offer higher rates of
investment return without the history of failure.
E. FIRREA and the Corporate Governance Scholarship
FIRREA takes a revisionist approach to the corporate govern-
ance scholarship, drawing upon principles from the traditional "coer-
cionist" model, the modern "contractarian" model and the
"corporate social responsibility" model.639 FIRREA creates a federal
minimum fiduciary duty standard, mirroring the coercionists'
mandatory corporate law approach. However, FIRREA's implicit
acknowledgement of management's fiduciary duty to creditors sug-
gests a "nexus of contracts" approach to financial institutions, an
approach associated with the contractarian school. Most remarkably,
however, FIRREA recognizes a corporate governance regime that is
responsive to community goals based on public policy. FIRREA's
oscillation between the competing views of corporate governance the-
ory is testimony to congressional uncertainty as to the application of
corporate governance principles in an industry rife with failure. The
difficulty of pursuing the disparate goals of attracting qualified leaders
to the boards of financial institutions and of ensuring a healthy, profit-
able savings and loan industry resulted in a federal enactment that
succumbs to the temptation of compromise without appreciating the
effects on financial institution management.
As demonstrated, the enactment of the fiduciary regime under
638. The result of the creditor fiduciary standard is to declare still solvent institutions
effectively insolvent, preserving creditor claims.
639. See supra part II.A.
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FIRREA creates a federal uniform fiduciary standard for financial
institutions. Congress and President Bush sought, and were success-
ful in achieving, the policy goal of conformity amongst the states.
The fiduciary regime under FIRREA is also a minimum fiduciary
obligation that permits states to independently enact stiffer fiduciary
regulations. FIRREA is a mandatory corporate law that protects
shareholders from abuse by officers and directors. It holds directors
and officers liable where many state laws prior to the enactment of
FIRREA would have permitted them to escape liability. As such,
FIRREA is the perfect realization of "coercionist" philosophy:
mandatory federal standards driven by the traditional notions of man-
agement separated from ownership. Other aspects of FIRREA, how-
ever, do not fit as neatly into the coercionist model. In fact, FIRREA
assumes a corporate structure far removed from that of the Berle and
Means thesis.
FIRREA departs from the coercionist model by recognizing the
fiduciary rights of creditors.' In so doing, FIRREA presumes the
existence of other corporate actors contractually related to the firm
with ownership rights similar to those traditionally held only by
shareholders. FIRREA thus adopts the "nexus of contract"
approach associated with the contractarian model of corporate gov-
ernance. Contractarians, however, advocate enabling laws that per-
mit corporate actors to negotiate their own corporate relationships.
Although FIRREA establishes a duty owed to creditors and assumes
a corporate structure not limited to traditional shareholders and man-
agement, it does not enact a federal enabling regime. Instead, FIR-
REA implements a mandatory federal minimum fiduciary regime.
FIRREA mixes and matches corporate governance theories to
combat the savings and loan crisis. By acknowledging the ownership
rights of corporate actors other than traditional shareholder owners,
Congress and the President implicitly recognized the complexity of
the relationships in the corporate financial form. In economic terms,
depositor creditors often have as much of an investment in the firm as
shareholders. 641 Furthermore, because of the liquidity of depositors'
"investment" and the sanctity of a deposit account, deposit creditors
interact in a unique relationship with financial institutions. Because
of the abuse of that relationship during the early days of the thrift
crisis, Congress and President Bush enacted mandatory corporate
fiduciary provisions protecting deposit creditors and serving the com-
munity goals of maintaining a viable thrift industry.
640. See supra part VI.D.
641. See supra part II.B.
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FIRREA's mandatory application is easily rationalized by the
inability of market forces to dictate optimal contractual obligations
that would have provided greater protection to thrift investors. But,
with the dramatic fallout caused by the savings and loan crisis, Con-
gress replaced the market regulation of corporate actors in financial
institutions with an inflexible and strict mandatory fiduciary regime.
Yet, the FIRREA fiduciary regime implements an inefficient and
unworkable corporate risktaking prohibition that questions the com-
petitive role of the thrift industry in modem financial markets.
Regardless of the ultimate workability of the fiduciary regime
established by FIRREA, Congress takes a revisionist approach to cor-
porate governance theory by adopting the contractual model of cor-
porations while implementing coercionist standards. Although
FIRREA dramatically restructured the savings and loan regulatory
environment, it is also notable for its social responsiveness. By bailing
out the savings and loan industry, Congress demonstrated its social
commitment to traditional conservative savings depositors and home
lenders. FIRREA's recognition of the rights of the government as
insurer, of depositors, and of other creditors, is responsive to public
policy goals serving a community of actors rather than solely serving
shareholder profit goals."' Although a strong savings and loan
industry benefits multiple actors in the financial institution, Congress
designed the new-regulated thrift industry as a primary safeguard of
depositor and homeowner stakes. Government-sponsored depository
insurance protects depositors, promoting confidence in institution
safety. Homeowners also benefit from the preservation of savings and
642. One former Federal Home Loan Bank Board chairman claims the new savings and
loan (and bank) industry will be guided by strong community goals. M. Danny Wall describes
the motivations behind the "classification of most of the nation's banks and thrifts as
community institutions." M. Danny Wall, The Future of the Thrift Industry, 2 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 25, 134 (1990).
First, the populist nature of Congress is sensitive to consumers' increasing affinity
for supporting institutions that regard consumer service as a primary business,
rather than as a sideline. Community development, affordable housing, and
services for the elderly predominate congressional debate over the regulation of
financial services. An amalgam of appropriately labeled community-oriented
institutions can have an intangible, yet invaluable, effect of creating an
atmosphere in which these consumer services thrive, set distinctly apart from
money center institutions.
Second, such an alignment may lessen the possibility of an increase in the
taxpayers' share of the net cost of the thrift industry rescue, estimated at $166
billion .....
Third, there is a perception in the banking industry, particularly among
smaller national banks, that consumer and community-oriented institutions
should be regulated differently than multinational or industrial lenders.
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loan institutions as the traditional source of low-interest home mort-
gage loans. Taxpayers are additional indirect beneficiaries of the reg-
ulatory regime. By preserving the assets of failing institutions, deposit
insurance reserves run less of a risk of depletion, saving taxpayers
from bearing further bailout expenses. Combined, the motivations
behind FIRREA constitute a recognition of community goals based
on public policy.
FIRREA's motivations are not necessarily extraordinary for
community responsiveness, because many business regulation statutes
provide for socially conscious business. 3 However, FIRREA is the
first federal corporate governance scheme to pursue corporate social
responsiveness. 6 " FIRREA is novel in its recognition of the multi-
plicity of corporate actors and its focus on the government as insurer,
and on depositors, homeowners, and taxpayers. No longer is the goal
of shareholder profit maximization the sole aim of corporate manage-
ment. Now, corporate managers, in their new role as foremen,
respond to individual claims on the financial institution based on pub-
lic policy. The "neutral technocracy" in corporate management-
predicted by Berle and Means-may finally become reality in the con-
text of insured depository institutions. 64-
In its effort to cure the ills of the savings and loan industry, Con-
gress discarded the basic concept of corporate structure that had
evolved since the Berle and Means thesis. 616  Instead, Congress
attempted to realize communitarian goals as envisioned in Berle and
Means' ideal of community obligation. But while other corporate
643. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), Title VIII of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-128 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2901-2909)
(1991) directly contemplates a financial institution regulatory framework sensitive to
community goals. The CRA regulated the financial institution licensing process to serve the
"convenience and needs of the community." Id. Under the CRA, federal regulatory agencies
monitor institutional records of meeting the credit needs of the communities the institutions
serve. The agencies' evaluation of an institutions' effectiveness in this area may be persuasive
in a regulatory "licensing" decision, such as decisions on charter, branch, relocation and
merger. Id. For an overview of the CRA, see Warren L. Dennis, The Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977: Defining 'Convenience and Needs of the Community,' 95 BANKING
L.J. 693 (1978); Peter F. Healey, A Banker's Guide to the Community Reinvestment Act, 96
BANKING L.J. 705 (1979).
644. The distinction here is between individual and institutional social responsiveness.
Business regulation statutes like the CRA attempt to enforce a corporation's responsiveness to
community. No statute prior to FIRREA has mandated individual managerial contemplation
of community, enforced with a threat of civil liability. FIRREA is therefore the first statute
that expects and requires corporate management to depart from their traditional goal of
shareholder wealth maximization to serve community goals in their individual managerial
capacities.
645. See supra part II.A.
646. See supra part II.A.
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institutions are unconstrained in their pursuit of traditional share-
holder profit maximization goals, FIRREA constrains savings and
loan institutions by requiring directors and officers to balance share-
holder profit maximization goals with community obligation in a
strict regulatory environment threatening enormous personal liabil-
ity." 7 The neutral technocracy furthering community obligation is a
last-ditch effort to resurrect the failed savings and loan industry with
a visionary approach to corporate structure. Nevertheless, the com-
petitiveness of insured depository institutions is in question, because
other financial institution management is not obligated to consider the
community in their single-minded pursuit of shareholder profit max-
imization goals. 648
VII. CONCLUSION
The sweeping reform of the thrift industry implemented under
FIRREA indicts financial institution management for their role in
causing the thrift crisis. In their zeal, however, the drafters of FIR-
REA's fiduciary regime overlooked the corporate liability crisis of the
early and mid-1980s and its effect on corporate governance. Perhaps
the drafters perceived the liability crisis as overblown. If so, the statu-
tory enactments after Trans Union are nothing but a "race to the bot-
tom," an end run of corporate plunder at the hands of liability-proof
officers and directors. Assuredly, the thrift crisis brought back a vivid
memory of the Great Depression, when bank failures pushed the
United States into the greatest economic disaster in history.
Whatever the psychological motivation, the magnitude of the savings
and loan crisis prompted Congress to reconceptualize the corporate
structure of financial institutions with a focus on community rather
than shareholder profit maximization.
In defense of FIRREA's drafters, reconciling the goals of
attracting qualified persons to the boardrooms of financial institutions
while holding previous and existing boardmembers liable as scape-
goats of the thrift crisis is a difficult if not impossible task. Still, the
enactment of FIRREA is a knee-jerk reaction in the hot political cli-
mate of the thrift crisis, a reaction that fails to consider the long-term
viability of corporate governance in a savings and loan industry on an
arduous road to recovery. The question thus becomes whether there
is a solution that would respond to the realities of both national poli-
tics and corporate governance. Any theory denying the liability of
corporate leadership assumes that the cause, or at least a contributing
647. But see infra discussion part VII.
648. See infra discussion part VII.
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cause, of the thrift crisis runs much deeper than the boardroom, and
ultimately leads to the steps of the Capitol and the White House.
Unless blame is deflected from the boardroom, no alternatives to the
fiduciary regime of FIRREA will ever be successful.
Several possible amendments to FIRREA could make insured
depository institutions more attractive to talented corporate leaders.
First, the codification of the business judgment rule would ensure that
the "unsafe and unsound" business practice standard would not allow
judicial second-guessing of good faith business decisions. The present
liability standards under FIRREA essentially preclude all risktaking.
Congress may desire to return the savings and loan industry to the
conservative industry it once was, but it is unrealistic to assume that
thrifts will survive in modern competitive markets without some
risktaking ability. Although the potential would still exist for board-
room liability, a business judgment amendment to FIRREA would
attract qualified leaders to the boardroom, leaders who would not be
constrained by fear of tremendous personal liability. The expertise of
these leaders would possibly guide savings and loans to success in the
comprehensive regulatory environment of FIRREA.
Second, FIRREA could distinguish between inside and outside
directors and officers." 9 Inside directors, who are personally involved
in the everyday business of the institution, could be held to a higher
standard of liability.65° Outside directors, who monitor the corporate
business, could be held to a lower standard, encouraging greater par-
ticipation of these directors in financial institution corporate govern-
ance. FIRREA could further distinguish fiduciary standards based
on service on various committees, such that directors and officers
would owe a higher degree of care for claims arising out of informa-
tion presented to their committee. 65' However, varying standards of
liability may seem unwieldy and may dissuade managerial involve-
ment in the corporation, much to the detriment of their monitoring
role. If applied retroactively, this model could hold many of the "vil-
lains" of the savings and loan crisis liable while exonerating the many
innocent directors whose action or inaction could not have forestalled
the failure of their institutions. 652
649. For an overview of the role of inside/outside directors, see supra part III.A.
650. Inside directors rewarded by an employment relationship are less likely to be deferred
by liability than outside directors who receive little pecuniary gain in the managerial service.
651. Liability based on particular committee service may have the undesired effect of
discouraging committee service, to the detriment of the corporation.
652. Certainly, in the case of "villains" like Charles Keating, Neil Bush, and David Paul,
their inside status could lead to greater liability. See Lincoln, Silverado, and Centrust
Hearings, supra note 332.
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Third, FIRREA's fiduciary regime could be amended to serve
the goal of limiting director liability and of preserving corporate
assets. Fiduciary standards could vary with the solvency of the insti-
tution: graduated standards of liability would permit corporate
risktaking during periods of institutional strength and prohibit
risktaking by institutions approaching insolvency.65 3 Such standards,
depending on a thrift's balance sheet, would promote the vitality of
institutions, while institutions approaching failure would be con-
strained from risking corporate assets eventually destined to reim-
burse the deposit insurance fund. One difficulty with this approach is
that it could have the effect of declaring nearly insolvent institutions
legally insolvent.65 4 Furthermore, the weakened condition of the
thrift industry might make the graduated standard impractical.
However, a graduated standard might be viable after codification
of the business judgment rule and after an opportunity for thrift
recovery in the new regulatory environment. The graduated fiduciary
method may serve the goals of both attracting personnel to the boar-
droom and of preserving the assets of failing institutions. Further-
more, an insider/outsider distinction could be appended to this
regime to ensure the liability of those high-profile fiduciaries who con-
tributed to the downfall of their institutions. One effect of this entire
regime would be the uncertainty of a changing fiduciary standard and
the persistent uncertainty and fear of personal liability. A workable
graduated standard regime, however, may reduce the conflict between
shareholder and creditor by designating optimal duties owed to each.
As both the FIRREA fiduciary regime and the alternate fiduci-
ary principles articulated above indicate, a corporate governance
model that completely redresses the ills of the thrift crisis is a virtually
unattainable goal. Unfortunately, Congress has focused on punishing
thrift management rather than creating a fiduciary regime that revi-
talizes a failing industry. By cutting the governing head off the sav-
ings and loan hydra, FIRREA potentially worsens the prospects of an
industry revival.
Perhaps the foregoing analysis falls victim to the same misread-
ing of the Berle and Means thesis given by corporate fiduciary law.655
653. A graduated standard of liability is similar to the "springing" fiduciary standard in the
Credit Lyonnais decision, discussed infra this part. See also Coffee, supra note 190.
654. See supra part VI.B.
655. Corporate fiduciary law misreads the Berle and Means thesis by assuming that
shareholders should be subject to protection from potentially self-interested management in
control of shareholder wealth. The Berle and Means thesis, however, is not sympathetic to
slothful shareholders, but instead envisions an advanced corporate economy driven by
community goals. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 312. See supra part II.A.
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While corporate law gives much weight to Berle and Means' "separa-
tion of ownership from control, ' 656 their "convincing system of com-
munity obligation" has only recently received the attention of the
corporate social responsibility theorists and, historically, has received
no recognition in corporate fiduciary statutory or common law. FIR-
REA's incorporation of community into the corporate governance
equation suggests, at least as far as financial institutions are con-
cerned, the realization of Berle and Means' prophecy.
In fact, FIRREA may be at the forefront of a dramatic revolu-
tion in corporate law, a break with the single-minded capitalist sanc-
tity of ownership wealth maximization. The growth of "other
constituency" statutes in more than half the states of the union, 657 and
Delaware's recent court decisions in Paramount Communications v.
Time, Inc. 658 and Credit Lyonnais Bank N. V v. Pathe Communica-
tions659 mark a trend in corporate governance law considering com-
munities of interest removed from shareholder owners. The "other
constituency" statutes, Time Inc., and Credit Lyonnais all demand a
corporate system of community obligation and all question the tradi-
tional corporate "capitalist" economy, valuing shareholder wealth
above all other interests.
Twenty-eight states have enacted "other constituency" stat-
utes.660 These statutes permit managers to consider a wide variety of
interests including those of employees, customers, creditors and
others in arriving at business decisions affecting the entire corporate
enterprise. While each of these statutes merely permits management
to consider non-shareholder constituencies, their evolution indicates a
growing sensitivity to the variety of actors in the corporate commu-
nity and in society at large. The language of each statute is similar in
its contemplation of community goals and instructive of the evolution
of a corporate governance scheme driven by public policy:
a director may consider such factors as the director deems rele-
vant, including the long-term prospects and interests of the corpo-
ration and its shareholders, and the social, economic, legal, or
other effects of any action on the employees, suppliers, customers
of the corporation or its subsidiaries, the communities and society
in which the corporation or its subsidiaries operate, and the econ-
656. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 300-01. See supra part II.A.
657. See supra note 632, for a list of the other constituency statutes.
658. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
659. Civ. 12150, 1990 Del. Ch. Lexis 215 (Dec. 30, 1991).
660. See supra note 632. For an excellent overview of these statutes, see Symposium:
Corporate Malaise-Stakeholder statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 3 n. 1 (1991).
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omy of the states and the nation.661
While no judicial interpretation of these statutes has yet read a fiduci-
ary right of other constituencies, the state statutory recognition of
"other constituencies" lends support to the evolution of "a convincing
system of community obligation. 662
In Time Inc. ,663 Justice Horsey of the Delaware Supreme Court
broadened corporate fiduciary law, at least in the takeover context, to
include constituencies other than traditional shareholder ownership.
In discussing the long-term corporate versus short term shareholder
profit maximization interests, Justice Horsey deviated from the tradi-
tional shareholder profitmaking maxim, and instead stated that man-
agement is obliged to operate in the corporation's best interests.6 6
Furthermore, Justice Horsey claimed that fiduciary rights do not
exclusively accrue to shareholders but rather to the corporation.665
"The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the
selection of a time frame for the achievement of corporate goals. That
duty may not be delegated to the stockholders. ' 666 Justice Horsey
describes corporate goals by quoting from Justice Moore's opinion in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum.667 "We have said that directors may
consider, when evaluating the threat posed by a takeover bid, the '...
impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders ... ,668 The lan-
guage of Time Inc. suggests that the corporation and its community
of other constituencies is the primary focus of managerial decision-
making. 669 By demanding managerial commitment to the larger
interests of the corporation itself rather than to shareholders, Time
Inc. is part of an evolving trend towards the Berle and Means system
of community obligation.
While both Time Inc. and the development of "other constitu-
ency" statutes form a trend toward community obligation, the most
remarkable testimony to the Berle and Means prophecy is the recent
Delaware Court of Chancery decision in Credit Lyonnais.670 In
661. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West Supp. 1992).
662. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 312.
663. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). For an excellent discussion of Time's recognition of
corporate community interests, see Norwitz, supra note 190.
664. Justice Horsey stated: "The question of long-term versus short-term values is largely
irrelevant because directors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which
is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment horizon." 571 A.2d at 1150
(emphasis added).
665. Id. at 1154.
666. Id.
667. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
668. 471 A.2d at 1153 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
669. See Norwitz, supra note 190, at 386.
670. Civ. 12150, 1991 Del. ch. Lexis 215 (Dec. 30, 1991).
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Credit Lyonnais, Chancellor Allen shocked corporate law experts by
recognizing managerial fiduciary duties owed to creditors and other
corporate constituencies. 671 While prior case law found fiduciary
rights of creditors after an institution's insolvency,672 Credit Lyonnais
holds that management owes fiduciary duties to creditors prior to
insolvency.67 a
At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of
insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the
residual risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise
... [management] had an obligation to the community of interest
that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an
informed, good faith effort to maximize the corporation's long-
term wealth creating capacity.674
Most importantly, however, the Delaware courts' repeated references
to "the community of interests that the corporation represents ' 675 is
testimony to a new concept of the corporate economy. Now manage-
ment, instead of pursuing single-minded shareholder profit goals, has
a duty to
recognize that in managing the business affairs of a solvent corpo-
ration in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances will arise when
the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the
corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or
the creditors, or the employees, or any single group interested in
the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act.6 76
Chancellor Allen's opinion is immediately significant for its recogni-
tion of pre-insolvency duties to creditors, but the opinion's long-term
effect may contribute to a revamped corporate scheme where manage-
ment operates for a wide range of corporate community interests.
Do "other constituency" statutes, Time Inc., Credit Lyonnais
and FIRREA's fiduciary regime fulfill the sixty-year-old Berle and
Means prophecy? Is corporate law experiencing a revolution leading
to a "convincing system of community obligation ' 677 that inevitably
transcends the boardroom and forces a reevaluation of the corporate
capitalist economy? The development of community obligation may
be an aberrant reactionary trend to the frenzied days of the 1980s.
But in the grander scheme, the fulfillment of the Berle and Means
671. Id. Slip Op. at 83.
672. See cases cited supra note 190.
673. Slip Op. at 83.
674. Id.
675. Id. at 84 n.55.
676. Id.
677. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 312.
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prophecy may be a secure deviation from the psychology of pure cor-
porate shareholder capitalism that has dominated the corporate world
since Adam Smith. And perhaps, given the history of failure in the
savings and loan industry, only the sixty-year-old foresight of a "con-
vincing system of community obligation' 67s may resurrect a dying
form of corporate financial institution. The savings and loan industry
now answers to "the paramount interests of community" as the "pas-
sive [shareholder] property right yields before the largest interests of
society. ' 679 Emerging from the carnage of the thrift industry debacle
is a corporate form of a financial institution that speaks to commu-
nity-oriented capitalism that may force a reevaluation of all core cor-
porate law.
MARK DAVID WALLACE
678. Id.
679. Id.
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